Shifting AI Governance in East Asia: AI Legislative Progress in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan
2025/09/09
Keywords: artificial intelligence, artificial intelligence regulation
I.Introduction
The landscape of AI governance in East Asia is changing, with two new AI laws enacted and one on the way. In South Korea, an act titled “the Basic Act on the Development of Artificial Intelligence and the Establishment of Foundation for Trustworthiness“ (“인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법”, henceforth referred to as “South Korea’s AI Act” or “SKAIA”)[1]was approved on December 26[2], 2024 and promulgated on January 21, 2025. The AI Basic Act is designed to establish a national AI governance framework and systematically foster the AI industry while preventing potential AI risks.[3] A few months later, Japan’s first law regulating AI was passed by the National Diet on May 28, 2025. The new law is titled "the Act on Promotion of Research and Development, and Utilization of AI-related Technology" (“人工知能関連技術の研究開発及び活用の推進に関する法律”, henceforth referred to as "Japan's AI Act" or "JAIA")[4], which reflects the strong will of the government to catch up in the global AI race.[5] Elsewhere in the region, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan finally passed its draft AI Basic Act (“人工智慧基本法草案”) on August 28[6] [7], which must now be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation. The government hopes the new law will lay the foundation for establishing Taiwan as an AI island and a key driving force in global AI development.[8] This article will give a quick overview of the key features of the three new AI regulations to illustrate the new landscape these countries are shaping in AI governance.
II.Key features of Japan’s AI Act (JAIA)
1.Purpose and principles of JAIA
Given Japan's lagging AI development and rising public concerns, JAIA reflects the government's worry about falling behind global peers in AI investment and adoption.[9] It is believed that new laws are needed in addition to existing laws and regulations to promote innovation and address risks.[10] Hence JAIA aims to advance the R&D and application of AI through the formulation of basic principles and plans, and the establishment of an "AI Strategic Headquarters".[11]
JAIA establishes basic principles for the promotion of the R&D and application of AI-related technologies[12], including enhancing industry R&D capabilities and competitiveness, systematically promoting AI collaboration from research to application with transparency, and enabling Japan to shape global norms through international cooperation.[13]
2.Industry Development and Promotion
JAIA requires the government to develop a National AI Basic Plan, in accordance with the basic principles, to promote the R&D and application of AI. The AI Basic Plan should set out fundamental policy guidelines and measures to comprehensively and systemically advance the R&D and application of AI-related technologies, along with other necessary provisions.[14]
JAIA also specifies basic measures to be included in the plan, which cover issues of promotion of R&D, expansion and sharing of facilities and data, human resources and education, international engagement in AI norm setting, and domestic guidelines making. In addition, the government should monitor AI technology trends and analyze cases of rights violations from improper AI use to develop countermeasures and provide guidance accordingly.[15]
3.Governance
JAIA stipulates that an AI Strategy Headquarters should be established under the Cabinet, composed of all cabinet members and headed by the Prime Minister.[16] The AI Strategic Headquarters is tasked with comprehensively and systematically advancing AI-related technology R&D and application policies, including the formulation, promotion, and implementation of AI Basic Plans and other related initiatives.[17] The Act also empowers the AI Strategy Headquarters to invite stakeholders to provide information, opinions or explanations, and other necessary assistance.[18]
4.Risk managements and rights protection
JAIA does not impose direct compliance obligations, but AI companies and research institutions are required to cooperate with government investigations and follow government guidance in cases involving violations of human rights and interests.[19]
5.Implementation of JAIA and Follow-up Work
JAIA came into force in May 2025. The Japanese government is required to develop guidelines that align with international standards and launch the Strategic Headquarters for the preparation and implementation of the National AI Basic Plan.
III.Key features of the South Korea’s AI Act (SKAIA)
1.Purpose and principles of SKAIA
SKAIA is designed to establish a foundation for AI development and trustworthiness, increasing citizens’ rights and interests protection, quality of life, and the country’s competitiveness.[20] It focuses on advancing national AI collaboration to foster a flourishing AI sector and developing legal frameworks to mitigate risks.[21]
Accordingly, the Act establishes basic AI development principles: prioritizing safety and reliability to improve quality of life, and ensuring those affected by AI output receive clear, meaningful explanations within reasonable parameters.[22]
2.Industry development and promotion
Supporting AI technology and industry development is a key feature of SKAIA. It establishes comprehensive measures covering technology development, industry revitalization, SME support, industrial foundations, talent cultivation, regulatory adaptation, and international cooperation.[23]
3.Governance
SKAIA also strengthens the institutional framework for AI governance. The Ministry of Science and ICT (henceforth referred to as “MSIT”) is mandated to execute an AI Master Plan every three years and empowered to investigate violations, require corrective action, and impose fines on non-compliant entities.[24]
The National AI Committee is authorized to review and decide on the AI Master Plan and AI-related matters, making it the highest decision-making body for South Korea's AI policies. It is composed of the heads of central administrative agencies and civilian AI experts appointed by the president.[25]
SKAIA also establishes the AI Policy Center to support MSIT on AI policy formulation, and the AI Safety Institute for AI safety matters.[26]
4.Risk management and rights protection
SKAIA imposes specific obligations on operators of high-impact AI and generative AI systems. All operators must ensure system transparency and safety, while high-impact AI operators face additional responsibilities including conducting fundamental rights impact assessments.[27]
High-impact AI systems are defined as AI systems that have a significant impact on or may pose a risk to human life, safety, and fundamental rights and are mainly utilized in critical infrastructure sectors and human rights-sensitive areas, or other areas specified by presidential decree.[28] The procedure for determining whether an AI system qualifies as high-impact AI will be established through subordinate legislation.[29]
5.Implementation of SKAIA and Follow-up Work
SKAIA will come into effect on January 1, 2026 and the formulation of subordinate statutes that detail enforcement mechanisms and guidelines should be expedited. However, domestic critics argue that corporate obligation provisions may hinder AI development and advocate for postponing their implementation.[30] Actually, an amendment to the Act was proposed in April 2025, seeking such a postponement along with a three-year grace period.[31]
IV. Key features of Taiwan’s draft AI Basic Act
1.Purpose and Principles of the draft AI Basic Act[32]
Taiwan adopts a relatively conservative approach to AI policy and measures to boost industrial development have long occupied the agenda of AI governance. Given that AI is a crucial technology for national development, the draft AI Basic Act (henceforth referred to as "the draft Act") seeks to ensure that AI technology develops vigorously in a human-centered approach, encourage innovation while considering human rights, and safeguard Taiwan’s national sovereignty and cultural values.[33]
Hence, the draft Act establishes seven guiding principles in line with international norms, which are sustainability, human autonomy, privacy protection and data governance, security, transparency and explainability, fairness and accountability.[34]
2.Industry Development and Promotion
It is the government’s responsibility to promote the R&D and application of AI and construct the infrastructure needed.[35] In order to facilitate AI innovations, competent authorities may provide a controlled environment for testing and validating AI innovation products and services before they are released to the market or put into use.[36] Considering the wide scope of AI application and development, the government is encouraged to collaborate with the private sector, including through public-private partnerships, and should promote international cooperation on AI matters.[37] The government should also continue to comprehensively promote AI education at all levels to enhance the public's AI literacy.[38]
Data is crucial for AI development, so the draft Act mandates the government to establish mechanisms to enhance data availability, and measures to facilitate AI outputs that maintain the country's multicultural values, and protect intellectual property rights.[39]
3.Risk Management and Rights Protection
(1) Risk Management
The draft Act includes several provisions addressing AI risks. The government should take steps to prevent AI from being used for illegal purposes. For example, Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) and other relevant agencies may provide or recommend tools or methods for AI evaluation and verification to avoid misuse of AI.[40] Secondly, MODA is mandated to foster an AI risk classification framework, based on which sectoral competent authorities should establish risk-based tiered management standards.[41] Thirdly, the government may, through binding regulations or non-binding administrative guidance, promote safety standards, verification, transparent and explainable traceability, or accountability mechanisms to enhance the trustworthiness of AI development and application.[42] Lastly, the government should clarify the ownership and conditions of liability for high-risk AI applications and establish relevant mechanisms for relief, compensation or insurance to protect affected parties.[43] However, AI application responsibility norms would not apply to pre-release activities in order to support technological innovation.[44] [45]
(2) Rights Protection
The draft Act concerns not only the privacy rights of individuals but also labor rights. The government should ensure the protection of personal data used throughout the AI lifecycle on the one hand[46] , and also protect workers' rights and provide necessary assistance to help them adapt to technological changes, especially those who have lost their jobs due to AI use.[47]
4.Governance and Implementation
Despite the heated debate regarding the designation of a dedicated AI regulatory authority in the country, the Executive Yuan decided against establishing such an authority, given AI's cross-ministerial nature. Relevant competent authorities will be responsible for formulating implementing regulations and guidelines and the Executive Yuan will continue to guide relevant agencies and departments at all levels through the existing Digital Legal Coordination Meeting to facilitate the development of AI.[48]
V.Analysis and conclusion
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all seek to maintain the countries' momentum in promoting AI development through AI legislation. The three parties all emphasize trustworthy AI, though they actually place greater emphasis on AI development. They share considerable common ground in the policies to foster AI industry development, such as promoting AI R&D and application and supporting infrastructure-building, and diverge in their approaches to addressing potential AI-related risks and governance structure.
Japan adopts a ‘light touch’ regulatory approach to AI regulation, maintaining coherent policy coordination that responds to domestic imperatives and global trends without imposing regulatory burdens on industries.[49] The country favors a soft approach with governmental guidance. In contrast, South Korea incorporates regulatory provisions specifically targeting high-impact AI systems in its AI Basic Act, seeking to balance between enhancing national competitiveness through AI and mitigating potential risks stemming from AI misuse, though this approach actually faces some domestic opposition currently. Taiwan adopts an approach similar to Japan's. The draft AI Basic Act avoids imposing regulatory obligations, and the government will prioritize AI verification and evaluation mechanisms to ensure trustworthy AI development.
Regarding governance approaches, both Japan and South Korea seek to strengthen governmental AI governance functions through legislation, with Japan establishing an AI Strategic Headquarters and South Korea creating an AI Committee, both operating under their respective Cabinets. In contrast, Taiwan's draft AI Basic Act does not address governance structural matters.
Given the profound societal transformations that AI technology may bring, all three East Asian countries recognize the importance of sustained AI advancement while acknowledging the critical need to ensure AI safety and trustworthiness to protect human rights. In an era of intense global AI competition, it seems to be the best policy for governments to carefully design AI policies that strike a balance between fostering innovation and safeguarding human rights. This cautious approach is essential as significant challenges remain and AI risks demand comprehensive solutions.
Reference:
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[5] CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, Outline of the Act on Promotion of Research and Development, and Utilization of AI-related Technology (AI Act), https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ai/ai_hou_gaiyou_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2025).
[6] 〈政院通過「人工智慧基本法」草案 建構AI發展與應用良善環境 打造臺灣成為AI人工智慧島〉,行政院,https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/5d673d1e-f418-47dc-ab35-a06600f77f07(最後瀏覽日:2025/09/09)。
[7] There are other AI bills brought up by legislators in the Legislative Yuan. The purpose of this article is to analyze the AI governance priorities of the governments of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; therefore, other AI bills proposed by legislators are not included in the discussion.
[8] 蘇文彬,〈行政院通過AI基本法草案,將不設立AI專責機關〉,iThome,2025/08/28,https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/170874 (最後瀏覽日:2025/09/09)。
[9] Japan’s AI Bill Advances Toward Enactment, Connect on Tech (May 27, 2025), https://connectontech.bakermckenzie.com/japans-ai-bill-advances-toward-enactment/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2025).
[10] 松尾剛行,〈【2025年施行】AI新法とは?AIの研究開発・利活用を推進する法律を分かりやすく解説!〉,Keiyaku-Watch,https://keiyaku-watch.jp/media/hourei/2025-ai-law/(最後瀏覽日:2025/09/11)。
[11] 人工知能関連技術の研究開発及び活用の推進に関する法律(令和7年法律第53号)第1条。
[12] 人工知能関連技術の研究開発及び活用の推進に関する法律(令和7年法律第53号)第3条。
[13] Japan Enacts AI Promotion Act: Overview and Implications for Businesses, Zelo Law Square (May, 2025), https://zelojapan.com/en/lawsquare/56899 (last visited Sept. 9, 2025).
[14] 人工知能関連技術の研究開発及び活用の推進に関する法律(令和7年法律第53号)第18条。
[15] 人工知能関連技術の研究開発及び活用の推進に関する法律(令和7年法律第53号)第11-17条。
[16] 人工知能関連技術の研究開発及び活用の推進に関する法律(令和7年法律第53号)第19、21-24条。
[17] 人工知能関連技術の研究開発及び活用の推進に関する法律(令和7年法律第53号)第20条。
[18] 人工知能関連技術の研究開発及び活用の推進に関する法律(令和7年法律第53号)第25条。
[19] 人工知能関連技術の研究開発及び活用の推進に関する法律(令和7年法律第53号)第16条。
[20] 인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법,제1조。
[21] The Korean AI Basic Act: Asia’s First Comprehensive Framework on AI, Lexology (Mar. 17, 2025), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f91ff0fb-94ed-4aa9-b667-65d6206a7227 (last visited Sept. 9, 2025).
[22] 인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법,제3조。
[23] 인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법,제13-26조。
[24] 인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법,제40조。
[25] 인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법,제7조。
[26] 인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법,제6-12조。
[27] 인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법,제31-32조。
[28] 인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법,제4조。
[29] 인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법,제33조。
[30] Seungmin (Helen) Lee, South Korea’s Evolving AI Regulations, Stimson (June 12, 2025), https://www.stimson.org/2025/south-koreas-evolving-ai-regulations/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2025).
[31] 〈인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법 일부개정법률안〉,대한민국국회,https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/bi/billDetailPage.do?billId=PRC_N2M5K0S3R2R0Q1O3X5X1W1U1T7P3Q6&currMenuNo=2600044(最後瀏覽日:2025/09/09)。
[32] 〈政院通過「人工智慧基本法」草案 建構AI發展與應用良善環境 打造臺灣成為AI人工智慧島〉,行政院,https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/5d673d1e-f418-47dc-ab35-a06600f77f07(最後瀏覽日:2025/09/09)。
[33] 人工智慧基本法草案第1條。
[34] 人工智慧基本法草案第3條。
[35] 人工智慧基本法草案第4條。
[36] 人工智慧基本法草案第5條。
[37] 人工智慧基本法草案第6條。
[38] 人工智慧基本法草案第7條。
[39] 人工智慧基本法草案第14條。
[40] 人工智慧基本法草案第8條。
[41] 人工智慧基本法草案第9條。
[42] 人工智慧基本法草案第10條。
[43] 人工智慧基本法草案第11條。
[44] 人工智慧基本法草案第11條。
[45] See also: Taiwan Rolls Out Draft Artificial Intelligence Law, OCACNEWS, July 18, 2024, https://ocacnews.net/article/374412 (last visited Sept. 3, 2025).
[46] 人工智慧基本法草案第14條。
[47] 人工智慧基本法草案第12條。
[48] 蘇文彬,〈行政院通過AI基本法草案,將不設立AI專責機關〉,iThome,2025/08/28,https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/170874 (最後瀏覽日:2025/09/09)。
[49] Sun Ryung Park, Less Regulation, More Innovation in Japan’s AI Governance, East Asia Forum (May 21, 2025), https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/05/21/less-regulation-more-innovation-in-japans-ai-governance/ (last visited July 4, 2025).
The use of automated facial recognition technology and supervision mechanism in UK I. Introduction Automatic facial recognition (AFR) technology has developed rapidly in recent years, and it can identify target people in a short time. The UK Home Office announced the "Biometrics Strategy" on June 28, 2018, saying that AFR technology will be introduced in the law enforcement, and the Home Office will also actively cooperate with other agencies to establish a new oversight and advisory board in order to maintain public trust. AFR technology can improve law enforcement work, but its use will increase the risk of intruding into individual liberty and privacy. This article focuses on the application of AFR technology proposed by the UK Home Office. The first part of this article describes the use of AFR technology by the police. The second part focuses on the supervision mechanism proposed by the Home Office in the Biometrics Strategy. However, because the use of AFR technology is still controversial, this article will sort out the key issues of follow-up development through the opinions of the public and private sectors. The overview of the discussion of AFR technology used by police agencies would be helpful for further policy formulation. II. Overview of the strategy of AFR technology used by the UK police According to the Home Office’s Biometrics Strategy, the AFR technology will be used in law enforcement, passports and immigration and national security to protect the public and make these public services more efficient[1]. Since 2017 the UK police have worked with tech companies in testing the AFR technology, at public events like Notting Hill Carnival or big football matches[2]. In practice, AFR technology is deployed with mobile or fixed camera systems. When a face image is captured through the camera, it is passed to the recognition software for identification in real time. Then, the AFR system will process if there is a ‘match’ and the alarm would solicit an operator’s attention to verify the match and execute the appropriate action[3]. For example, South Wales Police have used AFR system to compare images of people in crowds attending events with pre-determined watch lists of suspected mobile phone thieves[4]. In the future, the police may also compare potential suspects against images from closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV) or mobile phone footage for evidential and investigatory purposes[5]. The AFR system may use as tools of crime prevention, more than as a form of crime detection[6]. However, the uses of AFR technology are seen as dangerous and intrusive by the UK public[7]. For one thing, it could cause serious harm to democracy and human rights if the police agency misuses AFR technology. For another, it could have a chilling effect on civil society and people may keep self-censoring lawful behavior under constant surveillance[8]. III. The supervision mechanism of AFR technology To maintaining public trust, there must be a supervision mechanism to oversight the use of AFR technology in law enforcement. The UK Home Office indicates that the use of AFR technology is governed by a number of codes of practice including Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Surveillance Camera Code of Practice and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)’s Code of Practice for surveillance cameras[9]. (I) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 lays down police powers to obtain and use biometric data, such as collecting DNA and fingerprints from people arrested for a recordable offence. The PACE allows law enforcement agencies proceeding identification to find out people related to crime for criminal and national security purposes. Therefore, for the investigation, detection and prevention tasks related to crime and terrorist activities, the police can collect the facial image of the suspect, which can also be interpreted as the scope of authorization of the PACE. (II) Surveillance Camera Code of Practice The use of CCTV in public places has interfered with the rights of the people, so the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires the establishment of an independent Surveillance Camera Commissioner (SCC) for supervision. The Surveillance Camera Code of Practice proposed by the SCC sets out 12 principles for guiding the operation and use of surveillance camera systems. The 12 guiding principles are as follows[10]: A. Use of a surveillance camera system must always be for a specified purpose which is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing need. B. The use of a surveillance camera system must take into account its effect on individuals and their privacy, with regular reviews to ensure its use remains justified. C. There must be as much transparency in the use of a surveillance camera system as possible, including a published contact point for access to information and complaints. D. There must be clear responsibility and accountability for all surveillance camera system activities including images and information collected, held and used. E. Clear rules, policies and procedures must be in place before a surveillance camera system is used, and these must be communicated to all who need to comply with them. F. No more images and information should be stored than that which is strictly required for the stated purpose of a surveillance camera system, and such images and information should be deleted once their purposes have been discharged. G. Access to retained images and information should be restricted and there must be clearly defined rules on who can gain access and for what purpose such access is granted; the disclosure of images and information should only take place when it is necessary for such a purpose or for law enforcement purposes. H. Surveillance camera system operators should consider any approved operational, technical and competency standards relevant to a system and its purpose and work to meet and maintain those standards. I. Surveillance camera system images and information should be subject to appropriate security measures to safeguard against unauthorised access and use. J. There should be effective review and audit mechanisms to ensure legal requirements, policies and standards are complied with in practice, and regular reports should be published. K. When the use of a surveillance camera system is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and there is a pressing need for its use, it should then be used in the most effective way to support public safety and law enforcement with the aim of processing images and information of evidential value. L. Any information used to support a surveillance camera system which compares against a reference database for matching purposes should be accurate and kept up to date. (III) ICO’s Code of Practice for surveillance cameras It must need to pay attention to the personal data and privacy protection during the use of surveillance camera systems and AFR technology. The ICO issued its Code of Practice for surveillance cameras under the Data Protection Act 1998 to explain the legal requirements operators of surveillance cameras. The key points of ICO’s Code of Practice for surveillance cameras are summarized as follows[11]: A. The use time of the surveillance camera systems should be carefully evaluated and adjusted. It is recommended to regularly evaluate whether it is necessary and proportionate to continue using it. B. A police force should ensure an effective administration of surveillance camera systems deciding who has responsibility for the control of personal information, what is to be recorded, how the information should be used and to whom it may be disclosed. C. Recorded material should be stored in a safe way to ensure that personal information can be used effectively for its intended purpose. In addition, the information may be considered to be encrypted if necessary. D. Disclosure of information from surveillance systems must be controlled and consistent with the purposes for which the system was established. E. Individuals whose information is recoded have a right to be provided with that information or view that information. The ICO recommends that information must be provided promptly and within no longer than 40 calendar days of receiving a request. F. The minimum and maximum retention periods of recoded material is not prescribed in the Data Protection Act 1998, but it should not be kept for longer than is necessary and should be the shortest period necessary to serve the purposes for which the system was established. (IV) A new oversight and advisory board In addition to the aforementioned regulations and guidance, the UK Home Office mentioned that it will work closely with related authorities, including ICO, SCC, Biometrics Commissioner (BC), and Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) to establish a new oversight and advisory board to coordinate consideration of law enforcement’s use of facial images and facial recognition systems[12]. To sum up, it is estimated that the use of AFR technology by law enforcement has been abided by existing regulations and guidance. Firstly, surveillance camera systems must be used on the purposes for which the system was established. Secondly, clear responsibility and accountability mechanisms should be ensured. Thirdly, individuals whose information is recoded have the right to request access to relevant information. In the future, the new oversight and advisory board will be asked to consider issues relating to law enforcement’s use of AFR technology with greater transparency. IV. Follow-up key issues for the use of AFR technology Regarding to the UK Home Office’s Biometrics Strategy, members of independent agencies such as ICO, BC, SCC, as well as civil society, believe that there are still many deficiencies, the relevant discussions are summarized as follows: (I) The necessity of using AFR technology Elizabeth Denham, ICO Commissioner, called for looking at the use of AFR technology carefully, because AFR is an intrusive technology and can increase the risk of intruding into our privacy. Therefore, for the use of AFR technology to be legal, the UK police must have clear evidence to demonstrate that the use of AFR technology in public space is effective in resolving the problem that it aims to address[13]. The Home Office has pledged to undertake Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) before introducing AFR technology, including the purpose and legal basis, the framework applies to the organization using the biometrics, the necessity and proportionality and so on. (II)The limitations of using facial image data The UK police can collect, process and use personal data based on the need for crime prevention, investigation and prosecution. In order to secure the use of biometric information, the BC was established under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The mission of the BC is to regulate the use of biometric information, provide protection from disproportionate enforcement action, and limit the application of surveillance and counter-terrorism powers. However, the BC’s powers do not presently extend to other forms of biometric information other than DNA or fingerprints[14]. The BC has expressed concern that while the use of biometric data may well be in the public interest for law enforcement purposes and to support other government functions, the public benefit must be balanced against loss of privacy. Hence, legislation should be carried to decide that crucial question, instead of depending on the BC’s case feedback[15]. Because biometric data is especially sensitive and most intrusive of individual privacy, it seems that a governance framework should be required and will make decisions of the use of facial images by the police. (III) Database management and transparency For the application of AFR technology, the scope of biometric database is a dispute issue in the UK. It is worth mentioning that the British people feel distrust of the criminal database held by the police. When someone is arrested and detained by the police, the police will take photos of the suspect’s face. However, unlike fingerprints and DNA, even if the person is not sued, their facial images are not automatically deleted from the police biometric database[16]. South Wales Police have used AFR technology to compare facial images of people in crowds attending major public events with pre-determined watch lists of suspected mobile phone thieves in the AFR field test. Although the watch lists are created for time-limited and specific purposes, the inclusion of suspects who could possibly be innocent people still causes public panic. Elizabeth Denham warned that there should be a transparency system about retaining facial images of those arrested but not charged for certain offences[17]. Therefore, in the future the UK Home Office may need to establish a transparent system of AFR biometric database and related supervision mechanism. (IV) Accuracy and identification errors In addition to worrying about infringing personal privacy, the low accuracy of AFR technology is another reason many people oppose the use of AFR technology by police agencies. Silkie Carlo, director of Big Brother Watch, said the police must immediately stop using the AFR technology and avoid mistaking thousands of innocent citizens as criminals; Paul Wiles, Biometrics Commissioner, also called for legislation to manage AFR technology because of its accuracy is too low and the use of AFR technology should be tested and passed external peer review[18]. In the Home Office’s Biometric Strategy, the scientific quality standards for AFR technology will be established jointly with the FSR, an independent agency under the Home Office. In other words, the Home Office plans to extend the existing forensics science regime to regulate AFR technology. Therefore, the FSR has worked with the SCC to develop standards relevant to digital forensics. The UK government has not yet seen specific standards for regulating the accuracy of AFR technology at the present stage. V. Conclusion From the discussion of the public and private sectors in the UK, we can summarize some rules for the use of AFR technology. Firstly, before the application of AFR technology, it is necessary to complete the pre-assessment to ensure the benefits to the whole society. Secondly, there is the possibility of identifying errors in AFR technology. Therefore, in order to maintain the confidence and trust of the people, the relevant scientific standards should be set up first to test the system accuracy. Thirdly, the AFR system should be regarded as an assisting tool for police enforcement in the initial stage. In other words, the information analyzed by the AFR system should still be judged by law enforcement officials, and the police officers should take the responsibilities. In order to balance the protection of public interest and basic human rights, the use of biometric data in the AFR technology should be regulated by a special law other than the regulations of surveillance camera and data protection. The scope of the identification database is also a key point, and it may need legislators’ approval to collect and store the facial image data of innocent people. Last but not least, the use of the AFR system should be transparent and the victims of human rights violations can seek appeal. [1] UK Home Office, Biometrics Strategy, Jun. 28, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/home-office-biometrics-strategy (last visited Aug. 09, 2018), at 7. [2] Big Brother Watch, FACE OFF CAMPAIGN: STOP THE MET POLICE USING AUTHORITARIAN FACIAL RECOGNITION CAMERAS, https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/all-campaigns/face-off-campaign/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). [3] Lucas Introna & David Wood, Picturing algorithmic surveillance: the politics of facial recognition systems, Surveillance & Society, 2(2/3), 177-198 (2004). [4] Supra note 1, at 12. [5] Id, at 25. [6] Michael Bromby, Computerised Facial Recognition Systems: The Surrounding Legal Problems (Sep. 2006)(LL.M Dissertation Faculty of Law University of Edinburgh), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.7339&rep=rep1&type=pdf , at 3. [7] Owen Bowcott, Police face legal action over use of facial recognition cameras, The Guardian, Jun. 14, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/14/police-face-legal-action-over-use-of-facial-recognition-cameras (last visited Aug. 09, 2018). [8] Martha Spurrier, Facial recognition is not just useless. In police hands, it is dangerous, The Guardian, May 16, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/16/facial-recognition-useless-police-dangerous-met-inaccurate (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). [9] Supra note 1, at 12. [10] Surveillance Camera Commissioner, Surveillance camera code of practice, Oct. 28, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/surveillance-camera-code-of-practice (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). [11] UK Information Commissioner’s Office, In the picture: A data protection code of practice for surveillance cameras and personal information, Jun. 09, 2017, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/encryption/scenarios/cctv/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2018). [12] Supra note 1, at 13. [13] Elizabeth Denham, Blog: facial recognition technology and law enforcement, Information Commissioner's Office, May 14, 2018, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/blog-facial-recognition-technology-and-law-enforcement/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2018). [14] Monique Mann & Marcus Smith, Automated Facial Recognition Technology: Recent Developments and Approaches to Oversight, Automated Facial Recognition Technology, 10(1), 140 (2017). [15] Biometrics Commissioner, Biometrics Commissioner’s response to the Home Office Biometrics Strategy, Jun. 28, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/biometrics-commissioners-response-to-the-home-office-biometrics-strategy (last visited Aug. 15, 2018). [16] Supra note 2. [17] Supra note 13. [18] Jon Sharman, Metropolitan Police's facial recognition technology 98% inaccurate, figures show, INDEPENDENT, May 13, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/met-police-facial-recognition-success-south-wales-trial-home-office-false-positive-a8345036.html (last visited Aug. 09, 2018).
Review of Taiwan's Existing Regulations on the Access to Bioloical ResourcesThe activities of accessing to Taiwan's biological resources can be governed within certain extent described as follows. 1 、 Certain Biological Resources Controlled by Regulations Taiwan's existing regulation empowers the government to control the access to biological resources within certain areas or specific species. The National Park Law, the Forestry Act, and the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act indicate that the management authority can control the access of animals and plants inside the National Park, the National Park Control Area, the recreational area, the historical monuments, special scenic area, or ecological protection area; forbid the logging of plants and resources within the necessary control area for logging and preserved forestry, or control the biological resources inside the natural preserved area. In terms of the scope of controlled resources, according to the guidance of the Wildlife Conservation Act and the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, governmental management authority is entitled to forbid the public to access the general and protected wild animals and the plant and biological resources that are classified as natural monuments. To analyse the regulation from another viewpoint, any access to resources in areas and of species other than the listed, such as wild plants or microorganism, is not regulated. Therefore, in terms of scope, Taiwan's management of the access to biological resources has not covered the whole scope. 2 、 Access Permit and Entrance Permit Taiwan's current management of biological resources adopts two kinds of schemes: access permit scheme and entrance permit in specific areas. The permit allows management authority to have the power to grant and reject the collection, hunting, or other activities to access resources by people. This scheme is similar to the international standard. The current management system for the access to biological resources promoted by many countries and international organizations does not usually cover the guidance of entrance in specific areas. This is resulting from that the scope of the regulation about access applies for the whole nation. However, since Taiwan has not developed regulations specifically for the access of bio-research resources, the import/export regulations in the existing Wildlife Conservation Act, National Park Law, Forestry Act, and Cultural Heritage Preservation Act may provide certain help if these regulations be properly connected with the principle of access and benefit sharing model, so that they will help to urge people to share the research interests. 3 、 Special Treatments for Academic Research Purpose and Aborigines Comparing to the access for the purpose of business operation, Taiwan's regulations favour the research and development that contains collection and hunting for the purpose of academic researches. The regulation gives permits to the access to biological resources for the activities with nature of academic researches. For instance, the Wildlife Conservation Act, National Park Law, and theCultural Heritage Preservation Act allow the access of regulated biological resources, if the academic research unit obtains the permit, or simply inform the management authority. In addition, the access by the aborigines is also protected by the Forestry Act, Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, and the Aboriginal Basic Act. The aborigines have the right to freely access to biological resources such as plants, animals and fungi. 4 、 The Application of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) In topics of the access to and benefit sharing of biological resources, the PIC between parties of interests has been the focus of international regulation. Similarly, when Taiwan was establishing theAboriginal Basic Act, this regulation was included to protect the aborigines' rights to be consulted, to agree, to participate and to share the interests. This conforms to the objective of access and benefit sharing system. 5 、 To Research and Propose the Draft of Genetic Resources Act The existing Wildlife Conservation Act, National Park Law, Forestry Act,Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, Aboriginal Basic Act provide the regulation guidance to the management of the access to biological resources within certain scope. Comparing to the international system of access and benefit sharing, Taiwan's regulation covers only part of the international guidance. For instance, Taiwan has no regulation for the management of wild plants and micro-organism, so there is no regulation to confine the access to wild plants and microorganism. To enlarge the scope of management in terms of the access to Taiwan's biological resources, the government authority has authorize the related scholars to prepare the draft of Genetic Resources Act. The aim of the Genetic Resources Act is to establish the guidance of the access of genetic resources and the sharing of interests in order to preserve the genetic resources. The draft regulates that the bio-prospecting activity should be classified into business and academic, with the premise of not interfering the traditional usages. After classification, application of the permit should be conducted via either general or express process. During the permit application, the prospector, the management authority, and the owner of the prospected land should conclude an agreement jointly. In the event that the prospector wishes to apply for intellectual property rights, the prospector should disclose the origin of the genetic resources and provide the legally effective documents of obtaining these resources. In addition, a Biodiversity Fund should be established to manage the profits derived from genetic resources. The import/export of genetic resources should also be regulated. Violators should be fined.
The opening and sharing of scientific data- The Data Policy of the U.S. National Institutes of HealthThe opening and sharing of scientific data- The Data Policy of the U.S. National Institutes of Health Li-Ting Tsai Scientific research improves the well-being of all mankind, the data sharing on medical and health promote the overall amount of energy in research field. For promoting the access of scientific data and research findings which was supported by the government, the U.S. government affirmed in principle that the development of science was related to the retention and accesses of data. The disclosure of information should comply with legal restrictions, and the limitation by time as well. For government-sponsored research, the data produced was based on the principle of free access, and government policies should also consider the actual situation of international cooperation[1]Furthermore, the access of scientific research data would help to promote scientific development, therefore while formulating a sharing policy, the government should also consider the situation of international cooperation, and discuss the strategy of data disclosure based on the principle of free access. In order to increase the effectiveness of scientific data, the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) set up the Office of Science Policy (OSP) to formulate a policy which included a wide range of issues, such as biosafety (biosecurity), genetic testing, genomic data sharing, human subjects protections, the organization and management of the NIH, and the outputs and value of NIH-funded research. Through extensive analysis and reports, proposed emerging policy recommendations.[2] At the level of scientific data sharing, NIH focused on "genes and health" and "scientific data management". The progress of biomedical research depended on the access of scientific data; sharing scientific data was helpful to verify research results. Researchers integrated data to strengthen analysis, promoted the reuse of difficult-generated data, and accelerated research progress.[3] NIH promoted the use of scientific data through data management to verify and share research results. For assisting data sharing, NIH had issued a data management and sharing policy (DMS Policy), which aimed to promote the sharing of scientific data funded or conducted by NIH.[4] DMS Policy defines “scientific data.” as “The recorded factual material commonly accepted in the scientific community as of sufficient quality to validate and replicate research findings, regardless of whether the data are used to support scholarly publications. Scientific data do not include laboratory notebooks, preliminary analyses, completed case report forms, drafts of scientific papers, plans for future research, peer reviews, communications with colleagues, or physical objects, such as laboratory specimens.”[5] In other words, for determining scientific data, it is not only based on whether the data can support academic publications, but also based on whether the scientific data is a record of facts and whether the research results can be repeatedly verified. In addition, NIH, NIH research institutes, centers, and offices have had expected sharing of data, such as: scientific data sharing, related standards, database selection, time limitation, applicable and presented in the plan; if not applicable, the researcher should propose the data sharing and management methods in the plan. NIH also recommended that the management and sharing of data should implement the FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable and Reusable) principles. The types of data to be shared should first in general descriptions and estimates, the second was to list meta-data and other documents that would help to explain scientific data. NIH encouraged the sharing of scientific data as soon as possible, no later than the publication or implementation period.[6] It was said that even each research project was not suitable for the existing sharing strategy, when planning a proposal, the research team should still develop a suitable method for sharing and management, and follow the FAIR principles. The scientific research data which was provided by the research team would be stored in a database which was designated by the policy or funder. NIH proposed a list of recommended databases lists[7], and described the characteristics of ideal storage databases as “have unique and persistent identifiers, a long-term and sustainable data management plan, set up metadata, organizing data and quality assurance, free and easy access, broad and measured reuse, clear use guidance, security and integrity, confidentiality, common format, provenance and data retention policy”[8]. That is to say, the design of the database should be easy to search scientific data, and should maintain the security, integrity and confidentiality and so on of the data while accessing them. In the practical application of NIH shared data, in order to share genetic research data, NIH proposed a Genomic Data Sharing (GDS) Policy in 2014, including NIH funding guidelines and contracts; NIH’s GDS policy applied to all NIHs Funded research, the generated large-scale human or non-human genetic data would be used in subsequent research. [9] This can effectively promote genetic research forward. The GDS policy obliged researchers to provide genomic data; researchers who access genomic data should also abide by the terms that they used the Controlled-Access Data for research.[10] After NIH approved, researchers could use the NIH Controlled-Access Data for secondary research.[11] Reviewed by NIH Data Access Committee, while researchers accessed data must follow the terms which was using Controlled-Access Data for research reason.[12] The Genomic Summary Results (GSR) was belong to NIH policy,[13] and according to the purpose of GDS policy, GSR was defined as summary statistics which was provided by researchers, and non-sensitive data was included to the database that was designated by NIH.[14] Namely. NIH used the application and approval of control access data to strike a balance between the data of limitation access and scientific development. For responding the COVID-19 and accelerating the development of treatments and vaccines, NIH's data sharing and management policy alleviated the global scientific community’s need for opening and sharing scientific data. This policy established data sharing as a basic component in the research process.[15] In conclusion, internalizing data sharing in the research process will help to update the research process globally and face the scientific challenges of all mankind together. [1]NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SUBCOMMITEE ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON OPEN DATA SHARING POLICY, Principles For Promoting Access To Federal Government-Supported Scientific Data And Research Findings Through International Scientific Cooperation (2016), 1, organized from Principles, at 5-8, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/iwgodsp_principles_0.pdf (last visited December 14, 2020). [2]About Us, Welcome to NIH Office of Science Policy, NIH National Institutes of Health Office of Science Policy, https://osp.od.nih.gov/about-us/ (last visited December 7, 2020). [3]NIH Data Management and Sharing Activities Related to Public Access and Open Science, NIH National Institutes of Health Office of Science Policy, https://osp.od.nih.gov/scientific-sharing/nih-data-management-and-sharing-activities-related-to-public-access-and-open-science/ (last visited December 10, 2020). [4]Final NIH Policy for Data Management and Sharing, NIH National Institutes of Health Office of Extramural Research, Office of The Director, National Institutes of Health (OD), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-21-013.html (last visited December 11, 2020). [5]Final NIH Policy for Data Management and Sharing, NIH National Institutes of Health Office of Extramural Research, Office of The Director, National Institutes of Health (OD), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-21-013.html (last visited December 12, 2020). [6]Supplemental Information to the NIH Policy for Data Management and Sharing: Elements of an NIH Data Management and Sharing Plan, Office of The Director, National Institutes of Health (OD), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-21-014.html (last visited December 13, 2020). [7]The list of databases in details please see:Open Domain-Specific Data Sharing Repositories, NIH National Library of Medicine, https://www.nlm.nih.gov/NIHbmic/domain_specific_repositories.html (last visited December 24, 2020). [8]Supplemental Information to the NIH Policy for Data Management and Sharing: Selecting a Repository for Data Resulting from NIH-Supported Research, Office of The Director, National Institutes of Health (OD), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-21-016.html (last visited December 13, 2020). [9]NIH Genomic Data Sharing, National Institutes of Health Office of Science Policy, https://osp.od.nih.gov/scientific-sharing/genomic-data-sharing/ (last visited December 15, 2020). [10]NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, National Institutes of Health (NIH), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-14-124.html (last visited December 17, 2020). [11]NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, National Institutes of Health (NIH), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-14-124.html (last visited December 17, 2020). [12]id. [13]NIH National Institutes of Health Turning Discovery into Health, Responsible Use of Human Genomic Data An Informational Resource, 1, at 6, https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/Responsible_Use_of_Human_Genomic_Data_Informational_Resource.pdf (last visited December 17, 2020). [14]Update to NIH Management of Genomic Summary Results Access, National Institutes of Health (NIH), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-19-023.html (last visited December 17, 2020). [15]Francis S. Collins, Statement on Final NIH Policy for Data Management and Sharing, National Institutes of Health Turning Discovery Into Health, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-final-nih-policy-data-management-sharing (last visited December 14, 2020).
A Before and After Impact Comparison of Applying Statute for Industrial Innovation Article 23-1 Draft on Venture Capital Limited PartnershipsA Before and After Impact Comparison of Applying Statute for Industrial Innovation Article 23-1 Draft on Venture Capital Limited Partnerships I. Background Because the business models adopted by Industries, such as venture capital, film, stage performance and others, are intended to be temporary entities, and the existing business laws are not applicable for such industries,[1] the Legislature Yuan passed the “Limited Partnership Act” in June 2015,[2] for the purpose of encouraging capital injection into these industries. However, since the Act was passed, there are currently only nine limited partnerships listed on the Ministry of Economic Affairs' limited partnership information website. Among them, “Da-Zuo Limited Partnership (Germany) Taiwan Branch” and “Stober Antriebstechnik Limited Partnership (Germany) Taiwan Branch”, are branch companies established by foreign businesses, the remaining seven companies are audio video production and information service businesses. It is a pity that no venture capital company is adopting this format.[3] In fact, several foreign countries have set up supporting measures for their taxation systems targeting those business structures, such as limited partnerships. For example, the pass-through taxation method (or referred to as single entity taxation) is adopted by the United States, while Transparenzprinzip is used by Germany. These two taxation methods may have different names, but their core ideas are to pass the profits of a limited partnership to the earnings of partners.[4] However, following the adoption of the Limited Partnership Act in Taiwan, the Ministry of Finance issued an interpretation letter stating that because the current legal system confers an independent legal entity status to the business structure of a limited partnership, it should be treated as a profit-seeking business and taxed with Profit-Seeking Enterprise Income Tax.[5] Therefore, to actualize the legislative objective of encouraging innovative businesses organized under tenets of the Limited Partnership Act, the Executive Yuan presented a draft amendment for Article 23-1 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation (hereinafter referred to as the Draft), introducing the "Pass Through Taxation Principle" as adopted by several foreign countries. That is, a Limited Partnership will not be levied with the Profit-Seeking Enterprise Income Tax, but each partner will file income tax reports based on after-profit-gains from the partnership that are passed through to each partner. It is expected that the venture capital industry will now be encouraged to adopt the limited partnership structure, and thus increase investment capital in new ventures. II. The Pass Through Taxation Method is Applicable to Newly Established Venture Capital Limited Partnerships 1. The Requirements and Effects (1) The Requirements According to the provisions of Article 23-1 Paragraph 3 of the Draft, to be eligible for Pass Through Taxation, newly established venture capital limited partnerships must meet the following requirements: 1. The venture capital limited partnerships are established between January 1, 2017 and December 31, 2019. 2. Investment threshold of the total agreed capital contribution, total received capital contribution, and accumulated total capital contribution, within five years of the establishment of venture capital limited partnerships: Total Agreed Capital Contribution in the Limited Partnership Agreement Total Received Capital Contribution Accumulated Investment Amount for Start-up Companies The Year of Establishment 3 hundred million ✕ ✕ The Second Year ✕ ✕ The Third Year 1 hundred million ✕ The Fourth Year 2 hundred million Reaching 30 percent of the total received capital contribution of the year or 3 hundred million NT dollars. The Fifth Year 3 hundred million 3. The total amount, that an overseas company applies in capital and investments in actual business operations in Taiwan, reaches 50% of its total received capital contribution of that year. 4. In compliance with government policies. 5. Reviewed and approved by the central competent authority each year. (2) The Effects The effects of applying the provisions of Article 23-1 Paragraph 3 of the Draft are as follows: 1. Venture capital limited partnerships are exempt from the Profit-Seeking Enterprise Income Tax. 2. Taxation method for partners in a limited partnership after obtaining profit gains: (1) Pursuant to the Income Tax Act, Individual partners and for-profit business partners are taxed on their proportionally-calculated, distributed earnings. (2) Individual partners and foreign for-profit business partners are exempt from income tax on the stock earnings distributed by a limited partnership. 2. Benefit Analysis Before and After Applying Pass Through Taxation Method A domestic individual A, a domestic profit-making business B, and a foreign profit-making business C jointly form a venture capital limited partnership, One. The earnings distribution of the company One is 10%, 80% and 10% for A, B, and C partners, respectively. The calculated earnings of company One are one million (where eight hundred thousand are stock earnings, and two hundred thousand are non-stock earnings). How much income tax should be paid by the company One, and partners A, B, and C? (1) Pursuant to the Income Tax Act, before the amended draft: 1. One Venture Capital Limited Partnership Should pay Profit-Seeking Enterprise Income Tax = (NT$1,000,000 (earning) - NT$500,000[6])x12% (tax rate[7])=NT$60,000 2. Domestic Individual A Should file a comprehensive income report with business profit income =(NT$1,000,000-NT$60,000) x 10% (company One draft a voucher for net amount for A) + NT$60,000÷2×10% (deductible tax rate)= NT$97,000 Tax payable on profit earnings=NT$91,500×5%(tax rate)=NT$4,850 Actual income tax paid=NT$4,850 - NT$60,000÷2×10% (deductible tax rate) =NT$1,485 3. Domestic For-Profit Business B Pursuant to the provisions of Article 42 of the Income Tax Act, the net dividend or net income received by a profit-seeking company is not included in the income tax calculation. 4. Foreign For-Profit Business C Tax paid at its earning source=(NT$1,000,000 - NT$60,000) ×10% (earning distribution rate) ×20% (tax rate at earning source)=NT$18,800 (2) Applying Pass Through Taxation Method After Enacting the Amendment 1. One Venture Capital Limited Partnership No income tax. 2. Domestic Individual A Should pay tax=NT$800,000 (non-stock distributed earnings)×10% (earning distribution rate)×5% (comprehensive income tax rate)=NT$1,000 3. Domestic For-Profit Business B Pursuant to the provisions of Article 42 of the Income Tax Act, the net dividend or net income received by a profit-seeking company is not included in the income tax calculation. 4. Foreign For-Profit Business C Tax paid at its earning source=NT$800,000 (non-stock distributed earnings)×10%(earning distribution rate)×20% (tax rate at earning source)=NT$4,000 The aforementioned example shows that under the situation, where the earning distribution is the same and tax rate for the same taxation subject is the same, the newly-established venture capital limited partnerships and their shareholders enjoy a more favorable tax benefit with the adoption of pass through taxation method: Before the Amendment After the Amendment Venture Capital Limited Partnership NT$60,000 Excluded in calculation Shareholders Domestic Individual NT$1,850 NT$1,000 Domestic For-Profit Business Excluded in calculation Excluded in calculation Foreign For-Profit Business NT$18,800 NT$4,000 Sub-total NT$80,650 NT$5,000 III. Conclusion Compared to the corporate taxation, the application of the pass through taxation method allows for a significant reduction in tax burden. While developing Taiwan’s pass through tax scheme, the government referenced corporate taxation under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC), where companies that meet the conditions of Chapter S can adopt the “pass through” method, that is, pass the earnings to the owner, with the income of shareholders being the objects of taxation;[8] and studied the "Transparenzprinzip" adopted by the German taxation board for partnership style for-profit businesses. Following these legislative examples, where profits are identified as belonging to organization members,[9] the government legislation includes the adoption of the pass through taxation scheme for venture capital limited partnerships in the amended draft of Article 23-1 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation, so that the legislation is up to international standards and norms, while making an important breakthrough in the current income tax system. This is truly worthy of praise. [1] The Legislative Yuan Gazette, Vol. 104, No. 51, page 325. URL:http://misq.ly.gov.tw/MISQ//IQuery/misq5000Action.action [2] A View on the Limited Partnership in Taiwan, Cross-Strait Law Review, No. 54, Liao, Da-Ying, Page 42. [3] Ministry of Economic Affairs - Limited Partnership Registration Information URL: http://gcis.nat.gov.tw/lmpub/lms/dir.jsp?showgcislocation=true&agencycode=allbf [4] Same as annotate 2, pages 51-52. [5] Reference Letter of Interpretation dated December 18, 2015, Tai-Cai-Shui Zi No. 10400636640, the Ministry of Finance [6] First half of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Income Basic Tax Act [7] Second half of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Income Basic Tax Act [8] A Study on the Limited Partnership Act, Master’s degree thesis, College of Law, Soochow University, Wu, Tsung-Yeh, pages 95-96. [9] Reference annotate 2, pages 52.