A Brief Introduction to Taiwan’s Legislations to Promote Industrial Innovations of the Digital Economy

A Brief Introduction to Taiwan’s Legislations to Promote Industrial Innovations of the Digital Economy

2023/05/15

I. Background

To encourage the development of digital industries in communications, information, cybersecurity, networking and communication, to centralize digital governance and digital infrastructure development and to assist in digital transformation of public and private sectors in Taiwan, the Ministry of Digital Affairs (“the MODA”) was created on August 27, 2022 to spearhead the national digital development policy, communications and digital resources; the development of digital technology use cases and the environment for innovations and talents; policies and regulations governing digital economy industries, national cybersecurity, the government’s digital services, open data and data governance, digital infrastructure, international exchange and cooperation and competence standards for the government’s professional personnel in IT and informational security. The Administration for Digital Industries (ADI) and the Administration for Cyber Security (ACS) have been established as the MODA’s subordinate agencies, to address challenges on all fronts in the digital wave.

As the central competent authority on the industrial development of the digital economy, the MODA may subsidize, incentify or support innovative activities of digital economy industries in accordance with Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation and determine relevant matters in accordance with Paragraph 2 of the same article. Hence, the MODA promulgated the Subsidy, Reward and Assistance Regulations for Promoting Industry Innovation (“the Regulations”) on December 23, 2022, to encourage innovation and R&D on software, services, integration and application in telecommunications, information, cybersecurity, networking, and communication. The purpose is to enhance the industry environment and to boost the industry competitiveness.

These Regulations serve as the MODA’s flagship efforts in promotion of industrial innovations and highlights Taiwan’s emphasis on digital economy industries. Below is a summary of the Regulations.

II. Scope

As stated in the overview described in Article 2, the Regulations aim to assist in the development of software products, digital services and infrastructure, system integration and vertical use cases in telecommunications, information, cybersecurity, networking and communication, so as to encourage innovations in digital economy industries such as ecommerce, digital contents, new types of digital services, communications and network deployment, to improve the industry environment and enhance the industry competitiveness.

In sum, the “digital economy industries” mentioned in the Regulations refer to software, digital services or digital infrastructure sectors in telecommunications, information, cybersecurity, networking and communication.

III. Policy measures

According to Paragraph 1, Article 3 of the Regulations, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may provide subsidies, rewards and assistance to the activities in digital economy industries such as promotion of innovation or R&D, supply of technologies and support in upgrade. This may involve the encouragement of creation of innovation of R&D centers by companies; assistance to establishment of innovation or R&D institutions; fostering of cooperation among industries, academia and research organizations; promotion of corporate engagement in talent development at schools and development of human resources in industries; support to innovations by local industries; advocacy of corporate use of big data and the government’s open data; enhancement of communications network resilience and network infrastructure prevalence and other relevant matters.

Moreover, the Regulations provide details of the policy measures for subsidies, rewards and support as follows:

1. Subsidies

The relevant details are provided from Article 4 to Article 17 of the Regulations.

(1) Eligibility

According to Paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Regulations, subsidy recipients in principle shall be engaged in activities of digital economy industries, shall be either a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, or corporation registered in accordance with domestic laws or a natural person who is national of the R.O.C., a natural person from Hong Kong or Macau or a foreign national with permanent residency and has never been listed as a refusal account by any bank. Flexibility can be granted in accordance with Paragraph 2 of the same article. If required for the development of digital economy industries, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may establish separate eligibility criteria for subsidy recipients. However, such eligibility criteria only take effect via public announcement and publication on the Executive Yuan Gazette.

Finally, according to Article 13 of the Regulations, no subsidy application may be submitted in event of violation of laws related to environmental protection, labor safety and health or food safety and hygiene during the most recent three years, as determined to be serious by central competent authority.

(2) Subsidy limits

According to Article 5 of the Regulations, different programs come with different ceilings measured in percentage. In principle, the subsidized amount shall not exceed 50% of the program budget if it is for promotion of industry innovation or R&D or encouragement of corporate use of big data and the government’s open data to develop and innovate commercial applications or service models. However, this does not apply to specific policy considerations or subsidy schemes above the budget and approved by the MODA or its subordinate agencies.

For example, the subsidized amount shall not exceed 50% of the course fees for corporate engagement in talent development on campus or enhancement of talent resources for industries. However, this limit does not apply to subsidies to indigenous people, persons with disabilities, low-income households, or the special circumstances approved by the MODA or its subordinate agencies.

Support schemes such as assistance to industrial technology and upgrade; encouragement of creation of innovation of R&D centers by companies; assistance to establishment of innovation or R&D institutions; fostering of cooperation among industries, academia and research organizations; support to innovations by local industries; enhancement of communications network resilience and network infrastructure prevalence and other projects shall be announced by the MODA or its subordinate agencies and published on the Executive Yuan Gazette.

(3) Subsidy programs

According to Articles 6 of the Regulations, there are no specific restrictions on subsidy categories, with two exceptions: (1) promotion of industry innovation or R&D – Subsidies are limited to six categories, i.e., innovation or R&D personnel expenses for approved projects; costs for consumables and raw materials; access and maintenance expenses for innovative or R&D equipment; introduction of intangible assets; commissioning and verification fees of research; and travel expenses. (2) advocacy of corporate use of big data and the government’s open data to develop and innovate commercial applications or service models or enhancement of communications network resilience and network infrastructure prevalence - Subsidies are limited to three categories, i.e., fees for commissioned services; training & education fees; and promotional campaign expenses.

(4) Application submission

According to Article 7 of the Regulations, an applicant should submit the application form, the project plan and relevant data to the MODA or its subordinate agencies. If the contents of the project plan or documents fail to meet requirements, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may request missing materials before a deadline of up to one month. The MODA or its subordinate agencies may not accept applications without missing materials supplied before deadlines.

(5) Acceptance and review

According to Article 8 of the Regulations, the MODA or its subordinate agencies shall convene review meetings to review applications, changes and irregularities in the execution of subsidy programs. Applicants may be asked to provide explanations or Personnel may be sent to conduct on-site inspections. If necessary, relevant authorities or institutions may be commissioned assist in financial reviews.

Additionally, according to Article 9 of the Regulations, the period from document readiness by an applicant to notification of the completed review to the applicant may not exceed three months. This may be extended by one month if necessary.

Finally, according to Article 17 of the Regulations, subsidized projects, subsidy recipients, approval dates, subsidized amounts (including cumulative amounts) and relevant information shall be announced on the websites of the MODA or its subordinate agencies each quarterly unless the disclosure should be restricted or is not provided according to Article 18 of the Freedom of Government Information Law.

(6) Contract signing

Once reviewed and approved, the applicant must sign the subsidy contract with the MODA or its subordinate agencies within the time period specified by Article 10 of the Regulations. Unless extension has been agreed by the MODA or its subordinate agencies, the approval of the application loses validity if a contract is not signed before the deadline.

(7) Matters of adherence by subsidy recipients

Once the subsidy contract has been signed, an applicant becomes a subsidy recipient under the Regulations and must abide by relevant terms and conditions. First, the recipient shall establish a separate account for subsidy funds and maintain a separate account book, according to Article 11 of the Regulations. All of the interest generated from the subsidy account and any balance remaining after the project completion shall be fully returned to the national treasury via the MODA or its subordinate agencies. Meanwhile, to examine whether there are any duplications of application, the use of subsidy funds and the effectiveness of project implementation, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may dispatch personnel or commission a fair and just organization to inspect the relevant documents, account books and status of project execution. The subsidy recipient shall not refuse such an examination, is obligated to respond and shall submit work reports and details about the use of funds by following the agreed-upon schedule. In event of breach, the disbursement of subsequent funds may be suspended, under the terms and conditions of the subsidy contract.

Second, according to Article 12 of the Regulations, if a recipient fails to execute the subsidized project as planned or the project experiences a significant delay in progress, or there is an overly large gap between the project results and the business plan, or the project fails to pass the review, inspection or acceptance by the MODA or its subordinate agencies and no improvement has been made before the specified deadline, or there is a breach of the Regulations Governing Procurements for Scientific and Technological Research and Development if the subsidized amount exceeds 50% of the recipient’s procurement and it meets the threshold for public announcements under the Government Procurement Act, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may suspend the next disbursement in accordance with the terms and conditions of the subsidy contract, claw back the disbursed subsidy and even stop any subsidy to the recipient for one to five years, depending on the severity of the circumstances.

Third, according to Article 14 of the Regulations, the MODA or its subordinate agencies must conduct a comprehensive assessment of effectiveness of subsidized projects and the recipient shall cooperate by providing data required for the assessment.

Fourth, according to Article 16 of the Regulations and unless otherwise specified by laws, if the subsidized amount exceeds 50% of the total budget for a technology project, the ownership and utilization of R&D results shall comply with the Government Scientific and Technological Research and Development Results Ownership and Utilization Regulation. In event of breach by the recipient violates, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may terminate the subsidy contract and shall refuse to accept any subsidy application from the recipient for five years from the date of completion of the innovation or R&D. If the reason is attributable to the recipient, the subsidy contract shall be canceled and the subsidies shall be refunded.

(8) Subsidy applications

According to Article 17 of the Regulations, a subsidy applicant shall declare to the MODA or its subordinate agencies the following:

1) No significant default in the execution of any government-sponsored science and technology projects during the past five years.

2) No suspension currently in force as a result of disciplinary actions in relation to execution of a government-sponsored science and technology project.

3) No tax incentives, rewards or subsidies for the same matter under other laws granted to the same subsidized project.

4) No taxes owed during the past three years. However, individuals who apply for the subsidy under Subparagraph 5 or 6, Paragraph 1, Article 3 are exempted.

5) No violation of laws related to environmental protection, labor safety and health or food safety and hygiene or the People with Disabilities Rights Protection Act during the most recent three years, as determined to be serious by central competent authority. However, this does not apply to circumstances that occurred prior to the enforcement of the Statute.

If the applicant refuses to declare the above, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may not accept the application. If any false statement is identified, the application may be rejected, or the subsidy may be withdrawn, the contract may be canceled and the disbursed funds shall be returned.

2. Rewards

According to Paragraph 1 of Article 18 of the Regulations, the MODA or its subordinate agencies will announce reward programs for digital economy industries with details on recipients, eligibility criteria, evaluation standards, application procedures, approving agencies and other related matters.

Moreover, reward applications are not accepted according to Paragraph 2 of Article 18 and the provisions of Article 13 and Article 15 shall apply mutatis mutandis. Article 17 regarding announcement of government information on subsidy applications shall also apply to reward applications.

3. Assistance

Relevant rules are primarily prescribed from Article 19 to Article 21 of the Regulations.

(1) Eligibility

According to Paragraph 1 of Article 19 of the Regulations, the rules prescribed in Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1 of Article 4 also apply to the eligibility criteria for assistance to digital economy industries. In other words, assistance recipients in principle shall engage in activities of digital economy industries, either a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, or corporation registered in accordance with domestic laws or a natural person who is national of the R.O.C., a natural person from Hong Kong or Macau or a foreign national with permanent residency and has never been listed as a refusal account by any bank.

Flexibility can be granted outside the aforesaid limitations and in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article 19. If required for the development of digital economy industries, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may establish separate eligibility criteria for assistance recipients via public announcement and publication on the Executive Yuan Gazette.

(2) Oversight of commissioned organizations

According to Article 20 of the Regulations, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the assistance services provided by the commissioned organization(s) for recipients as an important basis for reviewing assistance projects.

(3) Establishment of a single contact window

The assistance unit may establish a single contact window to provide assistance and counseling services, according to Article 21 of the Regulations.

4. General provisions

In addition to specific rules, the general provisions prescribed from Article 22 to Article 25 shall apply to subsidies, rewards or assistance provided by the MODA and its subordinate agencies.

First, all the funds required for policy measures shall come from the budgets allocated by the MODA or its subordinate agencies, according to Article 25 of the Regulations.

Second, the MODA or its subordinate agencies may commission a legal person or a group to handle the application acceptance, review, approval, inspection, subsidy disbursement and claw-back, rewards, assistance and other relevant matters, according to Article 22 of the Regulations.

Furthermore, according to Article 23 of the Regulations, the incoming and outgoing of funds for subsidy, reward and assistance projects are managed as follows:

1) The same project applying for subsidies with two or more organizations should list the details of all expenses and the breakdowns and amounts of subsidies, rewards and assistance under application with each government agency. The subsidy, reward and assistance program shall be canceled and the disbursed funds shall be returned in event of concealment or false statements.

2) If the review by each government agency on the use of funds identifies poor results, utilization not consistent with the subsidy purposes, or inflated or dishonest numbers, the subsidy, reward or assistance recipient shall return the disbursed funds. Meanwhile, no subsidy shall be granted to the subsidy, reward or assistance recipient in question for one to five years, depending on the severity of circumstances.

3) If procurement is involved in the subsidy, reward or assistance budget, the subsidy, reward or assistance recipient shall adhere to the Government Procurement Act.

4) When reporting on expenses, the subsidy, reward or assistance recipient shall enumerate in detail the utilization of expenditures and the total amount of spendings. The same project subsidized by two or more organizations shall list the actual sum of subsidies, rewards and assistance.

Finally, according to Article 24 of the Regulations, the approval, disbursement and reimbursement of subsidies, rewards and assistance are processed as follows:

1) Disbursement based on project progress: The number of instalments, the method, the amount (percentage) are specified in the contract by the MODA or its subordinate agencies, depending on the project and the timetable.

2) Reimbursement shall be based on the Management Guidelines for the Disposal of Government Expenditure Vouchers, the Matters of Attention Regarding Budget (Donation) Implementations by Central Government Agencies for Private Groups and Individuals and relevant contractual provisions.

IV. Conclusions

To accelerate the innovation and development of digital economy industries in Taiwan, the MODA has promogulated the Subsidy, Reward and Assistance Regulations for Promoting Industry Innovation in accordance with Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation. It is hoped that the subsidies, rewards and assistance provided by the MODA helps to enhance the competitiveness of digital economy industries and the effectiveness of the digital economy development in addition to the Statute.

The Regulations set out detailed rules on policy measures e.g., subsidies, rewards, and assistance. Key matters such as eligible recipients, application procedures, review mechanisms, responsibilities and obligations are clearly defined but certain flexibility is reserved by exceptions. A contract-centric approach provides manoeuvrability in practice specific to project circumstances. It is hoped that the MODA and its subordinate agencies can utilize these Regulations once in force, to enhance the business environment of the digital economy industries and continue to drive industry innovations.

※A Brief Introduction to Taiwan’s Legislations to Promote Industrial Innovations of the Digital Economy,STLI, https://stli.iii.org.tw/en/article-detail.aspx?no=55&tp=2&i=170&d=9041 (Date:2025/07/01)
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Reference [1] Comité Maritime International, Maritime Law for Umanned Ships, 2017, available at https://comitemaritime.org/work/unmanned-ships/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) [2] MUNIN, D9.3: Quantitative Assessment, Oct. 10, 2015, available at http://www.unmanned-ship.org/munin/news-information/downloads-information-material/munin-papers/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) [3] Martime Digitalisation & Communication, MSC 100 set to review MASS regulations, Oct. 23, 2018, available at https://www.marinemec.com/news/view,msc-100-set-to-review-mass-regulations_55609.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) [4] IMAREST, Autonomous Shipping-Putting the human back in the headline, April. 2018, available at https://www.imarest.org/policy-news/institute-news/item/4446-imarest-releases-report-on-the-human-impact-of-autonomous-ships (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) [5] Danish Martime Authority, Analysis of regulatory barriers to the use of autonomous ships(Final Report), Dec. 2017, available at https://www.dma.dk/Documents/Publikationer/Analysis%20of%20Regulatory%20Barriers%20to%20the%20Use%20of%20Autonomous%20Ships.pdf (last visited Dec. 25, 2018)

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The platform was constructed by the SFC Research Institute of Keio University17[8] in collaboration with an alliance of 23 organizations that participate in SIP research, including agricultural production corporations, agricultural machinery manufacturers, ICT providers, universities, and research institutions (e.g., Japanese IT companies NTT - Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Fujitsu Limited, major agricultural machinery manufacturer- Kubota Corporation, Yanmar Holdings Co., Ltd.)17[9]. WAGRI has three major functions: "cooperation" (breaking down the barriers between different systems so that data is compatible and interchangeable), "sharing" (data is shared in a way chosen by the providers, so as to facilitate the establishment of a business model for data exchange and use), and "provision" (soil and meteorological data are provided by public and private sectors to help facilitate data acquisition and subsequent circulation). During the trial run, there were practical cases that demonstrated that after the implementation of WAGRI, the costs of labor and time spent on data collection and utilization had been significantly reduced17[10]. 3. The Independent Operation of WAGRI   In April 2019, WAGRI, which was originally supported by the SIP program, was transferred to NARO to be the main operating body and officially start the operation.   With the updated use of the information required to operate the WAGRI platform independently, starting in April 2020, the original no-fee approach has been changed. Organizations wishing to use WAGRI are required to pay variable fees according to the following two methods of using the platform [11]: (1)Data users (those who use WAGRI data), data users-and-providers (those who use WAGRI data and provide data to WAGRI) ·Monthly fee of 50,000 yen for platform use. ·If fee-based data is accessed, a separate data usage fee must be paid. (2)Data providers (those who provide data to WAGRI) ·Monthly fee of 30,000 yen for platform use. ·Proviso: If the data provided is free of charge, in principle, there is no requirement to pay the platform utilization fee. III. Application of WAGRI’s Expansion in Response to the Pandemic   The Smart Food Chain Alliance[13], which is supported by one of the 12 projects of the SIP Phase 2 program - "Smart bio industry / basic agricultural technology[12]", will expand WAGRI, which was established with the support of the SIP Phase 1 program, to build a smart food chain platform (WAGRI-dev for short).The main mission of the Smart Food Chain Alliance is to build a smart food chain (commercialized services are expected to begin in 2025) that enables the interoperability of data related to food processing, distribution, sales, and exports, to serve as a basis for fresh food logistics in Japan. This platform is built on the framework of WAGRI, and expanded to WAGRI-dev.   In response to the pandemic, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) jointly issued the "Interim guidance for COVID-19 and Food Safety for competent authorities responsible for national food safety control systems[14]" on April 7, 2020. Based on these guidelines, the Smart Food Chain Alliance of the Japanese SIP program "Smart bio industry / basic agricultural technology" has developed "Guidelines for the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Countermeasures". As part of the above-mentioned program, the "Japanese Food Guidelines Collaboration System (WAGRI.info, in short)"[15] developed countermeasure applications to respond to the pandemic.   WAGRI.info opened its website on July 13, 2020 to accept food safety registrations from food and agricultural product related companies. This registration is not limited to those who meet the COVID-19 countermeasure guidelines, but also those who meet the existing quality and safety management guidelines (e.g. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP), etc.). It also provides a corporate search function for general public use.   WAGRI.info is a part of WAGRI-dev, and will add various data collaboration functions and measures in the future to prevent data manipulation and unauthorized access. The Japanese government originally expected to build the world's first smart food chain platform that includes data from production to processing, distribution, sales and exporting by expanding WAGRI; in response to the pandemic, related functions were added to create a food safety information network.   In Taiwan, there are also data platforms related to smart agriculture that provide OPEN DATA interface functions[16], and the development of food safety traceability integrated application systems to provide information on the flow of school lunch ingredients. In addition to Japan's WAGRI model of data integration and sharing that, can be used as a model for the development of smart agriculture in Taiwan, WAGRI.info's approach can also be used as a reference for domestic food safety policies, in response to the pandemic. [1]"The Science and Technology Basic Plan", Cabinet Office of Government of Japan website: https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/kihonkeikaku/index5.html (last viewed on 07/12/2021). [2]WAGRI is a data platform that consists of a variety of data and services connected to form a wheel that coordinates various communities and promotes "harmony", with the anticipation of leading innovation in the field of agriculture. The word is formed by the combination of WA + AGRI (WA is the Japanese word for harmony + AGRI for agriculture). WAGRI website, https://wagri.net/ja-jp/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [3]As the command headquarters of the Japanese government for implementing economic policies and realizing growth strategies, the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization has been holding a "Future Investment Conference" session approximately every month since 2016, to discuss growth strategies and accelerate social structural reforms, so as to expand future investment. "Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization", Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [4]The Japanese government has been actively promoting the use of IT as a means of helping to solve social issues in various fields. In 2000, the IT Basic Act (Basic Act on the Formation of an Advanced Information and Telecommunications Network Society) was enacted in Japan, and in the following year, the IT Strategy Headquarters (Strategic Headquarters for the Promotion of an Advanced Information and Telecommunications Network Society) was established in accordance with the said laws. In 2013, in accordance with the Government Chief Information Officer (CIO) Act, the Cabinet Secretariat established the position of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Information Technology Policy (Government CIO, in short), and IT Strategic Headquarters was integrated with the GCIO to be the IT Comprehensive Strategy Headquarters (Strategic Headquarters for the Promotion of an Advanced Information and Telecommunications Network Society, IT Comprehensive Strategy Headquarters) to rapidly promote the key policies for an advanced telecommunications network society, and to break the vertical gap of the ministries and departments, and to connect the entire government horizontally. "Strategic Headquarters for the Promotion of an Advanced Information and Telecommunications Network Society" (IT Comprehensive Strategy Headquarters), Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/it2/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [5]Hsu, Yu-Ning, "The 10th Future Investment Conference, held at the Prime Minister's Residence of Japan, proposing Japan's "Future Investment Strategy 2017”, to realize "Society 5.0" as its goal", Science & Technology Law Institute website, https://stli.iii.org.tw/article-detail.aspx?no=64&tp=1&i=72&d=7844, (last visited on 07/12/2021). [6]Focusing on the important issues of "Society 5.0" in conjunction with the key areas of governance of the Future Investment Conference, the Cabinet Office set up an annual budget for science and technology to help create and promote the "Strategic Innovation Promotion Program (SIP)". The first phase of the SIP is a five-year program running from FY2014 to FY2018. "Strategic Innovation Promotion Program (SIP)", Cabinet Office website, https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/gaiyo/sip/index.html (last visited on 07/12/2021). Qiu, Jin-Tien (2017), "Technology Innovation Strategy for Realizing the Super Smart Society (Society 5.0) in Japan", National Applied Research Laboratories website, https://portal.stpi.narl.org.tw/index/article/10358 (last visited on 07/12/2021) [7]The National Agriculture and Food Research Organization, NARO in short, is a national research and development corporation for agricultural and food industry technology. [8]The SFC Research Institute, located on the Shonan-Fujisawa campus of Keio University, is a research institute affiliated with the Graduate School of Policy and Media Studies, the Department of General Policy, and the Department of Environmental Intelligence, and is an important research institute involved in the development of smart agriculture in Japan. Professor Atsushi Shinjo is the research director of WAGRI, and he is also the Deputy Government CIO of the Cabinet Secretariat and the Acting Director of the IT Strategy Office, contributing to the creation of the "Agricultural Information Creation and Distribution Promotion Strategy". He also serves as the President of the WAGRI Council and the Director of NARO's Agricultural Data Collaboration, and facilitates the coordination between WAGRI and Japan's smart agriculture empirical Project. He is a key player in the Japanese government's efforts to promote the flow of agricultural data, and is committed to promoting the development of smart agriculture in Japan. Keio Research Institute at SFC website, https://www.kri.sfc.keio.ac.jp/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [9]IoTNEWS, Building an ‘Agricultural Data Collaboration Platform’ Using Microsoft Azure Through Industry-government-academia Collaboration to Realize Digital Agriculture" 05/15/2017, https://iotnews.jp/archives/56366 (last visited on 07/12/2021). [10]Shinjo, Atsushi, "ICT changes society: Development of agricultural data collaboration platform and future plans, Technology and Promotion : Journal of the National Council of Agricultural Promotion and Staff Council Organization, December, pp. 24-26 (2017); Technology Policy Office, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, "Construction of agricultural data collaboration platform", 2018/09,http://www.affrc.maff.go.jp/docs/smart_agri_pro/attach/pdf/smart_agri_pro-15.pdf .(last visited on 07/12/2021). [11]"The Use of the Agricultural Data Collaboration Platform (WAGRI) Since FY2019", NARO website https://www.naro.go.jp/project/results/juten_fukyu/2018/juten01.html (last visited on 07/12/2021). , NARO website https://www.naro.affrc.go.jp/laboratory/rcait/wagri (last visited on 07/12/2021). [12]Same as Note 6; The SIP Phase 2 plan runs for a total of approximately five years, from the end of FY2017 to FY2022. [13]The construction of a smart food chain is one of the main research topics of the project. The members of the Smart Food Chain Alliance include: the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and other government organizations as observers, and more than 70 organizations as participants, including local governments, academic and research institutions, agricultural production corporations, wholesale markets, mid-marketers, logistics industries, retail businesses, manufacturers, and ICT providers (The representative of the Alliance is the Keio Research Institute at SFC), reference Note 13. SIP vol. 2, [Symposium on "Smart Bio-industry and Agricultural Technology" 2020 - Aiming to build a new smart food chain] 03/10/2020, WAGRI website, https://wagri.net/ja-jp/News/generalnews/2020/20200310 (last visited on 07/12/2021). [14]See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZASTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS [FAO], COVID-19 and Food Safety: Guidance for Food Businesses: Interim guidance (Apr. 7, 2020), http://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/1275311/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Health Organization jointly issued Interim guidance for COVID-19 and Food Safety for competent authorities responsible for national food safety control systems, Chinese Academy of Inspection and Quarantine, http://www.caiq.org.cn/kydt/902625.shtml (last visited 07/12/2021). [15]WAGRI.info Office, "WAGRI.info (Food Guideline Collaboration System) website launched and began accepting business registration", 07/13/2020, https://kyodonewsprwire.jp/release/202007131927 (last visited on 07/12/2021). Japanese Food Guideline Collaboration System WAGRI.info website, https://www.wagri.info/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [16]Smart Agriculture Common Information Platform Website, https://agriinfo.tari.gov.tw/ (last visited 07/12/2021); "Smart Agriculture 4.0 Common Information Platform Construction (Phase II) Results Presentation", 12/12/2019, Smart Agriculture Website, https://www.intelligentagri.com.tw/xmdoc/cont?xsmsid=0J141518566276623429&sid=0J338358950611186512, (last visited on 07/12/2021).

How Does Taiwan Respond to Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization

How Does Taiwan Respond to Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization Yuan-Qing, Liao Attorney and Legal Researcher 2022/3/24 I. The Tax Challenges arising from Digitalization   According to the Ability-to-pay principle, companies need to pay income tax for their income or profit. Nevertheless, in order to avoid their tax obligations, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have been continuously developing sophisticated and refined tax planning practices to disconnect or mismatch between “where value is created” and “where taxes are paid”, and such practices erode the tax base.[1]   A well-known example of trade model under digitalization of MNCs is that “MNCs do not necessarily have to open domestic physical stores or set up servers, those domestic consumers can purchase goods and services from MNCs directly through the Internet”. This trade model not only breaks the international tax rules “With Permanent Establishment (PE), With taxing power”, but also disconnects or mismatches between “where value is created” and “where taxes are paid” more perfectly. As a result, the taxing power of “where value is created” is eroded. This is a classical type of challenges faced by tax regulators in the age of digitalization of the economy.   In response, The European Commission (EC) and The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had respectively proposed new plans to ensure that digital business activities are taxed in a fair and friendly way. (I) The Digital Service Tax proposed by EC[2]   In 2018, EC proposed a temporary tax - Digital Services Tax (DST), which a basic rate of 3% to be imposed on revenues of a digital platform when such platform meets all of the following criteria, including (1) online placement or advertising services, (2) sales of collected user data, (3) facilitate interactions between users, (4) annual worldwide revenues exceeding 750 million euros and (5) taxable revenues within the European Union (EU) exceeding 50 million euros.[3]   Concerning that the DST apparently targeting US MNCs - Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (GAFA), the US government once threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs. Insofar, it seems that only a part of MNCs will be immediately affected by DST, but the entire trading systems in the rest of the world will be impacted if the retaliatory tariffs conducted by the US take effect. (II) The Two-Pillar plan released by OECD[4]   In October 2020, OECD had released Reports on the Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints (The Two-Pillar plan), which aimed to terminate the international dispute resulting from DST of EC and provide solutions for tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy in the long term.[5]   Pillar One is “Unified Approach”, to ensure the exercise of taxing powers of governments and a fairer distribution of profits among countries where largest MNCs, including digital companies are located at. It would “re-allocate” the taxing powers over MNCs among governments of different jurisdictions. The governments located at the place where MNCs have business activities and earn profits will have the tax powers over those MNCs, even MNCs do not have a physical presence there. Pillar Two is “Global Anti-Base Erosion rules (GloBE)”, tried to protect tax bases of countries through the introduction of “Global Minimum Tax (GMT)” which sets up a minimum corporate income tax rate on MNCs to prevent tax competitions among countries.   Compared with DST proposed by EC, which focuses on the taxing powers of the government that is located at the place where value is created. The Two-Pillar plan focuses more on both re-allocation of international taxing powers and protects the tax base of each country. (II) The Consensus on The Two-Pillar plan[6]   The Group of Seven (G7[7]), G20[8] and 137 countries and jurisdictions OECD stated not only agreed to remove the DST or the similar measures, but also had a consensus on Two-Pillar plan to reform international taxation rules[9]. In order to ensure that MNCs pay a fair share of tax wherever they operate, as well as to set a GMT rate to protect tax base of each country. Moreover, the new international tax system that the GMT rate is 15%[10] is expected to take effect in 2023 and an estimated 154 domestic MNCs will be thus affected accordingly. II. The Response of Taiwan to Tax Challenges   A foreign enterprise has to pay Taiwan taxing regulators enterprise income tax for income generated in Taiwan in the premise that this foreign enterprise has a PE in Taiwan. In other words, a PE in Taiwan, which is recognized as the fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on[11], is the determinant that affects the power of Taiwan to tax the profits of a foreign enterprise. In brief, “No PE, No taxing power”.   In the era of digitalization, the foreign enterprises can create value through the digital means without establishing a PE in Taiwan. The situation of disconnection or mismatch between where value is created and where taxes are paid not only erodes the taxing power of Taiwan, but also breaks the principle of equality in substantive taxation[12] as mentioned above. As a result, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) adjusted and implemented several new taxation policies or measures, including, inter alia, “Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services[13]” and “Income Basic Tax Act”. These two measures were once considered similarly to DST or GMT individually. (I) Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services   Responding to tax challenges posed by foreign enterprises under digitalization, the MOF promulgated a new income tax regulation “Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services[14]”, and asked those foreign enterprises who provide cross-border electronic services to purchasers in Taiwan, shall register for business value-added tax (VAT), including register a tax identification number and file taxes. The causation between the electronic services and national economy shall be the determinant to identify income generated in Taiwan: The payment made by a purchaser located in Taiwan to a foreign enterprise in order to procure following products or services provided by such foreign enterprise shall be deemed as income generated in Taiwan. (1) The product that is produced, manufactured, transmitted, downloaded and saved in a digital device and can only be provided with assistance by individuals or enterprises in Taiwan. (2) The real-time, interactive, handy, and continuing electronic services that are provided through digital means A foreign enterprise provides a digital platform to conduct transactions, once one of the transaction parties is in Taiwan, the sales amounts shall be recognized as income generated in Taiwan (II) Income Basic Tax Act (IBT)   To promote domestic economic development and industrial innovation, Taiwan has enacted many laws on tax incentives, mainly tax deductions and credits. However, these laws have been overdeveloped, the implement period has also been excessively extended, which contributes to severely unreasonable tax burden inequality.   Therefore, Taiwan officially introduced Alternative Minimum Tax System (AMT) and promulgated Income Basic Tax Act (IBT)[15] since 2006. As a separate taxation system, AMT is imposed by government that places a floor on the percentage of taxes a certain filer must pay, regardless of how many tax incentives the filer may claim[16]. Hence, in accordance with Article 1 of IBT “[T]he purposes of this Act are to uphold tax equity, to ensure tax revenue for the country, and to establish the basic requirements of profit-seeking enterprises and individuals in regard to their obligation to fulfill their income tax burden as a contribution to public finance.”   AMT uses a different set of rules to determining taxable income compared with the normal tax calculations. Once the regular income-tax amount is higher than the AMT, the taxpayer pays the regular income tax. Thus, if AMT is higher, then the taxpayer pays the AMT. And according to Article 8 (1) of IBT, the enterprise IBT rate is prescribed of 12% since 2013.[17]   However, according to Article 3 (1) (5) of IBT[18], a foreign enterprise without domestic fixed place of business or domestic business agent is not regulated by IBT. (III) Conclusion “Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services (Hereinafter referred to as “the measure”)” asked the foreign enterprises to file income tax. But the elements of “the measure” are different from DST. The reasons may be (1) “This measure” has been designed and promulgated earlier than DST and (2) The DST is essentially more like alternative minimum tax. IBT may effect by the concept of “with PE, with taxing power”. Therefore, a foreign enterprise without PE in Taiwan is not regulated by IBT, this means “No PE, No obligation of IBT”. Also, the IBT rate of profit-seeking enterprise is 12%. III. The Remaining Problems of Tax System in Taiwan   It is foreseeable that with the international consensus on launching the Two-Pillar Plan in 2023, those countries and jurisdictions will start to adjust their tax policies, inclusive of increasing the income tax rate as well as basic tax rate. As long as the issue of "Taiwan companies abusing tax planning to hide wealth aboard and avoid domestic tax obligations" is not solved, this issue will lead to the continuous erosion of Taiwan taxing power.   Concretely, in order to reduce domestic tax burden, several Taiwan companies abusing tax planning to detain profits in foreign affiliated companies or disguise as foreign companies. Though Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services has taking effect, those companies pay income tax only on income generated in Taiwan instead of global income. Therefore, the Controlled Foreign Company Rules and the Place of Effective Management Rules have been proposed. (I) The Controlled Foreign Company Rules   A controlled foreign corporation (CFC) is a corporate entity that is registered and conducts business in foreign countries or jurisdictions, and is either directly or indirectly controlled by a resident taxpayer.   According to Article 43-3 of the Income Tax Act, if a parent company holds 50% or more of the shares of a foreign subsidiary, or has significant influence on such foreign subsidiary, the subsidiary may be seen as a conduit of the parent company and subject to domestic enterprise income, whether there is dividend distribution to the parent company or not, unless the subsidiary can pass the substantial activity test or its revenue is below a certain threshold.[19]   Yet, the “Paragraph 3”, compared with “Paragraph 4”, is not ruled the “a CFC can deduct the domestic income tax from foreign income tax it paid[20]”, which may result in double taxation.   The Taiwan CFC rules have not come into effect yet. However, according to the ancillary resolution passed by Legislative Yuan[21], our CFC Rules will come into effect within one year after the tax amnesty legislation, "The Management, Utilization, and Taxation of Repatriated Offshore Funds Act", expires. Namely, the Taiwan CFC Rules will finally come into effect in 2022 at the latest. (II) The Place of Effective Management Rules   The place of effective management (PEM) is defined as a place where key managements and commercial decisions a business entity substantially made.[22] This means, once a foreign company sets and operates a branch in Taiwan, and this branch substantially made key managements and commercial decisions for the foreign company, then it will be deemed as a PEM, the foreign company will also be deemed as a domestic company, and will be subject to tax assessment in accordance with the Taiwan Income Tax Act and other tax regulations.[23]   Following the PEM rules, which is incorporated into Article 43-4 of the Income Tax Act, the elements of PEM including (1) decision making location, (2) record keeping and maintenance location, and (3) actual operating location are all in Taiwan.   However, take foreign experience for example, German practice believes that the PEM rules only need to list "decision making location" as a necessary condition. The rest elements "record keeping and maintenance location" and "actual operating location" are more like reference factors than necessary conditions[24].   The Taiwan PEM rules list all three elements as necessary conditions, which may probably cause excessive restrictions on future applications. And the PEM Rules were announced by the MOF in July 2016, which have yet to take effect neither. (III) Attachment: The Sophisticated and Conflicting Tax System   The enterprise income tax rate in Taiwan is 20% to 24% in accordance with Article 5 (5) and Article 66-9 (1) of Income Tax Act. Still, to achieve specific policy goals by promoting or suppressing certain behaviors, a policy that oriented tax deductions and credits is called tax incentives, and the disadvantage of which is apparently turn the tax burden into inequality. In the end, to solve the inequality of tax burden resulting from tax incentives and to ensure tax revenue, the minimum tax will be levied by AMT. The AMT rate in Taiwan is 12% as aforementioned.   The implementation of tax incentives and AMT has made the domestic tax system over-complicated. Since the overused tax incentives have abnormally increase the amount of uncompetitive enterprises, who heavily rely on them. While the AMT may strangle the enterprises, who are compliance with economic policies. Then, the interaction and conflicts between tax incentives and AMT not just complicate the domestic tax system, also substantively result in unpredictability and inconsistency of domestic tax environment, which may cause a double-loss situation between tax revenue for the country and economic development policies. IV. Conclusions and Prospects (I) Conclusion Amend the Income Basic Tax Act and Increase Enterprise Rate to at Least 15%   First, those foreign enterprises without PE but create value in Taiwan are not ruled by IBT. Second, the enterprise IBT rate in Taiwan is now 12%, apparently lower than GMT of 15%. If IBT rate maintains 12% through 2023, the difference between GMT and IBT may be deemed as a harmful tax-based competition. Hence, it is imperative to amend the IBT to rule the foreign enterprises without PE but create value in Taiwan and increase the enterprise IBT rate to at least 15%.   Once consider that GMT is aimed at large MNCs, the IBT may adopt a categorized approach and set different rates based on the size of the enterprise. For instance, increase the IBT rate of MNCs that meet all GMT criteria to 15%, and the rest maintains 12%. Amend and Take CFC rules and PEM rules into effects   A domestic company pays income tax on global income, while a foreign company with PE in Taiwan pays income tax on income generated in Taiwan. Responding to digitalization, the implement of Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services regulates foreign companies without PE in Taiwan to pay income tax generated in Taiwan fairly.   It is necessary to implement both CFC rules and PEM rules, to prevent domestic companies from abusing tax planning to detain the profit in foreign affiliated companies or to disguise as foreign companies for reducing domestic tax burden, which may continuously eroding taxing power of Taiwan. However, CFC rules and PEM rules still leave some problems to be improved and solved as aforementioned, which is undoubtedly the obligation of Taiwan government. (II) Prospects Substantive Review the Tax Incentives and Reconstruction of Taiwan Tax System   The Reasoning of Interpretation No.565 mentioned that “[W]hile taxpayers should, under the principle of equality in taxation, pay taxes which they are supposed to pay according to their actual taxpaying ability, it is not forbidden by Article 7 of the Constitution to specify, with reasonable cause, differential treatments by way of exceptions or special provisions within the scope of discretion authorized by law to grant taxpayers of a particular class tax benefits in the form of tax reduction or exemption in order to promote the public interest.”.   The principle of ability-to-pay means that those who have greater ability to pay taxes, usually measured by income, wealth and financial capability, should pay more in taxes compared with those who have minor capability. Since taxation is the pecuniary obligation with non-counter performance under public law, the only foundation of legitimacy is the principle of ability-to-pay. Therefore, this is the core principle of the tax law.   To achieve specific policy goals, a policy that oriented tax deductions and credits to promote or suppress certain behaviors is called tax incentives, which can be permitted only in case of justifiable reasons presented. Nevertheless, the weak connection between the policy goals and the tax incentives made the acts, especially the tax incentives, unreasonable.   Additionally, the tax-form expenditure is generally a formal review of fiscal balance, no substantive review of the impact on principle of ability-to-pay taxation and the compensation for it. Under these premises, the excessively extended implementation period of tax incentives has resulting in severely unreasonable tax burden inequality and excessive reliance of uncompetitive enterprises on tax incentives.   To sum up, instead of implement the tax incentives to limit the principle of ability-to-pay, then solve it with AMT. The enactment, amendment and implement of tax laws must strictly abide by above principle. The restriction of above principle must be strictly review and limited as a whole. Namely, it is better to comply with the principle of ability-to-pay strictly. Therefore, it is important to substantively review the domestic tax incentives and reconstruct the domestic tax system. Ministry of Digital Development and The Tax Reform   Taiwan government is intending to form Ministry of Digital Development (MODD),[25] which is considered as a step toward the right direction to coordinate and expedite the development of Taiwan’s digital economy.   According to Article 1 of the Organizational Act of MODD, "[T]o promote the development of digital industries such as national communications, information, cyber security, network and communication, to undertake digital governance and digital infrastructure, and to assist the digital transformation of public and private sectors, the Executive Yuan has specially established the Ministry of Digital Development."[26]   However, in name of the above-mentioned policies and ideals, which may possibly related to tax policies. Thus, this article considered that, once the MODD is staffed with public servants and experts both proficient in tax law as well as forward-thinking, and given a clear mandate, the MODD may not only contribute significantly to both domestic digital transformation and the tax reform, but also improve the efficiency of tax administration and maximize the overall economic and social benefits. [1] OECD, 〈BEPS – Base Erosion and Profit Shifting〉, https://cleartax.in/s/beps-oecd (last visited Aug 20, 2021). [2] 拙著,〈柳暗花明的數位服務稅〉,工商時報名家評論,2021年5月17日,網址:https://view.ctee.com.tw/tax/29375.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年11月24日。 [3] 陳衍任,〈歐洲數位服務稅發展簡析〉,台灣經濟論衡,2020年3月,第18卷第1期,頁58,網址:https://www.ndc.gov.tw/Content_List.aspx?n=1BD4A3B93EF55A5F,最後瀏覽日:2021年4月21日。 [4] 拙著,〈勢在必行的全球企業最低稅負制〉,工商時報名家評論,2021年4月20日,網址:https://view.ctee.com.tw/tax/28814.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年11月24日。 [5] 拙著,〈勢在必行的全球企業最低稅負制〉,工商時報名家評論,2021年4月20日,網址:https://view.ctee.com.tw/tax/28814.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年11月24日。 [6] 拙著,〈取消數位服務稅已為國際趨勢〉,工商時報名家評論,2021年11月23日,網址:https://view.ctee.com.tw/economic/34152.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年11月24日。 [7] Mayer Brown LLP, 〈The G7 Agrees on a Broad Framework for Pillar One and Two〉, June 23, 2021, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2021/06/one-small-step-but-perhaps-one-giant-leap-for-global-tax-reform-the-g7-agrees-on-a-broad-framework-for-pillar-one-and-two (last visited Nov 11, 2021). [8] G20, 〈G20 ROME LEADERS’ DECLARATION〉, at 11 of 20, https://www.g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/G20-ROME-LEADERS-DECLARATION.pdf (last visited Nov 11, 2021). [9] OECD, 〈Mauritania joins the Inclusive Framework on BEPS and participates in the agreement to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy〉, https://www.oecd.org/tax/mauritania-joins-the-inclusive-framework-on-beps-and-participates-in-the-agreement-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.htm (last visited Nov 11, 2021). [10] Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising From the Digitalization of the Economy, at 4 (Aug 2021), available at https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf (last visited Aug 20, 2021). [11] Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2010 (Full Version), at c(5)-1 (2010), available at https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2010_9789264175181-en#page208 (last visited Aug 20, 2021) [12] 稅捐稽徵法第12條之1第1項:「涉及租稅事項之法律,其解釋應本於租稅法律主義之精神,依各該法律之立法目的,衡酌經濟上之意義及實質課稅之公平原則為之。」亦有釋字第420、460、496、519、597、625及第700號供參。 [13] 資誠,〈法國徵數位服務稅,我不跟進〉,2019年7月24日報導,網址:https://www.pwc.tw/zh/news/media/media-20190724-1.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年4月15日。 [14] 財政部賦稅署,〈外國營利事業跨境銷售電子勞務課徵所得稅制度簡介〉,2018年4月27日,頁1以下,網址:https://www.dot.gov.tw/download/dot_201804270002_1_doc_476,最後瀏覽日:2021年4月21日。 [15] 中華民國94年12月28日總統華總一義字第09400212601號令制定公布全文18條;本條例施行日期除另有規定外,自95年1月1日施行。 [16] 所得基本稅額條例第1條:為維護租稅公平,確保國家稅收,建立營利事業及個人所得稅負擔對國家財政之基本貢獻,特制定本條例。 [17] 財政部台財稅字第10100670710號函:自102年度起營利事業基本稅額之徵收率為12%。 [18] 所得基本稅額條例第3條第1項第5款:營利事業或個人除符合下列各款規定之一者外,應依本條例規定繳納所得稅:五、所得稅法第七十三條第一項規定之非中華民國境內居住之個人或在中華民國境內無固定營業場所及營業代理人之營利事業。 [19] 所得稅法第43條之3第1項:營利事業及其關係人直接或間接持有在中華民國境外低稅負國家或地區之關係企業股份或資本額合計達百分之五十以上或對該關係企業具有重大影響力者,除符合下列各款規定之一者外,營利事業應將該關係企業當年度之盈餘,按其持有該關係企業股份或資本額之比率及持有期間計算,認列投資收益,計入當年度所得額課稅:一、關係企業於所在國家或地區有實質營運活動。二、關係企業當年度盈餘在一定基準以下。但各關係企業當年度盈餘合計數逾一定基準者,仍應計入當年度所得額課稅。 [20] 參考「所得稅法增訂第43條之3建立我國受控外國公司(CFC)課稅依據,係以受控外國公司當年度盈餘,依控制公司對其持有之資本比率按「權益法」認列之國外投資收益。惟查此依權益法認列之投資收益,似漏未規定該關係企業在國外已納所得稅額可予扣抵,恐形成公司階段稅負重複課稅;對照本條第4項規範營利事業於實際獲配股利或盈餘時,國外已納所得稅額得予扣抵之規定,其疏漏自明。」立法院,〈受控外國公司課稅新制相關問題評析〉,110年8月,網址:https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=6590&pid=210513,最後瀏覽日:2021年10月25日。 [21] 境外資金匯回管理運用及課稅條例自2019年8月15日起施行,施行期間2年,已於今(2021)年8月14日失效,故我國CFC制度至遲於明(2022)年8月14日前報請行政院核定施行日期。參考「另附帶決議針對105年增訂之「所得稅法」第43條之3條文(營利事業CFC制度),與106年增訂之「所得基本稅額條例」第12條之1條文(個人CFC制度),要求財政部於本案施行期滿後1年內報請行政院核定施行日期,有助落實反避稅條款。」立法院,〈制定境外資金匯回管理運用及課稅條例〉, 網址:https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=33324&pid=184215,最後瀏覽日:2021年8月20日。 [22] OECD, 〈THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION ON THE APPLICATION OF “PLACE OF EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT”AS A TIE BREAKER RULE〉, at 4 (Feb 2001), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/1923328.pdf (last visited Aug 20, 2021). [23] 所得稅法第43條之4第1項:依外國法律設立,實際管理處所在中華民國境內之營利事業,應視為總機構在中華民國境內之營利事業,依本法及其他相關法律規定課徵營利事業所得稅;有違反時,並適用本法及其他相關法律規定。 [24] 參考「從德國的經驗回頭看台灣可以發現:台灣雖然立意良善地將「決策者或決策地」、「帳簿及會議紀錄的製作或儲存地」,以及「實際執行主要經營活動地」,「同時」列為PEM的認定標準。然而,其中只有「決策者或決策地」確實屬於PEM認定上的必要條件;至於將「財務報表、會計帳簿紀錄、董事會議事錄或股東會議事錄的製作或儲存處所」及「實際執行主要經營活動地」也列為PEM的認定標準,恐怕就值得商榷。因為上述兩項標準,固然可以作為認定企業的PEM是否在台灣境內的「參考因素」,但卻不適合作為認定企業的PEM在台灣境內的『必要條件』」。陳衍任,〈實際管理處所在適用上的爭議問題〉,月旦會計實務研究,2018年3月,頁29以下。 [25] 2021 Taiwan White Paper Overview, 〈Facing New and Existing Challenges Head On〉, at WP7 (2021), https://amcham.com.tw/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/June-2021-Taiwan-Business-TOPICS.pdf (last visited Aug 20, 2021). [26] 作者自譯。

Introduction of the Revision of Article 22 and the Addition of Article 67-3 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation

Introduction of the Revision of Article 22 and the Addition of Article 67-3 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation 2025/06/04 I. Foreword Taiwan is enhancing overseas investment screening and technology security through modifications to the Statute for Industrial Innovation (hereinafter the Statute). The current updated Statute has demonstrated the international trend in tightening control over technology sector through means of investment. In a globalized arena of technology competition, Taiwan is spearheading the development of such a control mechanism. At the outset, the Statute was enacted in 2010 for elevating industrial innovation, improvement of the industrial environment and enhancement of industrial competitiveness. It’s broadly inclusive in the sectors within the purview of its governance in agricultural, industrial and service businesses. On April 18, 2025, the Legislative Yuan passed a bill modifying several provisions, including Article 22 and the newly added Article 67-3. Subsequently, on May 7, 2025, the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) promulgated the modified provisions, including Article 22 and the newly added Article 67-3. The effective dates for Articles 22 and 67-3 will be determined by the Executive Yuan. The Statute has now been revised to reflect the growing geopolitical and economic pressures Taiwan faces as a global leader in semiconductors and high-tech manufacturing in response to increasing concerns over technology security and capital outflows. The critical essence here to safeguard key know-how lies in Article 22 and 67-3. Article 22 governs the approval process for overseas investments, while Article 67-3 stipulates penalties for non-compliance. The revised Article 22 now is explicitly allowing the Ministry of Economic Affairs (hereinafter MOEA) to reject or conditionally approve outbound investments if they are deemed to fit into certain conditions. Together with the newly-added Article 67-3, those who are violating Article 22 will be subject to penalties. These amendments reflect a broader regulatory shift toward strengthening screening of outbound investments, particularly in sectors involving sensitive technologies. This article discusses the current legislative trend and the implication of latest statutory revision on Article 22 and 67-3. II. Article 22: Expanding the Scope of Investment Screening Under its original form, Article 22 required company incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Company Act of Republic of China (Taiwan) to obtain prior approval from relevant authorit(ies) for overseas investments exceeding NTD one and a half billion (approximately USD forty-eight million). This threshold-based approach was primarily designed to monitor large-scale capital outflows and ensure such investments aligned with national industrial policy. However, the latest amendment significantly redefines the scope of the authority’s review. Firstly, the subject matter of the Statute has been expanded to include juridical person organized and registered pursuant to the Limited Partnership Act of Republic of China (Taiwan). Therefore, persons subject to the application of the Statute are now limited partnerships and companies registered according to the applicable law. Secondly, Article 22 now provides foundation to the MOEA to require prior approval for outbound investments based not only on the investment amount but also on the nature, destination and strategic importance of the investment. Specifically, the amendment allows the MOEA to review and disapprove when it is determined the investment is of: 1. Impact on national security, such as defense and military 2. Impact on national economic development with significant adverse effects, such as undermining the supply chain resilience and security of Taiwan’s internationally leading position in or key industries of. 3. Influence on the Government to comply with international treaty, agreement or pact, such as the overseas investment or operation of the company influencing the Government to sign or voluntarily comply with international treaties agreement or pact, or is a breach of implementation of relevant treaties, agreement or pact. 4. Violation of the Labor Standards Act entailing major labor-capital issues that have yet to be resolved, such as malicious closure of factory closure and relocation of capital that affects labors' rights. In fact, similar provision regulating investment for the concern of national security is not new. A comparable regulatory mechanism may be traced back to Article 3 of the MOEA Guidelines for Reviewing and Supervising Investments in Semiconductor and LCD Panel Industries in Mainland China (在大陸地區投資晶圓鑄造廠積體電路設計積體電路封裝積體電路測試與液晶顯示器面板廠關鍵技術審查及監督作業要點, hereinafter the Guidelines). The Guidelines require that investments, such as establishing or acquiring 12-inch wafer foundries, IC design, packaging and testing operations exceeding USD fifty million, or LCD panel plants in Mainland China be subject to investment review by a Key Technology Task Force convened by the MOEA. Notably, this task force may include representatives from national security agencies, underscoring the long-standing policy to integrate security considerations into industrial and investment regulation. The alignment of the amended Statute with these existing security-based review frameworks reflects a broader institutionalization of national security as a key factor in Taiwan's outbound investment governance. In considering the above factor and in evaluating the conditions on the approval process, the amended Article 22 has added that the MOEA is authorized to consult with relevant authorities on providing the rules implementing the review of the specific investment destination country or regions, the specific industry or know-how, the threshold investment amount, the application procedures and other compliance matters. Importantly, the MOEA may fully or conditionally reject application of approvals if the investment is deemed to be contrary to national interests. This expanded regulatory framework is aimed at preventing the leakage of critical technology and intellectual capital to particular countries or regions that may pose strategic or economic risks to Taiwan. It aligns with global trends where countries are re-evaluating their foreign investment regimes to address national security concerns. III. Article 67-3: Aligning with the Purpose of Revision of Article 22 Through Stronger Penalties The newly added Article 67-3 introduces a robust penalty regime to enforce compliance with the amended Article 22. Previously, the Statute did not provide penalties for parties’ failure to seek required investment approvals. However, such a provision lacked sufficient enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, to prevent leakage of key know-how leading to erosion of industry competiveness and forming foundation to the threat of the country, for purpose of legal compliance, Article 67-3 has explicitly laid out the consequences to violation of Article 22. Under the revised provisions, companies that fail to comply with investment approval rules now face: 1. Fine(s) not less than NTD fifty thousand and not more than NTD one million and; 2. Mandatory withdrawal from the overseas venture, order of correction, cease the investment, where applicable. 3. In the event that the violator fails to comply with imposed conditions or fails to rectify the violation within the required time limit, the authority may impose fines not less than NTD five hundred thousand and not more than NTD ten million upon the violator for each and every violation in order to enforce regulatory control. In addition, to ensure effective enforcement of regulatory conditions and instructions issued by the MOEA, Article 67-3 further provides penalties targeting non-compliance with terms attached to overseas investment approvals or corrective orders issued under Article 22. Specifically, with regard to the conditions, restrictions, or other requirements MOEA imposed under Article 22 Paragraph 3 when granting approval for overseas investments, failure to fulfill the foregoing may lead to fine(s) not less than NTD five hundred thousand and not more than NTD ten million per violation. This enforcement mechanism serves to deter regulatory breaches in sensitive outbound investment activities. In light of rising global concerns over economic security and the protection of key technologies, Article 67-3 has been added to strengthen the regulatory framework for outbound investment. In sum, the introduction of Article 67-3 serves to reinforce the legal force of Article 22 by establishing a clear and enforceable penalty framework. This provision fills a critical gap in the Statute by providing the relevant authorit(ies) with the necessary tools to ensure compliance and deter unauthorized outbound investments. IV. Conclusion The amended Article 22 and newly added Article 67-3 are not merely administrative changes but represent a strategic recalibration of Taiwan’s industrial and security policy. Taiwan’s economic model has long emphasized innovation, global integration and export-driven growth. But with growing external pressure to align with allied democratic nations on technology controls, the policy is now steering toward balance with caution. It is also strengthening its national security through reducing vulnerability to economic coercion. Such a move not only gestures to preserve Taiwan’s competitive edge in strategic industries, but also ensures that public subsidies and domestic R&D efforts are not inadvertently diverted to foreign rivals. This shift also reflects the evolution in Taiwan’s approach to outbound investment regulation. The amended legislation introducing a more comprehensive review criteria under Article 22, along with the enforcement mechanism in Article 67-3, enhances the ability to respond proactively to emerging risks, whether they stem from the nature of the technology, the destination of the investment, or potential violations of domestic legal and labor standards. Looking ahead, these legislative changes could prompt companies to re-evaluate their international strategies. At the same time, it is expected that a strengthened policy in domestic innovation ecosystem through targeted incentives should be introduced to balance the current trend of investment screening. In sum, the latest changes underscore a broader shift toward reinforcing economic security and industrial self-reliance while navigating the complexities of a rapidly shifting global technological landscape. Disclaimer: This article was prepared as part of the work at the Institute for Information Industry. While it is published under the author's name, its title and content do not necessarily represent the personal views of the author. This article is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

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