Taiwan Planed Major Promoting Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry

Taiwan Government Lauched the “Biotechnology Action Plan”

The Taiwan Government has planned to boost the support and develop local industries across the following six major sectors: biotechnology, tourism, health care, green energy, innovative culture and post-modern agriculture. As the biotechnology industry has reached its maturity by the promulgation of "Biotech and New Pharmaceutical Development Act" in July, 2007, it will be the first to take the lead among the above sectors. Thus, the Executive Yuan has launched the Biotechnology Action Plan as the first project in building the leading industry sectors, to upgrade local industries and stimulate future economic growth.

Taiwan Government Planed to Promote the Biotechnology and Other newly Industries by Investing Two Hundred Billion

To expand every industrial scale, enhance industrial value, increase the value around the main industrial field, and to encourage the industrial development by government investments for creating the civil working opportunities to reach the goal of continuous economic development, the Executive Yuan Economic Establishment commission has expressed that, the government has selected six newly industrials including "Biotechnology", "Green Energy", "Refined Agriculture", "Tourism", "Medicare", and "Culture Originality" on November 19, 2009 to promote our national economic growth. The government will invest two hundred billion NT dollars to support the industrial development aggressively and to enhance the social investments from year 2009 to 2012. According to a Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research report, the future growth rate will reach 8.16% after the evaluation, Hence, the future of the industries seems to be quite bright.

Currently, the government plans to put money into six newly industries through the existing ways for investment. For instance, firstly, in accordance with the "Act For The Development Of Biotech And New Pharmaceuticals Industry" article 5 provision 1 ",for the purpose of promoting the Biotech and New Pharmaceuticals Industry, a Biotech and New Pharmaceuticals Company may, for a period of five years from the time it is subject to corporate income tax, enjoy a reduction in its corporate income tax payable for up to thirty-five percent (35%) of the total funds invested in research and development ("R&D") and personnel training each year; provided, however, that if the R&D expenditure of a particular year exceeds the average R&D expenditure of the previous two years or if the personnel training expenditure of a particular year exceeds the average personnel training expenditure of the previous two years, fifty percent (50%) of the amount in excess of the average may be used to credit against the amount of corporate income tax payable. Secondly, according to same act of the article 6 provision 1 ", in order to encourage the establishment or expansion of Bio tech and New Pharmaceuticals Companies, a profit-seeking enterprise that (i) subscribes for the stock issued by a Biotech and New Pharmaceuticals Company at the time of the latter's establishment or subsequent expansion; and (ii) has been a registered shareholder of the Biotech and New Pharmaceuticals Company for a period of three (3) years or more, may, for a period of five years from the time it is subject to corporate income tax, enjoy a reduction in its corporate income tax payable for up to twenty percent (20%) of the total amount of price paid for the subscription of shares in such Biotech and New Pharmaceuticals Company; provided that such Biotech and New Pharmaceuticals Company has not applied for exemption from corporate income tax or shareholders investment credit based on the subscription price under other applicable laws and regulations. Thirdly, to promote the entire biotechnological industry development, the government has drafted the "Biotechnology Takeoff Package" for subsidizing the startup´s social investment companies which can satisfy the conditions to invest in "Drug discovery", "Medical Device" or other related biotech industries up to 5 billion with the capital invest in domestic industry over 50%, , with operating experience of multinational biotech investment companies with capital over 150 million in related industrial fields, and with the working experiences of doctor accumulated up to 60 years.

Additionally, the refined agriculture industry field has not only discovered the gene selected products, but also combined the tourism with farming business for new business model creation. According to the "Guidelines for Preferential Loans for the Upgrading of Tourism Enterprises" point 4 provision 1, the expenditure for spending on machine, instruments, land or repairing can be granted a preferential loan in accordance with the rule of point 6, and government will provide a subsidy of interest for loaning Tourism Enterprises with timely payments.

At last, Council for Economic Planning and Development also points out because most of technology industry has been impacted seriously by fluctuation of international prosperity due to conducting the export trade oriented strategy. Furthermore, the aspects of our export trade of technology industry have been impacted by the U.S. financial crisis and the economic decay in EU and US; and the industrial development seems to face the problem caused by over centralization in Taiwan. Hence, the current framework of domestic industry should be rearranged and to make it better by promoting the developmental project of six newly industries.

Taiwan Government Had Modifies Rules to Accelerate NDA Process and Facilitate Development of Clinical Studies in Taiwan

In July 2007, the "Biotech and New Pharmaceutical Development Act" modified many regulations related to pharmaceutical administration, taxes, and professionals in Taiwan. In addition, in order to facilitate the development of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, the government has attempted to create a friendly environment for research and development by setting up appropriate regulations and application systems. These measures show that the Taiwanese government is keenly aware that these industries have huge potential value. To operate in coordination with the above Act and to better deal with the increasing productivity of pharmaceutical R&D programs in Taiwan, the Executive Yuan simplified the New Drug Application (NDA) process to facilitate the submission that required Certificate of Pharmaceutical Product (CPP) for drugs with new ingredients.

The current NDA process requires sponsors to submit documentation as specified by one of the following four options: (1) three CPPs from three of "ten medically-advanced countries," including Germany, the U.S., England, France, Japan, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Belgium, and Sweden; (2) one CPP from the U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia, or England and one CPP from Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden, or Belgium; (3) a Free Sale Certificate (FSC) from one of ten medically-advanced countries where the pharmaceuticals are originally produced and one CPP from one of the other nine countries; or (4) a CPP from the European Medicines Agency. Thus, the current NDA process requires sponsors to spend inordinate amounts of time and incur significant costs to acquire two or three FSCs or CPPs from ten medically-advanced countries in order to submit an NDA in Taiwan.

According to the new rules, sponsors will not have to submit above CPPs if (1) Phase I clinical studies have been conducted in Taiwan, and Phase III Pivotal Trial clinical studies have been simultaneously conducted both in Taiwan and in another country or (2) Phase II and Phase III Pivotal Trial clinical studies have been simultaneously conducted both in Taiwan and in another country. Besides, the required minimum numbers of patients were evaluated during each above phase. Therefore, sponsors who conduct clinical studies in Taiwan and in another country simultaneously could reduce their costs and shorten the NDA process in Taiwan.

The new rules aim to encourage international pharmaceutical companies to conduct clinical studies in Taiwan or to conduct such studies cooperatively with Taiwanese pharmaceutical companies. Such interactions will allow Taiwanese pharmaceutical companies to participate in development and implementation of international clinical studies in addition to benefiting from the shortened NDA process. Therefore, the R&D abilities and the internationalization of the Taiwanese pharmaceutical industry will be improved.

※Taiwan Planed Major Promoting Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry,STLI, https://stli.iii.org.tw/en/article-detail.aspx?no=55&tp=2&i=168&d=6132 (Date:2025/04/02)
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Executive Yuan Promotes Free Economic Demonstration Zone

I.Background To promote more liberal and internationalized development of Taiwan economy, Premier of Executive Yuan approved the “Free Economic Demonstration Zone Plan” on April 26, 2013. Meanwhile, an Executive Yuan Working Group on Promotion of Economic Demonstration Zone is set up to accelerate the mapping out of the promotion programs as well as detailed action plans. The first phase of the Free Economic Demonstration Zone is to be officially initiated in July. According to the “Free Economic Demonstration Zone Plan”, the relevant laws and provisions regarding the flowing of human and financial capitals, and of logistics, will be loosen up to a great degree, based on the core ideas of liberalization, internationalization, and forwardness. Other related measures such as offering of lands and taxation would also be made, in order to attract capitals from both the inside and outside of the country. In addition, the Free Economic Demonstration Zone will first develop economic activities such as intelligent computing, international medicine services, value-added agriculture and cooperation among industries, to accelerate the transformation of the industrial structure of Taiwan. In order to construe an excellent environment for business of full liberalization and internationalization, the promotion strategies will be focused on “break-through of legal frameworks and innovations of management mechanisms”. II.Content of the Plan To accelerate the promotion process, the Free Economic Demonstration Zone will be conducted in two phases. The first phase is centered on the existing free trade port areas, including five ports and one airport, incorporated with the nature of “being inside the country border but outside the tariff zone”. All the industrial parks in the near counties and cities will also be integrated. The promotion will be set out simultaneously in the north, middle and south of Taiwan. The effects of the promotion are expected to be magnified by fully utilizing the resources and the unique characters of industries of each region. Moreover, the promulgation of a special legislation on the Free Economic Demonstration Zone would be facilitated in the future. After this special legislation is passed, the set-ups of demonstration zones can be applied by authorities either of central or of local government and the related promotion works of the second phase will be unfolded immediately. According to the Executive Yuan, the Free Economic Demonstration Zone will be beneficial in terms of creating positive conditions for Taiwan to participate in regional trade organizations and attract both local and foreign investment, injecting new movement into the economic growth of Taiwan. III.Recent Development In addition, on August 8, 2013, relevant discussions on “Furtherance Plan for Free Economic Demonstration Zone Phase One” are further unfolded in the Executive Yuan conference. In addition, the Premier also indicates, that the furtherance of the Free Economic Demonstration Zone (hereafter: FEDZ) is divided into two phases. The first phase starts from the moment that the Plan is approved till the related special legislation is passed and promulgated. In this phase, the relevant tasks can be achieved through the ways of promulgation of administrative orders. On the other hand, the tasks concerning taxation benefits and other parts that involve legislation will not able to be initiated till the second phase of the Plan. For those tasks, the Council for Economic Planning and Development is asked to complete the drafting of this special legislation and related procedures for registering it into the Executive Yuan, together with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and other concerned agencies, in the hope that the related legislation works of the Executive Yuan can be completed before the end of this year. In respect of “Furtherance Plan for Free Economic Demonstration Zone Phase One”, Premier Jiang further points out, that FEDZ is a model incorporates the concept of “being inside the country border but outside the tariff zone” and the idea of “combining the stores upfront and the factories behind, outsourcing manufactures”. In this way, the hinterland of a port can be expended and magnified effects to be achieved through using the resources provided by the factory in behind. Under this pattern, the expansion effects that cities and counties such as New Taipei City and Changhua Country fight for, can be further extended by this concept of “factories in the back”. As for Port of Anping, over which Tainan City government has proactively fought for, can be listed as a demonstration zone once the Executive Yuan approved it as free trade port zone. In the future, other places that are with forward-looking industry and suitable can still be enlisted. Premier Jiang further expresses that, there are four demonstration industries in the first phase, including intelligent computing, international medicine services, value-added agriculture and cooperation among industries. Yet, he also points out that the demonstration of liberalized economy is a concept of “4+N”. It means that the demonstration will not be limited to the scope of these four industries. Other industries that match up with the idea of liberalization, internationalization and foresight can all be incorporated into FEDZ through continuing examination. Moreover, Premier Jiang later mentions on August 14th, that FEDZ is a crucial task for the government at this moment. He thus requests the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Council of Agriculture, to enhance the training and service quality of staffers of the single service window of furtherance of FEDZ. Moreover, Premier Jiang additionally indicated in November, that the scope of the FEDZ will include Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnology Park and Kaohsiung Free Trade Port Area. The combination of the two will facilitate adding value to the agriculture in Taiwan and put momentum into quality agriculture, making the high-quality agricultural products of our country being sold to all over the world with swift logistic services. Premier Jiang also mentioned, that in order to avoid Taiwan being marginalized amid regional integrations of global economies, the government is facilitating industries of potentials by proactively promote the FEDZ. The current approach is to expend the original free trade port area with legislative bases, creating the demonstration zones of free economy by combing original establishments such as Pingtung Agricultural Biotechnology Park. If this approach and system is proved feasible, the next step would be promoting it to island-wide, making the whole nation open-up. IV.Conclusion In the past decade, the economic development in Taiwan, compared to neighboring economic zones such as Hong Kong, Korean or Singapore, was indeed stagnant. It is thus a positive move for the government to put great efforts in promoting FEDZ, in the hope that the liberalization and internationalization of the economy of this country can therefore be significantly improved. Yet, some commentators are of slightly more skeptical opinions, reminding that in terms of the tax relaxation in the Plan, similar approach was already taken by the government before, which did not lead to the expected outcome. In sum, it still remains as a continuing task for us and for the administration as well, to ponder on how Taiwan can find out its own unique strength in the face of global competition. How we can attract more international partners, to create mutual economic benefits. The FEDZ is undoubtedly a first step. Nevertheless, challenges are still ahead of the government, as to how to take many more steps in the future, in order to make Taiwan to march on the stage of the world again.

Post Brexit – An Update on the United Kingdom Privacy Regime

Post Brexit – An Update on the United Kingdom Privacy Regime 2021/9/10   After lengthy talks, on 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom (‘UK’) finally exited the European Union (‘EU’). Then, the UK shifted into a transition period. The UK government was bombarded with questions from all stakeholders. In particular, the data and privacy industry yelled out the loudest – what am I going to do with data flowing from the EU to the UK? Privacy professionals queried – would the UK have a new privacy regime that significantly departs from the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’)? Eventually, the UK made a compromise with all stakeholders – the British, the Europeans and the rest of the world – by bridging its privacy laws with the GDPR. On 28 June 2021, the UK obtained an adequacy decision from the EU.[1] This was widely anticipated but also widely known to be delayed, as it was heavily impacted by the aftermaths of the invalidation of the US- EU Privacy Shield.[2]   While the rest of the world seems to silently observe the transition undertaken by the UK, post-Brexit changes to the UK’s privacy regime is not only a domestic or regional matter, it is an international matter. Global supply chains and cross border data flows will be affected, shuffling the global economy into a new order. Therefore, it is crucial as citizens of a digital economy to unpack and understand the current UK privacy regime. This paper intends to give the reader a brief introduction to the current privacy regime of the UK. The author proposes to set out the structure of the UK privacy legislation, and to discuss important privacy topics. This paper only focuses on the general processing regime, which is the regime that is most relevant to general stakeholders. UK Privacy Legislation   There are two main privacy legislation in the UK – the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘DPA’) and the United Kingdom General Data Protection Act (‘UK GDPR’). These two acts must be read together in order to form a coherent understanding of the current UK privacy regime.   The UK GDPR is the creature of Brexit. The UK government wanted a smooth transition out of the EU and acknowledged that they needed to preserve the GDPR in their domestic privacy regime to an extent that would allow them to secure an adequacy decision. The UK government also wanted to create less impact on private companies. Thus, the UK GDPR was born. Largely it aligns closely with the GDPR, supplemented by the DPA. ICO   The Information Commissioner’s Office (‘ICO’) is the independent authority supervising the compliance of privacy laws in the UK. Prior to Brexit, the ICO was the UK’s supervisory authority under the GDPR. A unique feature of the ICO’s powers and functions is that it adopts a notice system. The ICO has power to issue four types of notices: information notices, assessment notices, enforcement notices and penalty notices.[3] The information notice requires controllers or processors to provide information. The ICO must issue an assessment notice before conducting data protection audits. Enforcement is only exercisable by giving an enforcement notice. Administrative fines are only exercisable by giving a penalty notice. Territorial Application   Section 207(1A) of the DPA states that the DPA applies to any controller or processor established in the UK, regardless where the processing of personal data takes place. Like the GDPR, the DPA and the UK GDPR have an extraterritorial reach to overseas controllers or processors. The DPA and the UK GDPR apply to overseas controllers or processors who process personal data relating to data subjects in the UK, and the processing activities are related to the offering of goods or services, or the monitoring of data subjects’ behavior.[4] Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries   On 28 June 2021, the UK received an adequacy decision from the EU.[5] This means that until 27 June 2025, data can continue to flow freely between the UK and the European Economic Area (‘EEA’).   As for transferring personal data to third countries other than the EU, the UK has similar laws to the GDPR. Both the DPA and the UK GDPR restrict controllers or processors from transferring personal data to third countries. A transfer of personal data to a third country is permitted if it is based on adequacy regulations.[6] An EU adequacy decision is known as ‘adequacy regulations’ under the UK regime.   If there is no adequacy regulations, then a transfer of personal data to a third country will only be permitted if it is covered by appropriate safeguards, including standard data protection clauses, binding corporate rules, codes of conduct, and certifications.[7] The ICO intends to publish UK standard data protection clauses in 2021.[8] In the meantime, the EU has published a new set of standard data protection clauses (‘SCCs’).[9] However, it must be noted that the EU SCCs are not accepted to be valid in the UK, and may only be used for reference purposes. It is also worth noting that the UK has approved three certification schemes to assist organizations in demonstrating compliance to data protection laws.[10] Lawful Bases for Processing   Basically, the lawful bases for processing in the UK regime are the same as the GDPR. Six lawful bases are set out in article 6 of the UK GDPR. To process personal data, at least one of the following lawful bases must be satisfied:[11] The data subject has given consent to the processing; The processing is necessary for the performance of a contract; The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation; The processing is necessary to protect vital interests of an individual – that is, protecting an individual’s life; The processing is necessary for the performance of a public task; The processing is necessary for the purpose of legitimate interests, unless other interests or fundamental rights and freedoms override those legitimate interests. Rights & Exemptions   The UK privacy regime, like the GDPR, gives data subjects certain rights. Most of the rights granted under the UK privacy regime is akin to the GDPR and can be found under the UK GDPR. Individual rights under the UK privacy regime is closely linked with its exemptions, this may be said to be a unique feature of the UK privacy regime which sets it apart from the GDPR. Under the DPA and the UK GDPR, there are certain exemptions, meaning organizations are exempted from certain obligations, most of them are associated with individual rights. For example, if data is processed for scientific or historical research purposes, or statistical purposes, organizations are exempted from provisions on the right of access, the right to rectification, the right to restrict processing and the right to object in certain circumstances.[12] Penalties   The penalty for infringement of the UK GDPR is the amount specified in article 83 of the UK GDPR.[13] If an amount is not specified, the penalty is the standard maximum amount.[14] The standard maximum amount, at the time of writing, is £8,700,000 (around 10 million Euros) or 2% of the undertaking’s total annual worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year.[15] In any other case, the standard maximum amount is £8,700,000 (around 10 million Euros).[16] Conclusion   The UK privacy regime closely aligns with the GDPR. However it would be too simple of a statement to say that the UK privacy regime is almost identical to the GDPR. The ICO’s unique enforcement powers exercised through a notice system is a distinct feature of the UK privacy regime. Recent legal trends show that the UK while trying to preserve its ties with the EU is gradually developing an independent privacy persona. The best example is that in regards to transfers to third countries, the UK has developed its first certification scheme and is attempting to develop its own standard data protection clauses. The UK’s transition out of the EU has certainly been interesting; however, the UK’s transformation from the EU is certainly awaited with awe. [1] Commission Implementing Decision of 28.6.2021, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by the United Kingdom, C(2021) 4800 final,https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/decision_on_the_adequate_protection_of_personal_data_by_the_united_kingdom_-_general_data_protection_regulation_en.pdf.. [2] Judgment of 16 July 2020, Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems, C-311/18, EU:C:2020:559, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0311. [3] Data Protection Act 2018, §115. [4] Data Protection Act 2018, §207(1A); REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art 3. [5] supra note 1. [6] Data Protection Act 2018, §17A-18; REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art 44-50. [7] Data Protection Act 2018, §17A-18; REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art 46-47. [8]International transfers after the UK exit from the EU Implementation Period, ICO, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/international-transfers-after-uk-exit/ (last visited Sep. 10, 2021). [9] Standard contractual clauses for international transfers, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/standard-contractual-clauses-scc/standard-contractual-clauses-international-transfers_en (last visited Sep. 10, 2021). [10] ICO, New certification schemes will “raise the bar” of data protection in children’s privacy, age assurance and asset disposal, ICO, Aug. 19, 2021, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2021/08/ico-approves-the-first-uk-gdpr-certification-scheme-criteria/ (last visited Sep. 10, 2021). [11] REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art 6(1)-(2); Lawful basis for processing, ICO, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/ (last visited Sep. 10, 2021). [12] Data Protection Act 2018, sch 2, part 6, para 27. [13] id. at §157. [14] id. [15] id. [16] id.

Legal Analysis of the U.S. BIOSECURE Act: Implications for Taiwanese Biotechnology Companies

Legal Analysis of the U.S. BIOSECURE Act: Implications for Taiwanese Biotechnology Companies 2024/11/15 I.Introduction The U.S. BIOSECURE Act (H.R.8333)[1](hereunder, "BIOSECURE Act" or "Act") is a strategic legislative measure designed to protect U.S. biotechnology technologies and data from potential exploitation by foreign entities deemed to be threats to national security. Passed by the House of Representatives on September 9, 2024, with a vote of 306-81[2], the Act demonstrates robust bipartisan support to limit foreign influence in critical U.S. sectors. Passed during the legislative session known as "China Week[3]," the Act imposes restrictions on government contracts, funding, and technological cooperation with entities classified as "Biotechnology Companies of Concern" (hereunder, "BCCs") that are affiliated with adversarial governments. Given Taiwan's prominent role in biotechnology and its strong trade ties with the U.S., Taiwanese companies must examine the implications of the BIOSECURE Act, specifically in regard to technology acquisition from restricted foreign companies and compliance obligations for joint projects with U.S. partners. This analysis will delve into three core aspects of the BIOSECURE Act: (1) the designation and evaluation of BCCs, (2) prohibitions on transactions involving BCCs, and (3) enforcement mechanisms. Each section will evaluate potential impacts on Taiwanese companies, focusing on how the Act might influence technology transfers, compliance obligations, and partnership opportunities within the U.S. biotechnology supply chain. II.Designation and Evaluation of Biotechnology Companies of Concern A central element of the BIOSECURE Act is the process of identifying and evaluating foreign biotechnology companies considered potential threats to U.S. national security.[4] Under Section 2(f)(2) of the Act, a "Biotechnology Company of Concern" is defined as any entity associated with adversarial governments—specifically, China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran[5]—that engages in activities or partnerships posing risks to U.S. security[6]. These risks may include collaboration with foreign military or intelligence agencies, involvement in dual-use research, or access to sensitive personal or genetic information of U.S. citizens. Companies already designated as BCCs include BGI, MGI, Complete Genomics, WuXi AppTec, and WuXi Biologics, all of which have substantial ties to China and the Chinese government or military[7]. Under Section 2(f)(4) of the Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is required to continuously evaluate and update the BCC list in consultation with agencies such as the Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, and the National Intelligence Community to reflect evolving security concerns[8]. The designation process presents significant challenges for Taiwanese companies, particularly those that have connections with BCCs or rely on BCC technologies for their products, diagnostics, or research initiatives. For instance, if a Taiwanese company uses gene sequencing technology or multiomics tools sourced from one of the designated BCCs, it may face restrictions when pursuing contracts with U.S. entities or seeking federal funding. To proactively address these challenges, Taiwanese companies should establish compliance protocols that verify the origin of their technology and data sources. Moreover, developing new supply chain relationships with U.S. or European suppliers may not only reduce reliance on BCC-affiliated technology but also enhance Taiwanese companies' reputation as secure and reliable partners in the biotechnology industry. By adapting proactively to the BCC designation process, Taiwanese companies can anticipate and respond to future regulatory shifts more effectively. Diversifying their technology base away from BCCs positions these companies to better align with U.S. biosecurity standards, thereby becoming more attractive collaborators for U.S.-based biotechnology and life sciences companies. Given the rapid pace of regulatory and security developments, staying informed about changes in BCC designations will enable Taiwanese companies to operate with greater agility, adjusting suppliers and adopting new compliance measures as needed. Such proactive alignment can strengthen their resilience and reinforce their status as stable and secure participants in the global biotechnology landscape. III.Prohibition on Government Contracts and Funding A core component of the BIOSECURE Act is its stringent restrictions on contracting and funding involving entities linked to BCCs, as detailed in Section 2(a) of the act[9]. These restrictions extend beyond direct federal interactions to include any recipients of federal funds, prohibiting them from using such funds to procure biotechnology products or services from BCCs[10]. By curtailing federal support and preventing indirect financial benefits to these companies, the U.S. aims to mitigate national security risks posed by adversarial governments. The wide-reaching scope of these prohibitions makes the BIOSECURE Act one of the most comprehensive legislative efforts to secure the biotechnology sector and address concerns over foreign technologies potentially compromising U.S. security interests. For Taiwanese biotechnology companies, these prohibitions introduce substantial compliance demands, particularly for companies that utilize BCC technology within their supply chains. For example, a Taiwanese company engaged in a joint research project with a U.S. government contractor may be required to demonstrate that none of its technology or data sources originate from BCCs. Compliance could necessitate rigorous supply chain audits and operational adjustments, potentially increasing short-term costs. However, aligning with U.S. regulatory standards preemptively can position Taiwanese companies as more desirable partners for U.S. entities that are increasingly prioritizing security and regulatory adherence. The BIOSECURE Act also incentivizes Taiwanese companies to explore alternative technology providers that meet U.S. biosecurity criteria, including secure data management practices, compliance with federal regulations, and the absence of connections to adversarial governments. By sourcing technology from approved U.S. or European biotechnology companies, Taiwanese companies can enhance their market access and collaborative prospects in the U.S. biotechnology and life sciences sectors. This strategy may also foster long-term stability in partnerships and mitigate risks associated with supply chain disruptions, particularly if more companies are designated as BCCs in the future[11]. Establishing partnerships with U.S.-aligned suppliers can also provide Taiwanese companies with a competitive edge in securing government contracts and research funding, as U.S.-based entities increasingly prefer suppliers that comply with national biosecurity requirements. IV.Enforcement Mechanisms, Transition Periods, and Taiwanese Considerations The BIOSECURE Act outlines key enforcement mechanisms and transitional provisions designed to facilitate the adjustment process for companies affected by its restrictions. Specifically, Section 2(c) of the Act provides an eight-year grandfathering period for contracts established prior to the Act’s effective date involving existing BCCs, allowing these agreements to continue until January 1, 2032[12]. This provision is intended to provide companies that are dependent on BCC-supplied biotechnology ample time to transition to compliant suppliers. In addition, the Act includes a "safe harbor" provision[13], which clarifies that equipment previously produced by a BCC but now sourced from a non-BCC entity will not be restricted. This allows companies to re-source components without the risk of penalties for past procurement decisions. For Taiwanese companies, this transition period presents a critical opportunity to adapt to the new regulatory environment without facing immediate disruptions to business operations. Companies dependent on BCC technology for essential biotechnological functions can leverage the eight-year window to gradually phase out such suppliers, thereby minimizing the impact on operations while ensuring future compliance. For example, a Taiwanese company that relies on a BCC’s sequencing technology for genomic research can use this period to forge partnerships with compliant technology suppliers, thereby avoiding sudden disruptions in research or production. Additionally, the Act includes a waiver provision[14] that allows case-by-case exemptions under specific conditions, particularly when compliance is infeasible, such as in instances where critical healthcare services abroad are at risk[15]. By making strategic use of the phased enforcement and waiver provisions, Taiwanese companies can restructure their supply chains to align fully with U.S. requirements. Those that plan these transitions carefully not only ensure regulatory compliance but also enhance their appeal as resilient and trustworthy partners in the U.S. market. Exploring new collaborations with U.S.-approved biotechnology suppliers can further bolster supply chain resilience against future geopolitical or regulatory uncertainties. The transition period[16] and waiver options[17] reflect the BIOSECURE Act's balanced approach between immediate security needs and pragmatic implementation, which Taiwanese companies can capitalize on to build robust, compliant biotechnological operations. V.Conclusion The U.S. BIOSECURE Act[18] presents both significant challenges and strategic opportunities for Taiwanese biotechnology companies. The Act’s restrictions on contracts with designated BCCs and funding constraints necessitate a reassessment of technology acquisition strategies and a reinforcement of compliance practices. Taiwanese companies seeking deeper integration into U.S. and global biotechnology markets will benefit from aligning their procurement approaches with non-BCC suppliers, particularly those in the U.S. or allied countries. This proactive alignment will not only mitigate potential compliance risks but also enhance Taiwanese companies’ reputations as reliable global partners in biotechnology. The phased enforcement and waiver provisions of the BIOSECURE Act[19] provide Taiwanese companies with a clear pathway to navigate the evolving regulatory landscape, allowing them to establish stronger, more resilient supply chains that meet U.S. standards. Such alignment positions these companies as competitive players in the biotechnology sector, contributing to secure and innovative progress in an increasingly interconnected world. By actively engaging with the BIOSECURE Act’s compliance demands, Taiwanese biotechnology companies can leverage the Act's phased implementation to ensure sustained, secure access to the U.S. market and foster strategic biotechnology partnerships. [1] U.S. CONGRESS, H.R. 8333 – U.S. BIOSECURE Act (2024), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8333 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024). [2] OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Roll Call Vote No. 402 on H.R. 8333 (Sept. 9, 2024), https://clerk.house.gov/Votes?RollCallNum=402&BillNum=H.R.8333 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024). [3] JANINE LITTLE, U.S. House Of Representatives Passes The BIOSECURE Act During “China Week”, Global Supply Chain Law Blog (Sept. 13, 2024), https://www.globalsupplychainlawblog.com/supply-chain/u-s-house-of-representatives-passes-the-biosecure-act-during-china-week/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2024). [4] SABINE NAUGÈS & SARAH L. ENGLE, BIOSECURE Act: US Target on Chinese Biotechnology Companies, NAT'L L. REV. (Sept. 13, 2024), https://natlawreview.com/article/biosecure-act-us-target-chinese-biotechnology-companies (last visited Nov. 1, 2024). [5] 10 U.S.C. § 4872(d) (2024), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/4872 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024). [6] U.S. CONGRESS, H.R. 8333 – U.S. BIOSECURE Act (2024), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8333 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024). [7] id. [8] id. [9] id. [10] id. [11] JANINE LITTLE, U.S. House Of Representatives Passes The BIOSECURE Act During “China Week”, Global Supply Chain Law Blog (Sept. 13, 2024), https://www.globalsupplychainlawblog.com/supply-chain/u-s-house-of-representatives-passes-the-biosecure-act-during-china-week/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2024). [12] U.S. CONGRESS, H.R. 8333 – U.S. BIOSECURE Act (2024), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8333 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024). [13] id. [14] id. [15] id. [16] id. [17] id. [18] id. [19] id.

Impact of Government Organizational Reform to Research Legal System and Response Thereto (2) – Observation of the Swiss Research Innovation System

3.Commission of Technology and Innovation (CTI)   The CTI is also an institution dedicated to boosting innovation in Switzerland. Established in 1943, it was known as the Commission for the Promotion of Scientific Research[1]. It was initially established for the purpose of boosting economy and raising the employment rate, and renamed after 1996. The CTI and SNSF are two major entities dedicated to funding scientific research in Switzerland, and the difference between both resides in that the CTI is dedicated to funding R&D of the application technology and industrial technology helpful to Switzerland’s economic development.   Upon enforcement of the amended RIPA 2011, the CTI was officially independent from the Federal Office for Professional Education and Technology (OEPT) and became an independent entity entitled to making decisions and subordinated to the Federal Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA) directly[2]. The CTI is subject to the council system, consisting of 65 professional members delegated from industrial, academic and research sectors. The members assume the office as a part time job. CTI members are entitled to making decisions on funding, utilization of resources and granting of CTI Start-up Label independently[3].   The CTI primarily carries out the mission including promotion of R&D of industrial technology, enhancement of the market-orientation innovation process and delivery of R&D energy into the market to boost industrial innovation. For innovation, the CTI's core mission is categorized into[4]: (1)Funding technology R&D activities with market potential   The CTI invests considerable funds and resources in boosting the R&D of application technology and industrial technology. The CTI R&D Project is intended to fund private enterprises (particularly small-sized and medium-sized enterprises) to engage in R&D of innovation technology or product. The enterprises may propose their innovative ideas freely, and the CTI will decide whether the funds should be granted after assessing whether the ideas are innovative and potentially marketable[5].   CTI’s funding is conditioned on the industrial and academic cooperation. Therefore, the enterprises must work with at least one research institution (including a university, university of science and technology, or ETH) in the R&D. Considering that small-sized and medium-sized enterprises usually do not own enough working funds, technology and human resources to commercialize creative ideas, the CTI R&D Project is intended to resolve the problem about insufficient R&D energy and funds of small- and medium-sized enterprises by delivering the research institutions’ plentiful research energy and granting the private enterprises which work with research institutions (including university, university of science and technology, or ETH) the fund. Notably, CTI’s funding is applicable to R&D expenses only, e.g., research personnel’s salary and expenditure in equipment & materials, and allocated to the research institutions directly. Meanwhile, in order to enhance private enterprises' launch into R&D projects and make them liable for the R&D success or failure, CTI’s funding will be no more than 50% of the total R&D budget and, therefore, the enterprises are entitled to a high degree of control right in the process of R&D.   The industrial types which the CTI R&D Project may apply to are not limited. Any innovative ideas with commercial potential may be proposed. For the time being, the key areas funded by CTI include the life science, engineering science, Nano technology and enabling sciences, etc.[6] It intends to keep Switzerland in the lead in these areas. As of 2011, in order to mitigate the impact of drastic CHF revaluation to the industries, the CTI launched its new R&D project, the CTI Voucher[7]. Given this, the CTI is not only an entity dedicated to funding but also plays an intermediary role in the industrial and academic sectors. Enterprises may submit proposals before finding any academic research institution partner. Upon preliminary examination of the proposals, the CTI will introduce competent academic research institutions to work with the enterprises in R&D, subject to the enterprises' R&D needs. After the cooperative partner is confirmed, CTI will grant the fund amounting to no more than CHF3,500,000 per application[8], provided that the funding shall be no more than 50% of the R&D project expenditure.   The CTI R&D Project not only boosts innovation but also raises private enterprises’ willingness to participate in the academic and industrial cooperation, thereby narrowing the gap between the supply & demand of innovation R&D in the industrial and academic sectors. Notably, the Project has achieved remarkable effect in driving private enterprises’ investment in technology R&D. According to statistical data, in 2011, the CTI solicited additional investment of CHF1.3 from a private enterprise by investing each CHF1[9]. This is also one of the important reasons why the Swiss innovation system always acts vigorously. Table 1  2005-2011 Passing rate of application for R&D funding Year 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Quantity of applications 590 780 637 444 493 407 522 Quantity of funded applications 293 343 319 250 277 227 251 Pass rate 56% 44% 50% 56% 56% 56% 48% Data source: Prepared by the Study (2)Guiding high-tech start-up   Switzerland has learnt that high-tech start-ups are critical to the creation of high-quality employment and boosting of economic growth, and start-ups were able to commercialize the R&D results. Therefore, as of 2001, Switzerland successively launched the CTI Entrepreneurship and CTI Startup to promote entrepreneurship and cultivate high-tech start-ups. 1.CTI Entrepreneurship   The CTI Entrepreneurship was primarily implemented by the Venture Lab founded by CTI investment. The Venture Lab launched a series of entrepreneurship promotion and training courses, covering day workshops, five-day entrepreneurship intensive courses, and entrepreneurship courses available in universities. Each training course was reviewed by experts, and the experts would provide positive advice to attendants about innovative ideas and business models. Data source: Venture Lab Site Fig. 3  Venture Lab Startup Program 2.CTI Startup   The CTI is dedicated to driving the economy by virtue of innovation as its priority mission. In order to cultivate the domestic start-ups with high growth potential in Switzerland, the CTI Startup project was launched in 1996[10] in order to provide entrepreneurs with the relevant guidance services. The project selected young entrepreneurs who provided innovative ideas, and guided them in the process of business start to work their innovative ideas and incorporate competitive start-ups.   In order to enable the funding and resources to be utilized effectively, the CTI Startup project enrolled entrepreneurs under very strict procedure, which may be categorized into four stages[11]: Data source: CTI Startup Site Fig. 4  Startup Plan Flow Chart   In the first stage, the CTI would preliminarily examine whether the applicant’s idea was innovative and whether it was technologically feasible, and help the applicant register with the CTI Startup project. Upon registration, a more concrete professional examination would be conducted at the second stage. The scope of examination included the technology, market, feasibility and management team’s competence. After that, at the stage of professional guidance, each team would be assigned a professional “entrepreneurship mentor”, who would help the team develop further and optimize the enterprise’s strategy, flow and business model in the process of business start, and provide guidance and advice on the concrete business issues encountered by the start-up. The stage of professional guidance was intended to guide start-ups to acquire the CTI Startup Label, as the CTI Startup Label was granted subject to very strict examination procedure. For example, in 2012, the CTI Startup project accepted 78 applications for entrepreneurship guidance, but finally the CTI Startup Label was granted to 27 applications only[12]. Since 1996, a total of 296 start-ups have acquired the CTI Startup Label, and more than 86% thereof are still operating now[13]. Apparently, the CTI Startup Label represents the certification for innovation and on-going development competence; therefore, it is more favored by investors at the stage of fund raising. Table 2  Execution of start-up plans for the latest three years Quantity of application Quantity of accepted application Quantity of CTI Label granted 2012 177 78 27 2011 160 80 26 2010 141 61 24 Data source: CTI Annual Report, prepared by the Study   Meanwhile, the “CTI Invest” platform was established to help start-up raise funds at the very beginning to help commercialize R&D results and cross the valley in the process of R&D innovation. The platform is a private non-business-making organization, a high-tech start-up fund raising platform co-established by CTI and Swiss investors[14]. It is engaged in increasing exposure of the start-ups and contact with investors by organizing activities, in order to help the start-ups acquire investment funds. (3)Facilitating transfer of knowledge and technology between the academic sector and industrial sector   KTT Support (Knowledge & Technology Transfer (KTT Support) is identified as another policy instrument dedicated to boosting innovation by the CTI. It is intended to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and technology between academic research institutions and private enterprises, in order to transfer and expand the innovation energy.   As of 2013, the CTI has launched a brand new KTT Support project targeting at small-sized and medium-sized enterprises. The new KTT Support project consisted of three factors, including National Thematic Networks (NTNs), Innovation Mentors, and Physical and web-based platforms. Upon the CTI’s strict evaluation and consideration, a total of 8 cooperative innovation subjects were identified in 2012, namely, carbon fiber composite materials, design idea innovation, surface innovation, food study, Swiss biotechnology, wood innovation, photonics and logistics network, etc.[15] One NTN would be established per subject. The CTI would fund these NTNs to support the establishment of liaison channels and cooperative relations between academic research institutions and industries and provide small- and medium-sized enterprises in Switzerland with more rapid and easy channel to access technologies to promote the exchange of knowledge and technology between both parties. Innovation Mentors were professionals retained by the CTI, primarily responsible for evaluating the small-sized and medium-sized enterprises’ need and chance for innovation R&D and helping the enterprises solicit competent academic research partners to engage in the transfer of technology. The third factor of KTT Support, Physical and web-based platforms, is intended to help academic research institutions and private enterprises establish physical liaison channels through organization of activities and installation of network communication platforms, to enable the information about knowledge and technology transfer to be more transparent and communicable widely.   In conclusion, the CTI has been dedicated to enhancing the link between scientific research and the industries and urging the industrial sector to involve and boost the R&D projects with market potential. The CTI’s business lines are all equipped with corresponding policy instruments to achieve the industrial-academic cooperation target and mitigate the gap between the industry and academic sectors in the innovation chain. The various CTI policy instruments may be applied in the following manner as identified in the following figure. Data source: CTI Annual Report 2011 Fig. 5  Application of CTI Policy Instrument to Innovation Chain III. Swiss Technology R&D Budget Management and Allocation   The Swiss Federal Government has invested considerable expenditures in technology R&D. According to statistic data provided by Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) and OECD, the Swiss research expenditures accounted for 2.37% of the Federal Government’s total expenditures, following the U.S.A. and South Korea (see Fig. 6). Meanwhile, the research expenditures of the Swiss Government grew from CHF2.777 billion in 2000 to CHF4.639 billion in 2010, an average yearly growth rate of 5.9% (see Fig. 7). It is clear that Switzerland highly values its technology R&D. Data source: FSO and OECD Fig. 6 Percentage of Research Expenditures in Various Country Governments’ Total Expenditures (2008) Data source: FSO and OECD Fig. 7  Swiss Government Research Expenditures 2000-2010 1.Management of Swiss Technology R&D Budget   Swiss research expenditures are primarily allocated to the education, R&D and innovation areas, and play an important role in the Swiss innovation system. Therefore, a large part of the Swiss research expenditures are allocated to institutions of higher education, including ETH, universities, and UASs. The Swiss research expenditures are utilized by three hierarchies[16] (see Fig. 8): Government R&D funding agencies: The Swiss research budget is primarily executed by three agencies, including SERI, Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research, and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Intermediary R&D funding agencies: Including SNSC and CTI. Funding of R&D performing institutions: Including private enterprises, institutions of higher education and private non-profit-making business, et al.   Therefore, the Swiss Government research expenditures may be utilized by the Federal Government directly, or assigned to intermediary agencies, which will allocate the same to the R&D performing institutions. SERI will allocate the research expenditures to institutions of higher education and also hand a lot of the expenditures over to SNSF for consolidated funding to the basic science of R&D. Data source: FSO Fig. 8  Swiss Research Fund Utilization Mechanism ~to be continued~ [1] ORGANIZATION FOR ECONNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: Switzerland 27 (2006). [2] As of January 1, 2013, the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs was reorganized, and renamed into Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER). [3] The Commission for Technology and Innovation CTI, THE COMMISSION FOR TECHOLOGY AND INNOVATION CTI, http://www.kti.admin.ch/org/00079/index.html?lang=en (last visited Jun. 3, 2013). [4] Id. [5] CTI INVEST, Swiss Venture Guide 2012 (2012), at 44, http://www.cti-invest.ch/getattachment/7f901c03-0fe6-43b5-be47-6d05b6b84133/Full-Version.aspx (last visited Jun. 4, 2013). [6] CTI, CTI Activity Report 2012 14 (2013), available at http://www.kti.admin.ch/dokumentation/00077/index.html?lang=en&download=NHzLpZeg7t,lnp6I0NTU042l2Z6ln1ad1IZn4Z2qZpnO2Yuq2Z6gpJCDen16fmym162epYbg2c_JjKbNoKSn6A-- (last visited Jun. 3, 2013). [7] CTI Voucher, THE COMMISSION FOR TECHOLOGY AND INNOVATION CTI, http://www.kti.admin.ch/projektfoerderung/00025/00135/index.html?lang=en (last visited Jun. 3, 2013). [8] Id. [9] CTI, CTI Activity Report 2011 20 (2012), available at http://www.kti.admin.ch/dokumentation/00077/index.html?lang=en&download=NHzLpZeg7t,lnp6I0NTU042l2Z6ln1ad1IZn4Z2qZpnO2Yuq2Z6gpJCDeYR,gWym162epYbg2c_JjKbNoKSn6A--(last visited Jun. 3, 2013). [10] CTI Start-up Brings Science to Market, THE COMMISSION FOR TECHOLOGY AND INNOVATION CTI, http://www.ctistartup.ch/en/about/cti-start-/cti-start-up/ (last visited Jun. 5, 2013). [11] Id. [12] Supra note 8, at 45. [13] Id. [14] CTI Invest, http://www.cti-invest.ch/About/CTI-Invest.aspx (last visited Jun. 5, 2013). [15] KTT Support, CTI, http://www.kti.admin.ch/netzwerke/index.html?lang=en (last visited Jun.5, 2013). [16] Swiss Federal Statistics Office (SFO), Public Funding of Research in Switzerland 2000–2010 (2012), available at http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/04/22/publ.Document.163273.pdf (last visited Jun. 20, 2013).

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