Oct/30/2006 I. Intellectual Property Management among Taiwanese Firms: Status Quo and Problems 1. Current status of management of intellectual properties among Taiwan-based enterprises Way from Taiwan's participation into World Trade Organization (WTO) effective January 1st, 2002, huge impacts have been brought upon our domestic enterprises, since, apart from competition coming from giant international manufacturers, they have to meet challenges coming from elsewhere in the world. Besides, the arrival of a time when knowledge became an integral part of the economy in which we find ourselves, profits realizable to an enterprise depends largely on the control of market and on R&D of key technology, such that intellectual property alone is a sure key to the earning of profits and growth of modern enterprises to which admirable economical worth may be created commensurably. Intellectual properties owned by the enterprise should make it such that corporate know-how is thereby transformed into marketable commodities to stand in a viable position among competitors. An overall observation of the management system in our domestic enterprises or organizations indicated that management of intellectual properties is scattered among Education or Training units, R&D units, Legal Service Units, rather than detitle with collectively or through flow control. Management of intellectual property as such by and large would fail to produce immediate or admirable benefits to the enterprise, serving at most to avoid occasioning of losses, in fact and indeed it is but through strategic exploitation of an intellectual property management system would it be possible to pursue a share of the market or to realize licensed proceeds. 2. Problems facing domestic enterprises with respect to management of intellectual properties Renowned firms based in Taiwan and active in the prosecution of management of intellectual properties do so primarily because their executive realized how grave a loss could be incurred to corporate assets and corporate operation due to infringement charges, Taking the infringement charge by an alien firm against a certain domestic firm early January, 2006, for example, to reach a compromise a payment amounting to approx, US$85,000,000 was necessary, and that claiming a share of 10% of the Company's annual revenue, that lesson has taught the Company to pour mass resources in the establishment and execution of intellectual management system. In the Knowledge-based Economy of today, no top management of any enterprise or organization would deny the importance of the management of intellectual properties, understanding alone, however, would not suffice to push the Company getting to work forthwith, because the buildup of an intellectual property management system will of necessity incur a lot of costs, seeing the want of possibility to obtain any investment return all at once, most enterprises or organizations would have their intellectual property management systems designed essential to prevent infringement upon other part's intellectual properties. Notwithstanding that our local manufacturers have gradually come to their senses as regards the importance of intellectual properties, larger scale ones, confronted with cutthroat pricing competition in the global market, is largely harassed with litigation on infringement of intellectual properties; whereas the medium and small businesses, owing to inadequate manpower and funding resources, were largely unable to go for in-depth development of intellectual properties, still, a key to consistent development of our local industries lies in a sound planning of the intellectual property management system, amid the current of the Knowledge-based Economy featuring the 2lst century, the creation and protection of intellectual property rights is a critical index to the upholding of our national competition. So top issues on the agenda for competent authorities in charge of industrial sectors include; assisting local businesses or organizations to implement systematic management of intellectual properties, to retain, accumulate intellectual properties produced by its employees and convert same into intellectual assets, to thereby upgrade their competitive margin, this chain of efforts must be formed in a grand cycle encompassing all the staff, to stand firm and last. II. Formation and orientation of Taiwan's standards on management of intellectual properties 1. The origin of Taiwan's regulation of the standards on management of intellectual properties Impacts brought to local industries in the wake of Taiwan's participation in WTO have taught both the Administration and the Industry to realize, in the long run, that protection of intellectual strength and exploitation of intangible assets can redound much to build up competitive margin, Now that our nationwide economic and trade activities have entered global, international scale, the number one issue is to emphasize protection of intellectual properties if only it accounts to move further into transnational frontier and let our national competition be felt there, what's more, protection of intellectual properties is an obligation laden upon all the member states of WTO, and that consistent with our national interests Yet protection of intellectual properties is a comprehensive, integrally interrelated task demanding nationwide consensus, calling for unreserved cooperation across governmental, civil, administrative and legislative channels, if only any effect to be expected accounts, yes indeed it is but through an environment propitious to the safeguarding of intellectual properties can R&D tank go deeply rooted in this country, therein lies rightly a sure key to permanent survival of our nation at large. The buildup of a convenient, effective and low-cost intellectual property management system in lieu of discrete controls seen traditionally in our local enterprises or organizations, will help the enterprises to effectively control and safeguard their intellectual properties, and that sub serving to protect their proper interests, reduce risks of theft, and restraint from encroaching upon the intellectual properties of third parties, besides, roytitleies through licensing arrangement will redound to corporate revenue, that paralleled with boosted marketing competition, intellectual properties protected and exploited as such will mark a resounding foundation for lasting development in our times where know-how alone is the king. The foreground being recited above, in 2003 and 2004 the Intellectual Property Office, a department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (IPO for short), appointed Science and Technology Law Center, a unit under Institute for Information Industry (STLC for short), to establish an intellectual property management system suitable for local enterprises (Then known as “Intellectual Property Management System Standard”, in the hope that by the implementation of standardized intellectual property management procedure and promotion of same, local enterprises may remain less likely to getting involved in infringement charges, among other benefits foreseeable with exploitation of properly owned intellectual property rights. 2. Orientation of Taiwan's intellectual rights standards On December 9, 2004, the Ministry of Economic Affairs held a Conference on “Deliberation on the instituting and promotion of standards for the management of intellectual properties of Taiwan”, whereat a resolution was reached to work for Taiwan Intellectual Property Management System basing on the Intellectual Property Management System Standard proposed by STLC under trust for Intellectual Property Office, eventually it is hoped that through national standard certifying processing said Intellectual Property Management System Standard be instituted as our National Standard, to build up a nationally acknowledged credibility. Enterprises would then be encouraged to introduce for themselves a certifying mark once entitled through certification, and efforts will follow to see that the Intellectual Property Protection System be instilled in day-to-day realities, the whole system would by then be promoted internationally so that the image of our nation as an active protector of intellectual properties will one day be known to the world at large. However, as it will take years to have a national standard institutionalized, moreover, the enterprises at large are not sufficiently informed with the notion of the management of intellectual properties, the first step might well be to build up an Intellectual Property Management System Rating Scheme, to be followed with specification of supplemental procedures, and the same on completion, be recommended to the industry circle, and progression to applying for national standard would begin only if extensive consensus is obtained in the first place, paralleled with correlation with international realities, After the task was transferred to the Industrial Development Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (IDB for short), in 2005, it was reoriented to the positioning of industrial specification, that anyway helps local enterprises or organizations to build up a wholesome intellectual property management system. To adapt to industrial convention respecting specifications, the Intellectual Property Management System deliberate herein is named “Taiwan Intellectual Property Management System” (TIPS for short). The TIPS which is in the charge of the IDB is indicated for autonomous introduction by individual enterprises or organizations, in the hope that a systematic model for the management of intellectual properties would help correlate existent hardware facilities with ad hoc Intellectual Property Management so that a convenient, effective and low-cost management system be easier founded for the enterprise or organization concerned, in place of traditional trivial, random management practices 3. Process of formation of Taiwan intellectual property management standards While the establishment of Intellectual Property Management Standard was still in progress for the STLC, there was already lots of matured management standard system among international communities for consultation, including, for example, the ISO Quality Management System. So eventually in 2003, 2004, the Intellectual Bureau encrusted the STLC to analyze the ISO9001:2000 Quality Management System in terms of its spirits and structures, and to look into the possibilities for combination with Intellectual Property Management as well, so that, in the affirmative case, what needs be done is to work out an Intellectual Property Management Standard to which all kinds of business and industry may fit, and that will help to achieve procedural flow, efficiency and standardization all at the same time. The ISO9001:2000 Quality Management System is a standard established by ISO (International Organization for Standardization), and which is currently a Quality Management System running around the world. In the year 2000 ISO combined through amendments of ISO9001, ISO9002 and ISO9003 published titleogether in 1994, to form ISO 9001:2000. ISO 9001:2000 since replaces all the previous standards and stands as the only and sole standard for certification, featuring emphasis on the consolidated functioning of Quality Management Systems and the target for comprehensive Quality Management. The ISO 9001:2000 based the entire system structure on PDCA Management Cycle (Plan-Do-Check-Action), way up from the Management Level, setting corporate quality policies and targets as dictated by customer needs, whereby planning of corporate resources is decisive in production and service outputs, what with measuring and monitor mechanism to persistently improve functioning of the entire quality system. With respect to various operational procedures in an enterprise or organization, a four-step PDCA comprising: (1) Plan, whereby quality policy is formulated; (2) Do; (3) Check, as to the outcome of what has been done; and (4) Action, corrective and preventive by nature; will intervene to help resolve problems as they arise and hence, achieve the targets. Abiding by aforementioned PDCA model, the STLC will firstly incorporate the Intellectual Property Management Standard into ISO 9001:2000 Quality Control System, thence consult the ISO system structure to split into 0 to 8 units: General Description, Scope of Application, Reference Standards, Definitions, Intellectual Property Management System, Management Commitment, Resource Management, Procurement, of Intellectual Proprieties, efforts as such should help the enterprises to promptly set up hard environments necessary to the management of corporate intellectual properties, and make the STLC easier in lending a hand to facilitate substantive functioning of corporate intellectual property management systems. Intellectual Property Management Standards incorporated to ISO system will prove more structurally effective, and help the enterprise to rapidly lay a foundation for the management of their intellectual properties, so that hopefully they may more effectively manage, make use of their intellectual properties, whereby to fortify their competitive margin, so that in the long run the overall international competitive margin of our industries is upgraded. A common goal for the design and setup of intellectual property, management standards lies in searching for the maximum possible assent from the industrial society so that an auditing or certification platform be created to benefit the intellectual property management system that is working for any enterprise or organization in this country, in order for such systems one by one will necessarily conform to prescribed standards, minimum requirements from given organizations or stipulated in statutes inclusive, not to mention the ultimate goal of better protection and exploitation of intellectual properties, in a lawful and satisfying manner. However, as yet no consensus has been reached as regards the establishment of a national standard respecting management of intellectual properties, yet there is still a need for management of intellectual property rights among local enterprises or organizations, to offer the utmost assistance possible to them all, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has taken the initiative to revise what was once Intellectual Property Management Standard into Intellectual Property Management Specifications, and such is positioned as an industrial specification. By instructive posture, subjects considered suitable to accept said Intellectual Property Management Specifications include all kinds of organizations irrespective of their category, scale, products or services offered. Even units or ad hoc groups in a given organization may qualify for inclusion, including, for example, a company in its entirety, or a specific division of that company, a laboratory or production program. 4. Anticipated Benefits That the IDB is sparing no effort in the preparation of Intellectual Property Management Specifications is underlined with multiple objects, to offer a unified structure for the management of measurable intellectual properties, to help enterprises simplify their procedures of management of intellectual properties, to enlighten the object enterprises or organizations with the understanding and what to expect from an Intellectual Property Management System. If only management of intellectual properties is incorporated into routine operation of an enterprise whatsoever, and that concept spread afar internationally, that would certainly help to build our national image as a country that is brave enough to initiate protection of intellectual properties. In the mean while, with ever increasing demand for the setup of intellectual property management systems, a reality as such in the foreground, a good chance is struck to enlarge the service market or intellectual property management services emanation from Taiwan, and that sub serving to the development of know-how service industry, a surplus for the service industry by any rate. An enterprise or organization by the establishment of intellectual property management system may expect the following benefits; Increased competitive strength and creation of additional value. Once an Intellectual Property Management System is there, the facilitation to maximize intellectual properties will redound to corporate competition, while help creation more of additional value. Taking our sports implements industry or the vehicle lights manufacturers in Taichung area for example, intellectual properties are present in the products and in the production process as well, to make available diversified options for the purchasing parties, thereby greatly enhancing additional value to the products, interpreted to mean more profits realizable over pure OEMs. Avoidance of vicious cycle, increased will to placement of purchasing order. If only optimum use is made of intellectual properties such that they are represented in the products, in the process or even in the technology itself, Taiwanese manufacturers who are basically OEMs may avoid the painful dilemma of vicious competition, and may even make it may avoid the painful dilemma of vicious competition, and cay even make it for overseas buyers to be core willing to place orders, Taking again as an example a TIPS induced manufacturer, 2005, the Universal Scientific Industrial Co., Ltd., after the USI has built internal intellectual property management system pursuant to TIPS specifications, alien clients on the point of placing orders may very soon be adequately informed with the model the USI takes respecting their management of intellectual properties, satisfied that the products being purchased are largely safe from infringement of other's proprietary rights, the alien buyer may be willing to place more and greater orders. Reduced management costs, creation of greater profits. Most Taiwan-based medium and small businesses are far from being able to input mass manpower or material resources simply to build up systematically structured intellectual property management system. The meaning of introducing TIPS specifications lies simply in the close embodiment of existent hard equipments with management of intellectual properties for any intending enterprise whatsoever, so that a full set of convenient, effective and low-cost management may come into being in lieu of random and discrete management practice which has been the case for years or even for generations. Obvious benefits with such an arrangement include protection of proper interests, preclusion of encroachment upon the proprietary rights of third parties, and perhaps the possibility of granting licensing arrangements to earn roytitleies for the company. III. Implementation of Taiwan Intellectual Property Management Standards: History and Current Situation From 2006, the way to promoting the Intellectual Property Management System is prosecuted in the form of specifications submitted to industries in the hope that industries would establish their own intellectual property management systems using such specifications, through systematic flows, efforts as such should help to boost corporate competition, and the keynote has therefore shifted from once where it was, that was, verifying if a given industry had introduced and honestly follow specified Intellectual Property Management System against given standards. What follows below is a phase-wise account of the history of implementation of Taiwan's Intellectual Property Management Standards: 1. Trial Phase Emphasis placed on Intellectual Properties following Taiwan participation in WTO has driven the IPO to appoint the STLC to formulate a full set of standards for the management of intellectual properties based on a structure and morale embodying ISO 9001:2000 Quality Control Systems, and the same intended for trial introduction into local industries in addition to personnel training and promotion purposes. In this phase important businesses on the agenda include: To launch the institution, the intellectual property management standard will be firstly introduced into three manufacturers beginning in 2004, whereby manufacturer's comments collected in the counseling process will turn to account for reference for amendment considerations respecting said Intellectual Property Management Standard, with outcome of the introduction serving as a model for other manufacturers. As regards promotion, suitable promotion scheme will be put into effect to introduce Intellectual property Management Standard to enterprises or organizations to which predecessor experiences will be supplied as well, whose newly gained experiences would be shared among other enterprises for reference in Outcome Sharing Party activities. As regards counseling input, there have been 3 manufacturers in 2004, Asia Optical Co., Inc., Cheng Uei (Foxlink) Precision Industry Co., Ltd. and HiTRUST Inc., receiving trial introduction of Intellectual Property Management Standard whereby each has had their own Intellectual Property Management System established. As regards personnel training, seeds have been chosen who, after having received training on relevant curriculums, betook themselves to assisting enterprises or organizations introducing Intellectual Property Management Standards, this in turn benefits the seeds with on-job experiences such that they turned out better prepared to demonstrate counseling, assessment capabilities in the face of future promotion tasks, As regards R&D tasks, consistent brainstorming for the working of supplemental or operating procedures necessary for the promotion of Intellectual Property Management Standards, prepping up comprehensive implementation programs based on experiences accumulated over practical and personal involvements. 2. Demonstrative Introduction Phase Since promotion task is passed to the IDB in 2005, efforts to institute Intellectual Property Management Standard switched to introducing Intellectual Property Management Specifications where the top concern is to be helpful for the industries concerned. On the basis of as is Intellectual Property Management Specifications and prep up verification mechanism; Seen in the result of institutional promotion, out of stipulations and regulations conditioning the promotion of intellectual property management system that is persistently deliberated by the STLC on behalf of the IDB, a total of 11 documents nave been released pertinent to supplemental procedures and relevant date, plus up to 10 errands comprising reviewing of statutory provisions and effecting of major amendments. As regards promotion efforts; done are printing of notes on application of counseling services, brief introduction of Intellectual Property Management System, Specification of Intellectual property Management System, Paragon of Management Handbook and Guide to Assessors. Promotion efforts were consummated in 3 promotion seminars which took place in the north, central and southern part of Taiwan respectively, also done is an outcome share party where the protagonist is paragon manufacturer introducing the system in question; cooperation has been an event with Economic Daily News which has given an in-depth coverage on paragon counsel case. Forum on the media Economic Daily News whereat reputed scholars on intellectual property issues and experts in practice, such as Professor Ming-Yan Shieh of National Taiwan University, Professor Chung-Jen Cheng of Shih Hsin University, have been attending. As regards counseling for introduction, a total of 8 middle or smaller businesses have been successfully counseled into introduction for exemplification purposes in 2005, they are: Yulon-Nissan, Asia Optical Co., Inc., Advanced Connectek Inc. (ACON), Meifu Technologies, Universal Scientific Industrial Co., Ltd. (USI), Cycling & Hetitleh Tech Industry R&D Center (CHC), Apex Nanotechnology Corporation, and AURORA Office Automation Corp. 4 counsel execution meetings have been held, plus one Pre-assessment Seminar, on-the-spot written evaluation has been conducted with respect to 8 exemplary induced manufacturers. As regards personnel training, a total of 98 person-rounds have benefited under training programs encompassing: induction seeds, internal auditors, exemplary counselors, reserved seeds. 3. The Weighted Promotion Phase Following conclusion of infrastructural consolidation in 2005, diagnostic service was given to have a close check on existent intellectual property management system that was working in enterprises and organizations, this effort in concert with experiences accumulated through exemplary inducement, in 2006, in order to find out actual needs against differentials in place for promotion and rectification of the specifications in use of the management of intellectual properties: Institutionally, way from 2006 the unified designation “Taiwan Intellectual Property Management System” (TIPS) will apply as a common technical specification in sectors including: industry, government, schools, R&D interests, Follow-up promotion tasks will continue in the form of a team comprising interested scholars, experts invited by the grace of the Industry Bureau, in charge of strategic planning, execution, supervision, and literature screening. As regards promotion and propagation, in 2006 it is largely through self-assessment and evaluation, to which participation is on a voluntary basis with notices served on induced enterprises of organizations, To spread afar the inducement movement so that more and more people are adequately enlightened with what is all about TIPS, a total of 3 instruction seminars have been sponsored in the north, central and south to go pursuant to the inducement experience concluded in 2005, plus several occasions of manufacturers’ conceptual exchange meetings. As regards counseled inducements, a total of 30 manufacturers have benefits under the TIPS diagnostic service as offered, they are: Tatung Co., Taiwan Design Center (TDC), King Car Industrial Co., Ltd., Systex Corporation, National Nano Device Laboratories (NDL), National Center for High-Performance Computing (NCHC), Chi Mei Frozen Food Co., Ltd., Eastech Electronics (Taiwan) Inc., Lee Chi Enterprise Co., Ltd., WisTek, PRIT Biotech Co., Ltd, Intech Taiwan Corporation, Yeastern Biotech Co., Ltd., Yangsen Biotechnology Co., Ltd., Apex Biotechnology Corp. (ApexBio), Taiwan Electric Voice Co., Ltd. (TEV), Gewise Industrial Inc., SportsArt Industrial Co., Chien Yuan Food Chemicals Co., Ltd., Unicare Biotechnology Corp., Tek Maker Corporation, Chi Lin Technology Co., Ltd., Ihetitleh Co., Ltd., A3000 System Co., Ltd., Standard Chem. & Pharm. Co., Ltd., Jwo Ruey Technical Co., Ltd., Omni Hetitleh Group, Alinc Taiwan Co., Ltd., Marie International Co., Ltd., S.Z.S. Co., Ltd., each of them outstanding and highly revered in their respective field of avocation. From them 5 manufacturers have been chosen to account for exemplary TIPS inducement cases, these are: TDC, King Car Industrial Co., Ltd, Systex Corporation, Yeastern Biotech Co., Ltd., SportsArt Industrial Co., to demonstrate how the recommended Intellectual Property Management Specification works in reality, As regards personnel training services: one round of Tips inducement trainee course and one round of TIPS self-assessment trainee course have been sponsored to benefit a total of 91 person-rounds 16 professionals have been entered on registration as counselors, one round of assessment commissioner pre-task seminar has been sponsored. IV. Outlook of Future Planning Based on the consensus reached in “Conference to Work for the Instituting and Promotion of Taiwan Intellectual Property Management Standard” sponsored by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, universal promotion of the intellectual property management system will be implemented continually in phases so that same may be introduced to industries different in scale or fields of interest with more flexibilities, comprising both enterprises and organizations: Institutionally, specifications will adapt to the scale and classification of the industry concerned, with possibilities to allow for the planning of simplified versions and industry-specific versions, besides, the introducing of TIPS specifications will inevitably incur the necessity of integrality with existent ISO systems, owing to limited timing allowed for counseling intervention, the Industry Bureau will firstly strive for the buildup of TIPS with as many as possible manufacturers. Embodiment of ISO with TIPS is a precondition to introducing the latter, since ISO is an internationally recognized standard, in so far as TIPS fails to be combined with ISO, to target industries the inducement task is always a mission impossible, As regards promotion and propagation, the government is planning to qualify industries to which the suggested intellectual property management system has been introduced successfully as eligible for extra score when they go applying for benefit under Creative R&D Counsel Plan, or for favorable terms in closing same plan, this as an incentive to induce more manufacturers, Being considered is the editing of Inducement Manual which would include introduction of exemplary cases, exemplary inducement procedures, to help build up interchange of inducement experiences among manufacturers, More concrete encouragement means will be offered to pilot manufacturers who are willing to set themselves as paragon in the inducement movement, and manuals disclosing governmental resources relevant to the issue of intellectual properties will be compiled for manufacturers' reference; sponsoring promotion seminars addressed to specific group of manufacturers, whereat pilot manufacturers will give an account of their own initiation experiences. As regards inducement counseling, a review of the background of manufacturers to which TIPS has been introduced will yield the notion that most of our traditional industries or medium and small technique R&D oriented concerns fell short of the manpower and experience necessary for management of intellectual properties, so they very much need and wish that the government assist them to build their own Intellectual Property Management System. To alleviate cost burden on the intending enterprises or organizations, being envisioned is enlargement of scope of reach of services in coordination with e-mail dominant autonomous verification system, phase-wise inducement mode may be introduced eventually to help reinforce the autonomous verification software capabilities, and to assist induced plants in operation. Currently the target is set at reaching titleogether 300 manufacturers who are able to run autonomous verifications under TIPS by the year 2008, meanwhile 50 rounds of TIPS external assessments are completed for the manufacturers and titleogether 120 clients having received TIPS diagnostic services. As to personnel training, being continually sponsored are training courses, under planning are certifying training agency buildup programs so that the training service may spread wide afar, by the year 2008 a total of 280 TIPS professionals will have been turned out due to training efforts; it is believed that more individuals would be attracted by appealing on the importance of intellectual properties with respect to corporations and individuals alike, so as to prolong and spread benefits by reason of resource input. As regards R&D progressions, as incessant improvements, researching efforts are indispensable to the buildup of impeccable intellectual property management system; current status of intellectual property management among local industries will be surveyed persistently in parallel with studying of present status of intellectual property managements around the world. It is hoped that through personnel training, what with publication, exchange and transmission of experiences accumulated with intellectual property management system or institutions, incessant improvement of intellectual property management system, setup of evaluation scheme respecting and so as to make more wholesome intellectual property management systems, the day will come sooner for “Wholesale and universal institutionalization of generalized intellectual property management systems across the manufacturers, legal persons, consortium in particular, researching institute throughout Taiwan” to come true. V. Conclusions: A Reliable statistic source in 2006 claimed that the percentage of commercialization by local manufacturers to whom patent rights have been granted against application is merely 0.3%, which figure is 10 times behind the corresponding average in international communities, the latter being 3% It is advisable for our manufacturers to realize that innovation and intellectual property management are independent of capital resources, management subsequent to the acquisition of patent privileges must never go slow or put aside. The prime object of implementation of TIPS by the government is to push for universal buildup of intellectual property management system so that local manufacturers whose interests are associated therewith may best exploit as well as protect their properly owned intellectual privileges thanks to subsequent relevant planning, that they be alerted to application of patented rights once granted to them. For any enterprise or organization to establish their own intellectual property management system after TIPS, they will have to understand in the first place their own strengths and weaknesses and orientation for future operations, they will then fix defined policy and corporate objective, and that supported by the top management level, the next step, is to decide as to whether an ad hoc unit be installed by taking into consideration corporate scale and resources, or if it is more desirable to commission intellectual property management to outside concerns. Creation of intellectual property depends upon the character of corporate products, the setup of an intellectual property management system is meant to manage the creation, up keeping and application of intellectual properties, the training mechanism functions to promote conceptions about intellectual property by instilling same among corporate employees, concrete safety guarding measures are required to physically protect intellectual properties. Safeguarding operations to provide protection of intellectual properties must be checked periodically, the PDCA model will intervene to appropriately amend both policy directive and systems of intellectual properties so that the system may best achieve its intended purposes by incorporating the auditing, accounting and financial management of intellectual properties at the same time. Fair and just verification scheme will be built to verify what happens to an industry to which the system has been introduced for some time, so that the industry may remain alert as to where it stands in the system; the need for counseling services arising as a result of corporate aspiration to pass evaluation will help create a market of counseling service addressed to service industries intending to offer systematic management services to needy clients, Then corporations or organizations will sooner pay more attention to the management of intellectual properties, while knowledge service industry will develop and prosper in like measure, the causes interacting with each other to bid birth to more innovation and growth, and Taiwan is brought closer and closer to fulfilling its affectionately nicknamed designation: Intelligence Island.Blockchain in Intellectual Property Protection
Background Blockchain is a technology with the ability to decentral and distribute information. It records encrypted information of the user’s behavior. Blockchain has disintermediate, transparency, programmable, autonomous, immutable and anonymous essential features. The first application of blockchain is to develop cryptocurrency and a payment system, Bitcoin, which has overturned traditional concept of the currency model we knew. So far, blockchain has been widely applied in many territories, such as the intellectual property protection system, called the Blockai, which is a website using blockchain to overcome the plight of piracy in the United States. Example The Library of Congress in the United States found that it had been lack of efficiency for the copyright management. Blockai provided a solution for the Library. Authors will benefit from having proof of publication and copyright monitoring by registering with Blockai. The Blockai system securely timestamps copyright claims in the distributed database based on the Bitcoin protocol. For each copyright claim, a proof file is made available through the footer of the certificate and can be verified by authors using this open source proof verification tool, and it is free of charge for everyone. Although the "Proof of Publication" does not constitute admissible evidence in a trial, it is still credible in its technical features. Conclusion In Taiwan, there is still no copyright registering system. Before a copyright infringement suit may be filed in court, the burden of proof is on the copyright owner. For it is difficult for the copyright owner to provide a credible evidence in trial. We may consider using the experiences of other countries for our reference, developing the intellectual property protection system based on blockchain technology in order to help authors preserve their rights, and provide legal services as a legal technology.Discussion on the Formation of Taiwan’s Network of Intellectual Property Collaboration System in light of Japan’s Experience
Background Taiwan industries have been facing an increasing pressure from the competitive global market. To assist the Taiwan industries, the Government has approved the “National Intellectual Property Strategy Guideline” (the “Guideline”) on 17 October 2012. The Guideline stipulates six major strategies and twenty-seven relevant enforcement criteria in relation to intellectual property (“IP”). The six major strategies are as follows: (a) creation and utilization of high-value patents; (b) enforcing cultural integrity; (c) creation of high agricultural value; (d) support free flow of IP for academics; (e) support system of IP trade flows and protection; and (f) develop highly qualified personnel in IP. Under the “innovation of high-value patents” strategy, the relevant enforcement criterion, being “establishing academia-industry collaborative system for IP management”, is to support the Taiwan’s current and future technology development program on R&D planning, IP management and technology commercialization. In other words, this enforcement criterion can greatly improve the ambiguity and inadequacy of Taiwan’s research infrastructure which have caused inefficient research operation. Furthermore, this enforcement criterion can also improve network collaboration between organizations on IP management, allowing more efficient process for managing IP and thus achieving the purpose of “creation and utilization of high-value patent”. In light of the above, this article studies Japan’s practice on integrating the IP network resources and improving their IP management under the University Network IP Advisors Program (“IP Advisors Program”). University Network IP Advisors Framework Outline A. Policy background, goals and methodology National Center for Industrial Property Information and Training (“INPIT”) initiated the IP Advisors Program and commissioned Japan Institute for Promoting Invention and Innovation (“JIII”) to implement and carry out the new policy in year 2011. Prior to the implementation of the new policy by JIII, INPIT has assisted with establishing proper IP management systems for more than 60 Japanese universities by dispatching IP experts and advisors (“IP Advisors”) to each of the universities during 2002 to March 2011. After the implementation of the initial policy, review has suggested that by expanding the network collaboration, such as establishing intervarsity IP information sharing system within their university networks, the universities can fully aware of and identify technologies that were created by them and are beneficial to the industrial sector. In addition, expanding the network collaboration can also help the universities to quickly develop mechanisms that will enable them properly protect and utilize their acquired IP rights. Accordingly, after 2011, the initial policy has expanded its scope and became the current IP Advisors Program. Japan is expected to improve its nation’s ability to innovate and create new technologies. To attain this goal, Japan has identified that the basis for industry-academia-government R&D consortiums is through obtaining information on universities’ and other academic organizations’ research technologies and IP so that Japan can appropriately place these universities in the appropriate wide-area network. This will allow the universities within the wide-area network to establish IP management policy to properly protect and utilize their IP rights. The current IP Advisors Program is conducted through application from the universities in established wide-area network to JIII. Upon review of the application, JIII will then dispatch the IP Advisor to the applicant university of that wide-area network. IP Advisors not only can provide solutions to general IP related problems, they can also provide professional advice and service on how to establish and operate IP management system for all the universities within the wide-area network. B. IP advisors’ role In principle, IP Advisors are stationed to the Administrative School or Major Supporting School within the wide-area network. IP Advisors can be dispatched to other member schools (“Member Schools”) or provide telephone inquiry service by answering IP related questions. In other words, IP Advisors are not stationed in any Member Schools to manage their IP management affairs, rather, IP Advisors advise or instruct the IP managers of the Member Schools on how to establish and utilize IP management system based on the Member School’s infrastructure. The contents of IP Advisors roles listed are as follows: (a) Assist with activities within the wide-area network. 1. assist with establishing information sharing system between universities within the wide-area network; 2. assist with solving region-based or technology-based IP problems; 3. provide inquiry service for planning activities within wide-area network; and 4. provide inquiry service on other wide-area networks activities planning. (b) Provide services for Member Schools (Type 1) with undeveloped IP management system. 1. investigate or analyze the available IP management system in the Member Schools; 2. assist with drafting a plan to establish IP management system (through an assisting role) and provide instructions or advices accordingly; 3. direct personnel training (i.e. provide education on invention evaluation, assessment on applying for patent and contracts); 4. advocate different regimes of IP; and 5. collect relevant information on new developing technologies. (c) Provide services for Member Schools (Type 1) with developed IP management system 1. investigate or analyze the available IP management system in the Member Schools; 2. provide advices or instructions on the application of IP management department; 3. provide advices or instructions for solving IP management problems; 4. direct personnel training (i.e. provide education on invention evaluation, assessment on applying for patent and contracts); 5. advocate different regimes of IP; and 6. gather relevant information on new developing technologies. (d) Provide services for Member Schools (Type 2) 1.Share and exchange information through network conference. C. Recruitment process and criteria JIII adopts an open recruitment process without a set number of allocated IP Advisor positions. Working location is based in Member Schools of wide-area network in Japan. In principle, IP Advisors are stationed in Administrative Schools or Major Supporting Schools within the wide-area network and can only provide telephone inquiry service or temporary assignment for assistance to the Member Schools (Type 1). However, it is noted that IP Advisors do not belong to any specific university within the wide-area network, they are employed by JIII under an exclusive contract. Based on 2013 example, IP Advisors’ employment contract started from 1 April 2013 and expires on 31 March 2014. IP Advisors’ salary and travelling expenses are paid by JIII. However, expenses for Members School (Type 1) establishing a working environment and any other disbursements should be paid by the Member School (Type 1). Furthermore, under the implementation of the current policy with respect to IP Advisors who are unable to comply with the new criteria, previous contract is considered as a non-periodical contract for the IP Advisors to continue to station in the university. However, if IP Advisor is stationed in a specific university, it must be limited to a maximum of 3 years. Due to the IP Advisors’ work, they must comply with the privacy law and keep any obtained information confidential. D. IP advisors’ qualification 1. Require a high level of professional knowledge on IP management system IP Advisor candidates must have relevant experience working in the industry with IP management system department, operation planning department, R&D department (collectively refer as “IP Management Related Departments”). 2. Have relevant experience in directing trainings in IP Management Related Departments IP Advisor candidates must have the ability to train personnel in IP Management. 3. Can provide IP strategies based on the demands. IP Advisor candidates must have the ability to plan and utilize IP strategies to achieve optimal outcomes in R&D base on the circumstances and needs of different universities. 4. Have referral from the supervisors. IP Advisor candidates who are currently employed must be able to obtain a referral from their current positions’ supervisor, IP manager or personnel from higher up. IP Advisor candidates who are current unemployed must be able to obtain a referral from their previous employment. E. IP advisors’ selection process Based on JIII’s “University Network IP Advisors Adopted Standards” (“Adopted Standards”), IP Advisors are selected first through written application followed by interview. After a comprehensive assessment, all qualified candidates will be compared based on their compatibility of the essential criteria and other non-essential criteria, and finally selecting the most suitable candidate for the wide-area network. F. Application criteria for IP advisors services 1.Common requirements for Member Schools of wide-area network (a) must be an university or educational organization pursuant to the School Education Act (No. 26 of 1947) and must be able to conduct research and have set number of entry students and graduates per year;and (b) university must have developed IP related technology or design. 2. Criteria for wide-area network (a) Must have minimum of 3 and maximum of 8 Member Schools (Type 1) and 10 or less Member Schools (Type 2) combined, and have Member School (Type 1) entering wide-area network; (b) Must clearly state the nature of network as region-based or technology-based; (c) With Administrative School as base, the network must have collaborative system to plan network events; (d) Administrative School must be able to propose and carry out network events which can benefit Member Schools (Type 1) and the society through annual business plan. (e) Must be capable to provide indirect assistance to IP Advisors who are limited by time and region such that there is a proper environment to conduct wide-area network events. 3. Entry requirement for Member Schools (Type 1) (a) Must include in the university’s policy that they will become a Member School (Type 1) in the network and provide assistance to IP Advisors accordingly; (b) IP management and IP utilization system must be clearly implemented; (c) must clearly state the scope of responsibility in relation to the collaboration with the Administration School; (d) Propose and carry out an annual business plan which can improve IP management and utilization system to a certain level on their own; and (e) Has the facility to allow IP Advisors to provide assistance and service. 4. Entry requirement for Member Schools (Type 2) (a) Must include in the university’s policy that they will become a Member School (Type 2); (b) Same as paragraph F(3)(b) in this article; and (c) Same as paragraph F(3)(c) in this article. G. Current status quo The original aim was to establish the initial IP Advisors Program to assist with university’s IP management system by dispatching IP Advisors to 60 and more universities from 2002 to March 2011. The current wide-area university network IP Advisors Program started on April 2011. Since then, JIII has dispatched IP Advisors to 8 wide-area networks. In addition, IP Advisors have also been dispatched to wide-area network with art and design colleges/universities. During year 2011, IP Advisors has achieved and completed several IP management policies as follows: 7 IP policies, 3 academia-industry collaboration policies, 2 conflicting interest policies and 2 collaborative research policies etc. Recommendation This article is based on a legal perspective view point, taking Japan’s IP Advisors Program as a reference to provide the following recommendations on the topic of network for academia-industry collaboration in Taiwan. A. Separate levels of collaboration base on needs Using Japan’s policy as an example, universities within the wide-area network require different content of services tailored to each university individually, and the universities can be categorized into two types of member schools based to the content of services. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Government should consider a similar approach to the Japan’s policy when establishing IP management alliance and forming network of IP management system. For instance, design different levels of content and collaboration, and thus expand collaboration targets to gradually include major legal research institute, technology transfer centre for universities, and IP services in northern, center and southern area of Taiwan. This will allow collaboration of these organizations to coordinate IP programs such as IP northern, application and utilization with ease. B. Emphasis on the idea of establishing and maintaining IP basic facilities Based on Japan’s past experience, it is recommended that before expanding IP Advisors related policy to solve regional IP problems, universities must first be assisted to improve their own IP management system, which has taken Japan almost 10 years to improve their universities’ IP management system. From the current IP management system policy, it can be observed that the establishment of IP management system has a certain relevant importance. Furthermore, there is an emphasis on IP Advisors’ experience in training IP managers. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Government in future planning of network IP collaborate system should set short term and long term goal flexibly, such that the basic IP facilities within the members of the network can develop continuously. For example, short term goal for a legal research institute can be growing to a certain size for it to adjust or implement IP related policies. As for longer term goal, it can be a requirement to set up a unit or department to operate and manage IP. C. Expanding the definition of ‘Networks” Taiwan and Japan are high populated country on an island with limited land. Thus, if Taiwan and Japan insist on maintaining the geographic position for networking concept and adopting such concept on the regional economics for cluster effects, then it is difficult for Taiwan and Japan to compete with American Silicon Valley or other overseas universities. In light of the above, on establishing network of IP collaborative system, the Government should take reference from Japan’s practice in 2012 and combine same industry such as medicine industry or art industry in the definition of network. This will accelerate the integration of IP experience, information, and operation management capability within the network of same industry. Conclusion In conclusion, in order to establish academia-industry IP collaboration system and efficiently improve Taiwan’s IP management system in research organizations, first must focus on various policies tailored for different levels of collaboration so that it can be integrated and expand the integration of IP resources such that there is a good foundation to develop IP basic facilities. Following the establishment of good IP foundation, it can then be further develop to more complex IP programs such as IP landscape, planning and strategizing etc.Antitrust Issue of Reasonable Royalty and Prohibition of Excessive Pricing in Taiwan
Antitrust Issue of Reasonable Royalty and Prohibition of Excessive Pricing in Taiwan A proposed antitrust framework to determine a reasonable royalty I. INTRODUCTION “Can, and should antitrust laws and authorities step in market prices?” - It has long been a controversial antitrust issue, especially when an antitrust case is involved with allegedly unlawful monopolization (or called abuse of monopoly in some countries), Intellectual Property (IP) rights (IPRs), reasonable royalties, and the complex and fast-changing technologies behind. It thus constitutes the tricky and challenging antitrust issue of reasonable royalty - “if a monopolistic firm is charging reasonable royalties or abusing its monopoly power?” Since the goals and regimes of antitrust are very different between Asia, the United States (the U.S.), and Europe, there are consequently various ways to deal with such issue. A. China and its Per-Se Violation of Excessive Pricing Several countries in East Asia aim to protect fair competition and social public interests via antitrust laws, including some other non-competition-based goals. China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan’s goals of antitrust all include protection of fair competition. China also articulates its goals to maintain public interests and promote socialist market economy. Japan also aims to promote the employment rate and the level of national income which are not competition-based goals. Furthermore, South Korea expresses its antitrust goal to achieve balanced economic development which is somehow tricky to judge. As a result of the concepts of fairness and non-competition interests, the antitrust issue of reasonable royalty can possibly lead to the determination of unfairly high prices and thus constitutes an unlawful per se violation of excessive pricing in East Asia. Take China as an example, China explicitly articulates the prohibition of charging unfairly high prices as a firm in dominant position. Moreover, China has further stepped in determining “appropriate royalties” supposedly charged by licensors and has demanded foreign firms in China to charge lower royalty rates. In Huawei v. InterDigital Technology Corporation (IDC), the court ruled that IDC charged Chinese firms unfairly high royalties and further held that the royalty rates of the Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) charged by IDC shall not exceed 0.019%. In the Qualcomm case in China, National Development and Reform Commission of China ruled that Qualcomm was charging unfairly high prices and demanded it to lower its royalty base. Additionally, China’s Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights published by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) in March of 2017 were passed in the end of 2018. While already waiting to be formally executed, these Guidelines had received comments regarding reasonable royalties – especially the antitrust violation of licensing IPRs at unfairly high prices with 5 listed factors to consider whether there is abuse of dominant position. By pointing out the dangers of regulating price following with potential harms to competition, one of the comments encourages the Guidelines to have the relevant factors in terms of determining unfairly high prices, such as the prices of comparable licenses instead of any other irrelevant indicators. B. European Commission (EC) and its Per-Se Violation of Excessive Pricing While embracing free market economy and achieving social and political goals at the same time, EC prohibits unfairly high prices as unlawful per se by articulating “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions” as abuse of market dominance. The test to it started from the case United Brands (1978) which stipulates the difference between cost and price. As the time came to the late 2000s, EC once said that “it takes no position on what a reasonable royalty is” in 2013 but later stated its option to act directly against excessive prices in 2016. In 2017, the Copyright and Communication Consulting Agency/Latvian Authors Association (the AKKA/LAA case) was brought to the court for charging excessive fees for its exclusive right to license. According to Article 267(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaties. Given the questions referred to the CJEU in the AKKA/LAA case, the concept of excessive pricing therefore had the chance to be clarified further.  Three important principles established in this case are: (1) comparing the price at issue between the prices charged by other appropriate and sufficient comparators; (2) there is no threshold of what a royalty rate must be regarded as appreciably high, but a difference between rates must be both significant and persistent to be appreciable; (3) an analysis of fairness justification provided by the alleged dominant firm must be conducted. The AKKA/LAA case reestablished and reaffirmed EC’s resolve to enforce prohibition of excessive pricing. As for the recent times, the Danish Competition Council found that the Swedish pharmaceutical distributor - CD Pharma had abused its dominant position by charging excessive prices for Syntocinon, ruling the price increase of 2000% unjustified. The appeal against this decision is now pending. Many more excessive pricing cases are still ongoing within EU jurisdictions. C. The U.S. and its Hands-Off Approach towards Pricing U.S., on the other hand, never did and does not prohibit monopoly or excessive pricing, and has been warning the great dangers and potential harms to competition resulting from regulating price. The long-established principle of not regulating price, however, was shaken by U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s complaint against Qualcomm for conducting unfair methods of competition in 2017. U.S. FTC filed a complaint against Qualcomm in 2017, alleging Qualcomm violating the Federal Trade Commission Act.According to the complaint, customers accepted elevated royalties that a court would not determine fair and reasonable due to Qualcomm’s unlawful maintenance of monopoly. However, the complaint fails to explain what a reasonable royalty is and why Qualcomm charges more than it is supposed to be charging. Furthermore, the dissenting statement of this case states that the theory adopted by FTC required proof of Qualcomm charging unfairly high royalties where there was failure of proving reasonable royalty baseline in the case. In January of 2019, this case finally kicked off in a California courtroom and the outcome of it will definitely have tremendous impacts on every stakeholder. Later in May 2019, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California found that Qualcomm violated the FTC Act. The case is still ongoing. D. Taiwan and its Unclear Attitude towards the Antitrust Issue of Reasonable Royalty So, where does Taiwan stand between prohibition of excessive pricing and the hands-off approach in the U.S.? In Taiwan, improperly setting, maintaining, or changing the price for goods or the remuneration for services as a monopolistic enterprise has long been unlawful per se since Taiwan’s Fair Trade Act (FTA) was enacted in 1991. This unlawful per se violation is in fact Taiwan’s prohibition of excessive pricing. However, the attitudes of Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) and the courts in Taiwan towards the antitrust issue of reasonable royalty can be switching. They have avoided the issue, left the issue for private contracting, resorted to Patent Act, and determined royalties for the involving parties. Antitrust cases involving the issue of reasonable royalty can be a matter of billion-dollar fines, tremendous costs of litigation, negative impacts on innovation and competition, and harms to consumers. Such important issue can no longer be neglected by Taiwan anymore. By focusing on the antitrust issue of reasonable royalty in Taiwan, this paper will begin with the past attitude and the current antitrust framework of reasonable royalty in Taiwan. Further, because Taiwan has been looking up to the U.S. and its patent law in terms of calculating reasonable royalty in patent infringement cases; this paper will then turn to the reasonable royalty approach in Taiwan and the U.S. respectively. Even though this paper does not support prohibition of excessive pricing, we hope the antitrust issue of reasonable royalty in any excessive pricing case in Taiwan will be properly and carefully dealt with. Therefore, based on the proposed methodologies in a 2016 paper, the core of this paper will be proposing a framework for Taiwan in order to give clearer directions on how to face the antitrust issue of reasonable royalty along with the potential violation of Article 9 of FTA. II. THE PAST ATTITUDE AND THE CURRENT ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK OF REASONABLE ROYALTY IN TAIWAN A. The RCA, Catrick, and Microsoft case - 1995 ~ 2003 TFTC’s attitude towards the antitrust issue of reasonable royalty had long been unclear. In TFTC v. Radio of Corporation of America (RCA)(1995), RCA settled with TFTC for the accusation of charging improper royalties.In TFTC v. Microsoft (2002-2003), Microsoft settled with TFTC after 10 months being accused of conducting excessive pricing.  However, the details of both settlements were never published. In the Catrick case (1998), a U.S. firm named Catrick was accused of improperly charging royalties. TFTC attempted to resort to Patent Act but Patent Act at that time was silent on calculation of royalties. To play safe, TFTC did not interpret FTA or determine a reasonable royalty. Instead, TFTC left the issue to be solved under the principle of freedom of contract and closed the investigation. B. The CD-R Patent Pool Case – 2001~2015 1. Summary of the case Even being given 15 years of time, the antitrust issue of reasonable royalty still remained unsolved in the CD-R Patent Pool case (2001-2015). Upon the investigation from 1999, TFTC found that Philips Electronics NV (Philips) and other two companies had violated Article 10 of FTA with their unlawful concerted action and abuse of dominance in 2001. Here is the background: The CD-R manufactures in Taiwan accounted for 80% of the global CD-R manufacturing output when the time the CD-R technologies were a worldwide industrial revolution. The price of CD-R was originally at around $60 per piece in 1990. It later went down to $0.20 per piece in 2000. However, the three enterprises in the case kept refusing to change the formula for calculating the license fee. Thus, the pricing issue here was that if the three monopolistic enterprises improperly maintained the formula for calculating the CD-R license fee by joint licensing and refusing to change the license fee even though the market conditions had changed drastically at that time. After a series of appeals and retrials, TFTC again ruled that Philips violated Section 2 of Article 10 of FTA by abusing its dominant position and improperly maintaining the price for its jointly licensed technologies in 2015. To everyone’s disappointment, TFTC again left the determination of reasonable royalty unsolved. 2. Fights over reasonable royalty between courts and TFTC The tricky thing is, administrative courts, TFTC, Intellectual Property Court of Taiwan (IP Court of Taiwan) held totally different positions in the CD-R case in terms of the antitrust pricing issue: a. Taipei High Administrative Court (2003)  The court reasoned that the license fees should be determined by competition and cost structure on principle. As a result, the determinants to reasonable royalties would be supply and demand in the market. b. TFTC Decision No.095045 (2006)  TFTC did not hold that the defendants’ pricing practice in violation of FTA. However, it stated its position in stepping in royalties - “Business value of patents varies due to maturity of technologies and market development. Therefore, patent holders should consider prices of final products, value of patents, and contributions made by licensees while determining reasonable royalties… It is inappropriate for the antitrust authority in Taiwan to step in royalties unless there is indication of illegal monopolization or cartel. “ c. Intellectual Property Court Appeal Case No.14 (2008)  IP Court of Taiwan incorporated the concept of fairness in its decision by saying – “courts could only adjust the royalty rates in consideration of fairness towards both parties and other relevant factors in the contract.” Further, the court also said that it was not within TFTC’s jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the license fee charged by Philips. d. TFTC Decision No. 098156 (2009) By revealing the prices of CD-R output, shipment of CD-R, change of market conditions within 10 years, and the 60 times higher royalty revenues earned by Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden, TFTC found that the profits earned by the three defendants were beyond expectation and estimation. In conclusion, TFTC again held in its 2009 decision that the three defendants violated FTA by not giving opportunities to negotiate over the CD-R license fee upon the easily perceived market changes. e. Supreme Court of Taiwan, Case No.883 (2012)  After the long fights between courts and TFTC for 10 years, Sony and Taiyo Yuden had stopped fighting and their cases were affirmed in 2011. As for Philips, they enjoyed a huge turning point in 2012 because the Supreme Court of Taiwan abolished IP Court of Taiwan’s 2008 verdict and ruled that the governing laws of the contracts between the involving parties were Dutch laws. f. TFTC Decision No. 104027 (2015) TFTC did not get defeated and reached another decision against Philips in 2015. In the reasoning, TFTC first clarified that market prices should be determined by competition and cost structure. Then it claimed to still have the role to rule that Philips had been improperly maintaining the license fee of CD-R through abuse of dominance, refusals to renegotiate and earning excessive profits. To everyone’s disappointment, TFTC still left the determination of reasonable royalty unsolved. C. TFTC v. Qualcomm Incorporated (Qualcomm) (2015 - 2018) In 2017, TFTC ruled that Qualcomm violated Article 9(1) of FTA by refusing to license, imposing no license no chips policy, and conducting exclusive dealing. As for the pricing issue in this case, it was argued if the license fees charged by Qualcomm were unreasonably high and if the fees should be based on value of patents instead of net prices of manufactured phones. TFTC did point out the pricing issue in its reasoning but did not say much further. Instead, TFTC commented in the decision that Qualcomm had been enjoying excessive profits and stated that license fee was a matter of freedom of contract and negotiation. After a series of fights between TFTC and Qualcomm, both parties agreed to settle in August 2018. The Administrative Decision No. 106094 issued by TFTC was vacated with the replacement of the settlement which Qualcomm agreed to invest hundreds of millions in Taiwan and on other matters. D. The Current Antitrust Framework of Reasonable Royalty in Taiwan The current antitrust framework of reasonable royalty in Taiwan in this paper is based on the latest version of Fair Trade Act of Taiwan which was amended in 2017 and the latest version of IP Guidelines of Taiwan which was amended in 2016. There are three main steps in the current antitrust framework to deal with the reasonable royalty issue that suspiciously violates FTA in Taiwan. 1. Proper conducts pursuant to Intellectual Property Laws in Taiwan First, and most importantly, Article 45 of FTA excludes the application of FTA to all “proper conducts” pursuant to all IP Laws in Taiwan where TFTC does not give quite clear explanation of. The reason behind such exclusion stated in the legislative rationale of Article 45 of FTA is problematic - “Copyrights, Trademarks, and Patents are monopoly rights endowed by IP laws. Therefore, FTA shall not apply to them by nature.”  2. Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements (IP Guidelines of Taiwan) Secondly, TFTC shall turn to review if IP Guidelines of Taiwan apply to any licensing practice in the case when it sees Article 45 of FTA not applicable. IP Guidelines of Taiwan articulates a correct and fundamental principle while reviewing a technology licensing agreement – “TFTC does not presume market power resulted from owning a patent or know-how.” Further, IP Guidelines of Taiwan do not articulate reasonable royalty or excessive pricing. Instead, the Guidelines make clear of the allowed and prohibited calculation methods for royalties. By recognizing the ease of calculation as efficiency, IP Guidelines of Taiwan basically allows the end product approach and the net sales approach to be applied in a technology licensing agreement as long as the licensed technology was indeed used by the licensee. Notwithstanding, TFTC still has the power to find an antitrust violation upon finding of improper matters even if a licensor complies with Section C of Article 5 of IP Guidelines of Taiwan.  3. Prohibited monopolistic conducts When neither Article 45 of FTA nor IP Guidelines of Taiwan applies to the case, the last step TFTC shall take towards reasonable royalty issue is to review if Section 2 of Article 9 of FTA applies - ” Monopolistic enterprises shall not engage in improperly setting, maintaining or changing the price for goods or the remuneration for services.”  Basically, it is the prohibition of excessive pricing in Taiwan. To be noticed, Article 9 of FTA can only be applied when there is one or more monopolistic enterprises involved. 4. Some issues under the current antitrust framework of reasonable royalty in Taiwan a. Proper conducts pursuant to all IP laws in Taiwan. Article 45 of FTA excludes the application of FTA to what so called “proper IP conducts.” Such exclusion is based on the idea that IPRs are monopoly rights – which is problematic. The fact is - IPRs are exclusive rights instead of monopoly rights. IPRs do not necessarily confer monopoly power or induce more anticompetitive behaviors than other types of property. Moreover, exercising an IPR can be engaging in improper market conducts that lessens competition. In other words, what should be kept in mind is that a proper IP conduct may still possibly constitute an antitrust violation. b. The maybe-violation in IP Guidelines of Taiwan. IP Guidelines of Taiwan are basically friendly towards the end product and the net sales approaches for calculating royalties. However, Article 5 of the Guidelines still gives TFTC the power to find a “maybe” antitrust violation upon any improper matters. Such maybe violation makes the protection under IP Guidelines shaky and even not that useful. c. No such thing as excessive profit. One of the legislative reasons behind the prohibition of excessive pricing in Taiwan is that - “when a firm does not price its products based on reflection of the costs but intends to gain exorbitant profits, such improper pricing conduct would be the most effective way to exclude competition.”  Firstly, there is no such thing as an excessive or exorbitant profit in a free market economy when a price is determined by supply and demand which results in profits you earn accordingly. Secondly, instead of the profits, it should be the price or the pricing practice to be evaluated due to the purpose of excessive pricing violation. d. Missing harms to competition. Most important of all in any excessive pricing case – where are the harms to competition? It should be clear that unjustified profits are not what antitrust laws aim to punish but the anticompetitive market conducts that harm competition. Which is to say – if a monopolistic enterprise has been charging excessive prices through abuse of monopoly that generates harms to competition? With the ultimate goal of protecting the overall competition and consumers, there must be potential or actual harms to competition proven in any excessive pricing case. Such as higher prices, lower outputs, exclusion of competition, entry barriers, negative impact on innovation, or so. E. The Reasonable Royalty Approach under the Patent Act in Taiwan 1. Damages as reasonable royalty Article 97(1) of Patent Act of Taiwan lists three approaches for calculating damages in any event of patent infringement. One of the approaches is the reasonable royalty approach. The so-called reasonable royalty is the royalty the licensee would have paid if there had been a negotiation instead of an infringement. In practical, any profit earned by the licensee from the infringement is excluded from the damages while adopting such approach. Since the infringing licensee saved the costs of negotiation and the licensor spent extra costs on patent infringement litigation, it is also recognized that damages calculated by adopting the reasonable royalty approach can be more than the royalty the licensee would have paid. 2. Determinants and principles in a hypothetical negotiation over royalty After all, the reasonable royalty approach assumes a hypothetical negotiation over royalty between the licensee and licensor. There are still controversies over the determinants and principles to be applied while adopting such approach. Various considerations would possibly lead to drastically different reasonable royalties just like the NT$10 million and NT$1 billion damages in the Philips v. Gigastorage case.  Koninklijke Philips NV (Philips) brought a patent infringement lawsuit against Gigastorage Corporation (Gigastorage, a Taiwan-based manufacturer) at the IP Court of Taiwan in 2014, alleging that Gigastorage had been infringing their Taiwanese patent from 2000 through 2015 by manufacturing and selling DVD related products. The pricing issue here is how to calculate the damages and compensation of unauthorized utilization of the patent involved where the calculation methods and considerations would make big differences. IP Court of Taiwan awarded NT$10.5 million as damages based on reasonable royalty approach in the first trial. However, the same court of different judges later ruled that the damages should be over NT$1 billion according to unjust enrichment. The case was brought to the Supreme Court of Taiwan in 2017. In September 2018, the NT$1 billion judgement was remanded and now the IP Court of Taiwan is thus responsible for a retrial. Nevertheless, the two most common determinants to a reasonable royalty under this approach are – licensing history and comparable patents. Interestingly and importantly, these two determinants are also taken into consideration by several antitrust jurisdictions in the world while dealing with the issue of reasonable royalty. III. WHETHER TO REGULATE EXCESSIVE PRICING AND THE MONDERN REASONABLE ROYALTY APPROACH IN THE U.S. A. Whether to regulate excessive pricing? Supply and demand are two key factors that determine a price in a free market. Profits are usually what encourage innovation and attract firms doing businesses in the first place. There is no doubt that a firm sets a price it believes to maximize its profits – which is profit maximization rule in economics. When a monopoly tries to manipulate or disturb the market by setting a lower or higher price that does not go along with profit maximization rule, here are some possible consequences: (1) new entries in the market trying to share the profits; (2) consumers might switch to substitutes of the product in order to pay less; (3) monopoly might lose profits that it would earn otherwise. Simply saying, a free market usually responds to market changes quite well and can function accordingly without too much disruption. Regardless of the free market mechanism, there are still many voices discouraging the prohibition of excessive pricing due to the inherent dangers of regulating prices – such as discouraging investment in research and development activities, impairing innovation, and ultimately harming consumers. Along with the antitrust jurisdictions that prohibit excessive pricing by law, there are studies showing that prohibition of excessive pricing may benefit the market or – the consumers. A 2015 research finds that: “when economies of scale and entry barriers imply a great likelihood of dominant firms not subjecting to regulation but capable of charging supra-competitive prices, excessive pricing regulation is then important for smaller markets.” A study in 2017 further examines the competitive effects of the prohibition of excessive pricing by applying two competitive benchmarks – retrospective benchmark and contemporaneous benchmark to assess the price charged by a dominant firm excessive or not. The study finds that the two benchmarks restrain the dominant firm’s behavior but soften the firm’s behavior when its competing with a rival. By setting certain factors homogeneous, a retrospective benchmark for excessive pricing benefits consumers. While under different circumstances, consumers are worse off and inefficient entries are created. Overall, the study indicates that the competitive effects of prohibition of excessive pricing vary as we consider various factors – such as the nature of competition, the expected fines, incentive to invest in research and development (R&D), cost of litigation and more.  As a whole, there are still a great number of concerns about potential dangers of regulating price. However, whether to regulate excessive pricing or not, the fundamental question to ask is still – “how to determine a reasonable price to assess if the price at issue is excessive?” B. The Modern Reasonable Royalty Approach in the U.S. U.S. antitrust agencies do not prohibit excessive pricing. An IPR holder is free to charge a monopoly price just as a monopoly is free to earn its monopoly profits as long as the monopoly price and profits are not resulted from anticompetitive conducts that violate antitrust laws in the U.S. While saying that, U.S. still has a reasonable royalty approach developed under its patent law which is the law Taiwan has copied a lot from.  There are different methodologies for the reasonable royalty approach in the U.S., the most common one would be the hypothetical negotiation which was matured from Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corpin 1971 (Georgia-Pacific case), ruling that the proper damages in a patent infringement case as – “the amount that a licensor and the infringer would have agreed upon.” By adopting this hypothetical negotiation framework, the case eventually developed a list of 15 determinants as to a reasonable royalty:  (1) The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty. (2) The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit. (3) The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold. (4) The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly. (5) The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and promotor. (6) The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales. (7) The duration of the patent and the term of the license. (8) The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity. (9) The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results. (10) The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention. (11) The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use. (12) The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions. (13) The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer. (14) The opinion testimony of qualified experts. (15) The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license. The U.S. reasonable royalty approach and the calculation of reasonable royalty have been evolving since then. The Federal Circuit in a 2011 case held that the long-used and criticized 25 percent rule of thumb is fundamentally flawed for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation. The rule suggests that 25% of the expected profits for the product that incorporates the IP at issue as a baseline royalty rate. Practically, the profits earned by the licensee and the revenues of the product are still often taken into consideration nowadays while applying the U.S. reasonable royalty approach. Further, the Ninth Circuit modified some factors in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc. (2012) which was a case involved with reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) commitment, standard essential patents (SEPs), and patent pool.  This case raised some important factors to determine a RAND royalty, such as RAND commitment and its purposes, SEPs’ contribution and importance, alternatives of SEPs to the adopted standard, and so on. Comparable patents play a very critical factor in this case in terms of calculating a RAND royalty. Also, it is important to notice that the function of a RAND commitment limits a SEP licensor to royalties that reflect their ex ante values instead of the incremental monopoly power provided by the standard. In Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc. (2014), a modified version of the 15 factors was adopted after the Federal Circuit held that – not every factor from the 15 factors in Georgia-Pacific will apply to every case, and courts must instruct the jury on factors that are relevant in the case. Also, the burden of proof is on the implementer (or, the antitrust authority in an excessive pricing case) to establish a baseline royalty with evidence. That royalty then must be assessed to determine if it is excessive. By adopting incremental value approach and incorporating apportionment, the Federal Court here provides a more complete guidance on how to calculate royalties for patents on RAND terms: (1) Importance of RAND commitment; (2) Apportionment of patented features: the royalty for the patented technology must be apportioned from the value of the standard as a whole; (3) Incremental value approach: the royalty must be based on the incremental value of the invention, instead of any value added by the standardization of the invention or the standard itself. Lastly, two factors that were not often discussed while determining a reasonable royalty were applied inPrism Technologies LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2017) - previous settlement agreements and cost savings though infringement. In conclusion, the modern reasonable royalty approach under U.S. patent law was evolved from the adopted 15 factors in Georgia Pacific case. The approach then has been developing along with changes of law, development of technology, adoption of SEPs, RAND and FRAND commitments, and more other relevant factors. IV. A PROPOSED ANTITRUST FRAMEWORLK OF REASONABLE ROYALTY FOR TAIWAN Having articulated the past attitude and the current antitrust framework of reasonable royalty in Taiwan, we have pointed out some misunderstandings in the current framework. Having addressed the reasonable royalty approaches under the patent laws in Taiwan and the U.S., we also have found similarities in between – the hypothetical negotiation framework and relevant determinants. Even though there are concerns against prohibition of excessive pricing due to potential dangers of regulating price and supports towards ultimate protection of free competition, TFTC and the courts in Taiwan are still required by law to apply the prohibition of excessive pricing against IPRs for the current time being. Therefore, the most important section and the core of this paper now has come forward – which is a proposed antitrust framework composed of possible methodologies and clearer guidance for Taiwan to deal with the antitrust issue of reasonable royalty in an excessive pricing case. The proposed framework is based on the proposed methodologies in a 2016 paper - which is to apply the hypothetical negotiation framework under U.S. patent law to determine a reasonable royalty or a competitive benchmark in an excessive pricing case. By applying the most relevant factors and adhering to important and correct principles in the case, a reasonable royalty as a baseline is thus determined to evaluate if the price at issue is excessive. Before articulating the proposed framework in a more detailed way, it is important to notice some basic differences between reasonable royalty in a patent infringement case and an excessive pricing case: Table 1 Reasonable Royalty in between a Patent infringement Case and an Excessive Pricing Case Reasonable Royalty in an Excessive Pricing Case Reasonable Royalty in a Patent Infringement Case Base Country Countries that prohibit excessive pricing. U.S. Case Type Antitrust case Patent infringement case Governing Law Antitrust (competition) law Patent law Prohibited Action A prohibited act of charging unfairly high price through abuse of monopoly. A prohibited act of unauthorized making, using, offering, or selling any patented invention. The Reasonable Royalty Issue Through determining a reasonable royalty to evaluate if a firm is charging excessive royalty through abuse of monopoly. Through determining a reasonable royalty to establish damages/compensation for the act of patent infringement. Proof of Harm Having found excessive pricing, competitive harms should be proved to establish an excessive pricing violation. Harm is proved after determining the reasonable royalty. Having proven the act of patent infringement, damages will then be determined based on reasonable royalty. Harm is proved to exist before calculating the damages. Negotiation There was negotiation over royalty before the lawsuit starts. There sometimes had no negotiation over royalty. Reasonable Royalty Approach Apply relevant factors to determine a reasonable royalty, then compare it with the price at issue to decide if the firm is charging excessive price through abuse of monopoly. Apply hypothetical negotiation framework to determine the royalty the licensor and the infringer would have agreed upon if there had been a negotiation instead of an infringement. Relevant Factors There are multiple and various factors applied in different countries, often not systematic or relevant. The 15 factors evolved from Georgia-Pacific, and some modified and new factors developed later on. A. Step 1 – Important Principles to Keep in Mind Regarding the Antitrust Issue of Reasonable Royalty. 1. No presumption of monopoly power: Ownership of IPRs does not necessarily confer monopoly power. 2. IP conducts may possibly constitute antitrust violations: Enforcing IPRs or any seemingly proper IP conduct may still possibly constitute an antitrust violation, so that they shall not be excluded from the application of FTA. 3. No such thing as excessive profit in free market economy: It is the pricing practice conducted by a monopolistic enterprise that should be evaluated in an excessive pricing case, instead of the profits the enterprise earns. 4. Harm to competition is and should be the key to establish an antitrust violation under Article 9 of FTA: Simply charging a perceived excessive price or earning some unjustified profits does not automatically constitute an antitrust violation. It is the competition and consumers that we should protect in terms of any excessive pricing case. Thus, harms to competition and consumers should be proved – such as lower outputs, entry barriers, and negative impacts on innovation or R&D activities. B. Step 2 – Compliance with Article 45 of FTA & IP Guidelines of Taiwan. 1. Firstly, all proper conducts pursuant to all IP laws in Taiwan are excluded to the application of FTA even though there is no clear explanation of what would be proper IP conducts. 2. If Article 45 of FTA does not apply in the case, we should turn to IP Guidelines of Taiwan to see if the involved market conducts or pricing practices would violate the Guidelines. If the Guidelines do not apply here, then we shall turn to Step 3 of the proposed framework. C. Step 3 – If it is a Potential Excessive Pricing Case? Section 2 of Article 9 of FTA articulates - “Monopolistic enterprises shall not engage in improperly setting, maintaining or changing the price for goods or the remuneration for services.” 1. There must be a monopolistic enterprise. 2. The prices of goods or services or the pricing practices involved are reasonably challenged by the implementers or TFTC.  D. Step 4 – When would a hypothetical negotiation have taken place? When it is a potential excessive pricing case under Section 2 of Article 9 of FTA, it is time to apply the hypothetical negotiation framework under patent law to determine a reasonable royalty within antitrust framework. While the first thought we come up with is usually “how much the parties would have agreed upon,” what we often ignore is that – “when would a hypothetical negotiation have happened? “The timeframe of the hypothetical negotiation is in fact highly related to what relevant factors we should consider in terms of determining a reasonable royalty. Such timeframe issue thus could cause huge impacts on the amount of damages in a patent infringement case and affect the competitive benchmark in an excessive pricing case. More clarifications are as follows: 1. In a patent infringement case: a. Pure ex ante approach: By assuming the parties would have negotiated over the royalty before the infringement began, such approach reflects an ex ante negotiation in the absence of infringement based on the information available before the infringement. Two supporting reasons are: (1) preservation of incentives; (2) avoidance or lowering the cost of patent holdup. b. Pure ex post approach: This approach sets the negotiation reached on some later date, such as the date of judgement or any time after the infringement. Such approach could possibly provide more available and provable information to determining a royalty but could also give the patentee more bargaining power when the patentee is holding an injunction against the infringer. Figure 1 Timeframes of the Hypothetical Negotiation Applying Pure Ex Ante Approach and Pure Ex Post Approach c. Contingent Ex Ante Approach: Pros and concerns when applying pure ex ante and pure ex post approaches are out there to be noted. While a proposed approach claims to address the issues of patent holdup and bargaining power at the same time – which is called contingent ex ante approach. This approach sets the negotiation prior infringement reached contingent on the ex post information, arguing that ex post information provides a better measure for the true value of the patented technology. Further, it is said to be able to take new and changed circumstances into account in every individual infringement case. Here is a simple example presented in the paper: (1) A $500,000 royalty might be agreed upon based on the parties’ expectation that the infringer would earn $1 million above what it would earn if it used the next-best available non-infringing patent. (2) At the date of judgement, the infringer is proven to earn $1.5 million instead of $1 million. This $1.5 million earning would be the ex post information applied in an ex ante negotiation. On the other hand, if the proven earning is only $500,000, then the royalty the parties might have agreed upon would be lower. (3) By applying contingent ex ante approach, it is argued that the patent hold-up would be avoided and the bargaining power between the parties would be balanced. Figure 2 Timeframes of the Hypothetical Negotiation Applying Contingent Ex Ante Approach 2. In an excessive pricing case: Applying the hypothetical negotiation framework under patent law in an excessive pricing case is much more difficult on one matter – the timeframe discussed above. Some important reasons are as follow: (1) Excessive pricing cases involve comparing a competitive benchmark with the price at issue, yet the prices in a case could be changing over time. (2) There were already negotiations over royalty before an excessive pricing lawsuit starts. (3) Involvement of FRAND and SEPs only make it more complicated to determine a reasonable royalty while facing the timeframe issue. E.g. the timing of a patent’s incorporation into a standard is critical and affects the value of the invention. Figure 3 Excessive Pricing Case and the Timeframe Issue E. Step 5 – If there are FRAND or RAND terms? Royalties negotiated on FRAND or RAND terms (FRAND royalties) can be and are usually different from those without. FRAND royalties may involve the following factors which often consequently affect royalties in real world: 1. FRAND obligations and terms: such as fairness, royalty free, grant back provision, exclusivity and other reciprocal terms. 2. Timing of the establishment of a standard: A patent may exist before the establishment of an industrial standard. As this patent is considered essential to a standard and also is included in such standard, the value of such patent – SEP usually goes up. 3. Cooperation between SEP holders: the number of SEP holders and the number of SEPs included in a standard can be influential. 4. Other factors: standard setting organizations’ policies, threat of injunction, patent hold-up and hold-out, royalty stacking, other available and comparable technologies, and relationship between licensors and licensees. F. Step 6 – Consider the Most Relevant Factors. No matter what approach or timeframe of hypothetical negotiation gets adopted in an excessive pricing case, the most relevant factors to consider in determining a reasonable royalty are as follow: 1. Comparable patents The best potential non-infringing alternatives should be the top determinant. What we usually consider as alternatives here are the existing patents in the marketplace since it would be impractical to include expired or invalid patents as comparable patents. But if we take the issue of the timeframe of a hypothetical negotiation into consideration, the status of the patents could be different – which means the hypothetical negotiation could have happened when there were more or less comparable patents. Undoubtedly, comparability is hard to judge. Loads of factors have been taken into account – technical and economic standpoints, the underlying technology, timing of the licensing, previous settlements or litigations, and other more. As noted here, comparable patents are provided as evidence to determining a reasonable royalty – not to its admissibility. Further, here are more difficulties while looking for comparable patents: a. Lots of technology-related royalties nowadays are negotiated on a patent portfolio basis using the end-user device as the royalty base. Both end-user based and portfolio based calculations make it harder to extract the value of an individual patent. b. Cross-licensing or business relationships are sometimes built in exchange of patent licensing. It means that there sometimes has no cash payment involved to know the values of patents. c. Should the allegedly comparable patents cover foreign patents? 2. FRAND royalties: a. FRAND or RAND commitment and its importance. b. Number of SEPs and number of SEP holders in a standard setting. c. Proper apportionment: By the reason that not all patents are created equal or of the same value, the value of an individual patent’s contribution to the standard and the end product is a critical factor when determining a FRAND royalty. As noted here for clarification, even though the Federal Circuit in the famous Ericsson v. D-Link case stated that a FRAND royalty should not include the value that a technology gains from simply being included in a standard, it should not be interpreted as a complete exclusion of any of a standard’s value. When a patented technology in fact creates values for a standard due to its inclusion, these values should definitely be considered as contribution and an important factor. G. Step 7 – Consider Other Factors 1. Other factors may possibly be considered a. The terms and scope of the licensing agreement, as exclusive, non-exclusive, restrictive, or non-restrictive. b. The nature and benefits of the technology or invention. c. Licensor’s monopoly power, and its policies or programs to maintain or preserve such power. d. Licensing history between the parties, and between the licensor and other firms. e. Investments made to implement the technology or the standard. f. Barriers to entry, it could be legal barriers, exclusive agreements, economies of scale, or network effect. As for antitrust of excessive pricing in Taiwan, a paper suggests that entry barriers should be one of the keys to determine if TFTC should step in. That is to say - when there are entry barriers delaying or barring new entries in a market, TFTC should possibly have jurisdiction and a case according to the types of the barriers. g. Royalty stacking and patent hold-up and hold-out. h. Smallest saleable component rule: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) amended its patent policy in 2015 and included the smallest saleable Compliant Implementationas an important consideration in terms of determining a reasonable royalty. 2. Factors not recommended to be considered. a. Profits earned from charging the allegedly excessive royalty. b. The profitability, commercial success, popularity, advantages, utilities, and the sales of the patented products. c. The value of the pure adoption of the standard. d. Commercial and business relationships involved. e. Other non-competition, non-patent-related, or pure business factors. H. Step 8– Compare the Reasonable Royalty to the Alleged Excessive Price 1. The determined reasonable royalty is a baseline or what we call a competitive benchmark. It should not be a minimal royalty a patent owner can charge. 2. As for practicality, it is allowed to be more than just reasonable royalty to be compensated to the patent owner in a patent infringement case. Just like a firm can charge a price more than the cost of its product. Therefore, the price at issue should not be necessarily excessive when the determined reasonable royalty is greater than the alleged excessive price. V. CONCLUSION Excessive pricing cases involving the antitrust issue of reasonable royalty can be a matter of tremendous cost of litigation, fines of billion dollars, and unimaginable potential harms to competition. The great dangers involved through regulating price can lead to negative impacts on innovation, industries, and consumers - consequently to the ultimate failure of protection of competition. Putting aside the doubts about the prohibition of excessive pricing, I respectfully propose an antitrust framework of reasonable royalty in this paper with a sincere goal to help Taiwan with the issue of reasonable royalty in any excessive pricing case in the future. Lastly, I sincerely address the most essential and ultimate principle of antitrust here, again - it is and should always be the competition that antitrust laws and agencies aim to protect, not competitors, prices or only the consumers.  Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, Law Info China, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=0&CGid=96789 (last visited Aug. 6, 2019); The Antimonopoly Act, Japan Fair Trade Commission, http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/amended_ama09/amended_ama15_01.html(last visited Mar.9, 2018); Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Fair Trade Commission of Korea, http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng?pstSeq=54772(last visited Aug. 6, 2019); Fair Trade Act, Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan, https://www.ftc.gov.tw/law/EngLawContent.aspx?lan=E&id=29 (last visited Mar.9, 2018).  Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China §17(1), available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm (last visited Mar.12, 2018). Huawei Technologies Co. v. InterDigital Technology Co., Guangdong High Court Decision No.306 (2013), available at http://www.mlex.com/China/Attachments/2014-04-17_BT5BM49Q967HTZ82/GD%20verdict.pdf (last visited Mar.9, 2018);CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, China’s NDRC Concludes Qualcomm Investigation, Imposes Changes in Licensing Practices (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/chinas-ndrc-concludes-qualcomm-investigation-imposes-changes-in-licensing-practices.pdf (last visited Mar.9, 2018).  THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Full text of the Draft of the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights (2017), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201703/20170302539418.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). Bruce Kobayashi, Douglas Ginsburg, Joshua Wright & Koren Wong-Ervin,Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, on the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council's Anti-Monopoly Guidelines against Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights, GEORGE MASON LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER, No.17-19, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2952414 (last visited Mar.12, 2018).  European Commission is the competition authority within European Union.  TheTreaty on the Functioning of the European Union §102(a), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:FULL&from=EN (last visited Mar.12, 2018).  United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities, Case 27/76 (1978).  Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on potential misuse of mobile phone standard-essential patents- Questions and Answers, European Commission, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-403_en.htm (last visited Mar.12, 2018); see also Protecting consumers from exploitation-Chillin’ Competition Conference, Brussels, 21 November 2016, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/protecting-consumers-exploitation_en (last visited Mar.12, 2018).  Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra / Latvijas Autoru apvienība v. Konkurences padome, C-177/16(2017).  TheTreaty on the Functioning of the European Union §267(a), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E267:en:HTML (last visited Mar.13, 2018).  Miranda Cole,Kevin Coates&Siobhan L.M. Kahmann, Welcome clarifications by the EU Court on the concept of excessive pricing, Covington & Burling LLP - Inside Tech Media (Sep. 15, 2017), https://www.insidetechmedia.com/2017/09/15/welcome-clarifications-by-the-eu-court-on-the-concept-of-excessive-pricing/ (last visited Mar.13, 2018).  Martin André Dittmer & Sofie Kyllesbech Andersen, Recent decisions on excessive pricing, abuse of dominance, cartel penalties and gun jumping (2018), https://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Competition-Antitrust/Denmark/Gorrissen-Federspiel/Recent-decisions-on-excessive-pricing-abuse-of-dominance-cartel-penalties-and-gun-jumping (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).  Michal S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. And the EC: Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly? ANTITRUST BULLETIN, 49, 343-384 (2004), available athttps://ssrn.com/abstract=700863 (last visited Mar.14, 2018).  U.S. Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated ( N.D. Cal. Filed Jan. 17, 2017), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170117qualcomm_redacted_complaint.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).  Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK (D. Northern District of California, filed Feb.1, 2017).  FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen In the Matter of Qualcomm, Inc. (Jan. 17,2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170117qualcomm_mko_dissenting_statement_17-1-17a.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).  Taiwan Fair Trade Act §9(1) (2017), available at: http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0150002 (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).  Bruce H. Kobayashi, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Joshua D. Wright, and Koren W. Wong-Ervin, “Excessive Royalty” Prohibitions and the Dangers of Punishing Vigorous Competition and Harming Incentives to Innovate, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONOCLE, 4(3) (2016).  Kung-Chung Liu, Interface between IP and Competition Law in Taiwan, THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 8(6), 735–760 (2005).  Pei-Fen Hsieh, Antitrust Regulatory Measures Under the trend towards Bureaucratic Regulation- A Study on Consent Decree, FAIR TRADE QUARTERLY, 13(1), 166 (2005).  Taiwan Fair Trade Commission, Meeting Minutes No.352 (1998).  Hong Xuan, On principles in tackling technology license and market competition, 112-113 (2008).  TAIWAN FAIR TRADE COMMISION, Meeting Minutes No.480 of Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (2001), https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/upload-90R480_REC.txt (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  Kung-Chung Liu & Vick Chien, Analysis of and Comments on CD-R-related Cases: Focusing on Competition Law and Patent Compulsory Licensing Issues, FAIR TRADE QUARTERLY, 17(1), 2 (2005).  Sony and Taiyo Yuden did not appeal against the administrative decisions in 2010; therefore their cases were affirmed before 2015. See TAIWAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Administrative Decision No.104027 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/269b6dff-a0fc-46a0-8512-ca5f716732bb.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  Taipei High Administrative Court, Philips Electronics NV v. TFTC, Decision No. 00908 (2003).  TAIWAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Administrative Decision No. 095045 (2006), https://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/2005302-0950426_002_095d045.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).  Taiwan Intellectual Property Court Appeal Case No.14 (2008), https://law.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/data.aspx?ro=10&q=cd8bdbb8d80f8d587805c863b2e64c55&gy=jcourt&gc=IPC&sort=DS&ot=in (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).  TAIWAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Administrative Decision No. 098156 (2009) http://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/faed94a8-34ce-4f8e-b59a-239a9eaece1d.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).  Supreme Court of Taiwan, Case No.883 (2012), https://law.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/data.aspx?ro=0&q=033765ef814495b27d346fcbd9f38606&gy=jcourt&gc=TPS&sort=DS&ot=in (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).  TAIWAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Administrative Decision No. 104027 (2015) https://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/269b6dff-a0fc-46a0-8512-ca5f716732bb.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).  TAIWAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Administrative Decision No.106094 (2017) https://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/561633e4-42bd-4a4f-a679-c5ae5226966b.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).  Fair Trade Act of 2017 §9(1), available at: http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0150002 (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).  id, at Page 61-62.  Settlement between TFTC and Qualcomm, TAIWAN FTC NEWSLETTER, August 10, 2018, https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=126&docid=15551 (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).  TAIWAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Record of Commission Meeting No. 1396 (Nov. 2018), https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/b0aa3b61-d0e7-41c4-b6a0-b1e6a472ee04.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).  TAIWAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Qualcomm’s Investment Plan under the Settlement, (Oct. 2018), https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/ee937bcf-68b9-4751-b2da-b636c46b0faa.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).  The latest amendment of the Fair Trade Act of Taiwan was proposed in the October of 2018, waiting to be reviewed. https://join.gov.tw/policies/detail/898e30a4-1ee8-491b-8c5a-5fbdbb5973f9 (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).  See Fair Trade Act of 2017 §45:”No provision of this Act shall apply to any proper conduct in connection with the exercise of rights pursuant to the provisions of the Copyright Act, Trademark Act, Patent Act or other Intellectual property laws.”; available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0150002 (last visited Mar. 5, 2018); also see FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Administrative Statement No. 02678 (2000), https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=225&docid=431 (last visited Mar.25, 2018).  Legislative Rationales of Fair Trade Act of 1991, available at https://www.ftc.gov.tw/law/LawContent.aspx?id=FL011898 (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).  Guidelines on Technology Licensing, Fair Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=163&docid=227 (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).  id, §3.  id, §5(C): “Stipulations that, for ease of calculation, fees for licensed technology that is part of a manufacturing process or that subsists in component parts are to be calculated on the basis of the quantity of finished goods manufactured or sold that employ the licensed technology, or the quantity of raw materials or component parts used that employ the licensed technology, or the number of times such materials or parts are used in the manufacturing process.”; see also §6(L): “Requirements that the licensee pay licensing fees based on the quantity of a particular type of good manufactured or sold irrespective of whether the licensee used the licensed technology.”  id, §5: “The following kinds of technology licensing arrangement stipulations do not intrinsically violate the provisions of the Act on restraint of competition or unfair competition, with the exception of those improper matters to be found after reviewed in accordance with Point 5(C) and 5(D)…”  Fair Trade Act §9(2): “Monopolistic enterprises shall not engage in any one of the following conducts… improperly set, maintain or change the price for goods or the remuneration for services,” available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0150002 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).  Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Whither Symmetry? Antitrust Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights at the FTC and DOJ, COMPETITIN POLICY INTERNATION, 9 (2) (2013).  Id.  id, Section 1-3 of § 97(1).  id, Section 3 of §97(1) :”the amount calculated on the basis of reasonable royalties that may be collected from exploiting the invention patent being licensed.”; see also The 2013 Amendment to Patent Act of Taiwan, List of Amendments to Patent Act of Taiwan, http://www.6law.idv.tw/6law/law2/專利法歷年修正條文及理由.htm#_%EF%BC%8E12%EF%BC%8E%E4%B8%80%E7%99%BE%E9%9B%B6%E4%BA%8C%E5%B9%B4%E4%BA%94%E6%9C%88%E4%B8%89%E5%8D%81%E4%B8%80%E6%97%A5%EF%BC%88%E5%85%A8%E6%96%87%E4%BF%AE%E6%AD%A3%EF%BC%89 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).  id.  Intellectual Property Court of Taiwan Case No.38 (2014); see also Intellectual Property Court of Taiwan Case No.24 (2017); Chung-Lun Shen, Taiwan Supreme Court to Clarify Distinction between Patent Damages and Unjust Enrichment: Koninklijke Philips N. V. v. Gigastorage Corporation, IP OBSERVER, 18 (2017).  <與飛利浦專利訴訟 國碩扳回一城>，經濟日報UDN，https://money.udn.com/money/story/5607/3393179 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  Bruce H. Kobayashi, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Joshua D. Wright, and Koren W. Wong-Ervin, “Excessive Royalty” Prohibitions and the Dangers of Punishing Vigorous Competition and Harming Incentives to Innovate, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONOCLE, 4(3) (2016).  Reena Das Nair & Pamela Mondliwa, Excessive Pricing revisited: what is a competitive price?, Presented at Conference: 1st ANNUAL COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC REGULATION (ACER) WEEK, SOUTHERN AFRICA (2015), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Reena_Das_Nair/publication/290440699_Excessive_Pricing_revisited_what_is_a_competitive_price/links/5698d5f408ae34f3cf2070dd/Excessive-Pricing-revisited-what-is-a-competitive-price.pdf (last visited June. 5, 2018).  David Gilo & Yossi Spiegely, The Antitrust Prohibition of Excessive Pricing, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Elsevier, vol. 61(C)(2018).  35 U.S. Code § 284.  Georgia-Pacific Corp v. United States Plywood Corp, 318 F. Supp. 1116 (NY.S.D.N.Y. 1970).  Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F. 3d 1292 (Fed. Cir., 2011).  Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc,696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012).  William H. Page,Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/RAND and Antitrust Injury, TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL, 22, 181-208 (2014), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/588 (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).  Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed.Cir. 2014).  Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, An Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Decision in Ericsson v. D-Link,Competition Policy International, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, (1) (2015), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2669269 (last visited Mar. 29, 2018), see also Huntern Shu, Determination of royalties in Ericsson v. D-Link, Science & Technology Policy Research and Information Center (STPI) (2015), http://iknow.stpi.narl.org.tw/post/Read.aspx?PostID=10945 (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).  Prism Technologies LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No.16-1456 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  GINSBURG, KOBAYASHI, WONG-ERVIN & WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19.  Id.  Fair Trade Act §7.  Norman V. Siebrasse &Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation, FLORIDA LAW REVIEW, 68 (2016), available at : http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss4/1 (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).  U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies With Competition (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).  id. at 21.  Standard-essential patents, COMPLETION POLICY BRIEF, 5 (2014).  id. at Page17.  Ma, Tay-cheng,Regulation of the Exploitative Abuse: Policy Initiative and Practical Dilemma, Fair Trade Quarterly 17(1) (2009).  INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRINICS ENGINEERS, IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS (2015),https://standards.ieee.org/about/policies/bylaws/sect6-7.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).  Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, FordhamLAW REVIEW, 81 (2013), available at https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol81/iss5/9 (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).