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Finland’s Technology Innovation System

I. Introduction

　　When, Finland, this country comes to our minds, it is quite easy for us to associate with the prestigious cell-phone company “NOKIA”, and its unbeatable high technology communication industry. However, following the change of entire cell-phone industry, the rise of smart phone not only has an influence upon people’s communication and interaction, but also makes Finland, once monopolized the whole cell-phone industry, feel the threat and challenge coming from other new competitors in the smart phone industry. However, even though Finland’s cell-phone industry has encountered frustrations in recent years in global markets, the Finland government still poured many funds into the area of technology and innovation, and brought up the birth of “Angry Birds”, one of the most popular smart phone games in the world. The Finland government still keeps the tradition to encourage R&D, and wishes Finland’s industries could re-gain new energy and power on technology innovation, and indirectly reach another new competitive level.

　　According to the Statistics Finland, 46% Finland’s enterprises took innovative actions upon product manufacturing and the process of R&D during 2008-2010; also, the promotion of those actions not merely existed in enterprises, but directly continued to the aspect of marketing and manufacturing. No matter on product manufacturing, the process of R&D, the pattern of organization or product marketing, we can observe that enterprises or organizations make contributions upon innovative activities in different levels or procedures. In the assignment of Finland’s R&D budgets in 2012, which amounted to 200 million Euros, universities were assigned by 58 million Euros and occupied 29% R&D budgets. The Finland Tekes was assigned by 55 million Euros, and roughly occupied 27.5% R&D budgets. The Academy of Finland (AOF) was assigned by 32 million Euros, and occupied 16% R&D budges. The government’s sectors were assigned by 3 million Euros, and occupied 15.2% R&D budgets. Other technology R&D expenses were 2.1 million Euros, and roughly occupied 10.5% R&D. The affiliated teaching hospitals in universities were assigned by 0.36 million Euros, and occupied 1.8% R&D budgets. In this way, observing the information above, concerning the promotion of technology, the Finland government not only puts more focus upon R&D innovation, but also pays much attention on education quality of universities, and subsidizes various R&D activities. As to the Finland government’s assignment of budges, it can be referred to the chart below.

　　As a result of the fact that Finland promotes industries’ innovative activities, it not only made Finland win the first position in “Growth Competitiveness Index” published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) during 2000-2006, but also located the fourth position in 142 national economy in “The Global Competitiveness Report” published by WEF, preceded only by Swiss, Singapore and Sweden, even though facing unstable global economic situations and the European debt crisis. Hence, observing the reasons why Finland’s industries have so strong innovative power, it seems to be related to the Finland’s national technology administrative system, and is worthy to be researched.

II. The Recent Situation of Finland’s Technology Administrative System

A. Preface

　　Finland’s administrative system is semi-presidentialism, and its executive power is shared by the president and the Prime Minister; as to its legislative power, is shared by the Congress and the president. The president is the Finland’s leader, and he/she is elected by the Electoral College, and the Prime Minister is elected by the Congress members, and then appointed by the president. To sum up, comparing to the power owned by the Prime Minister and the president in the Finland’s administrative system, the Prime Minister has more power upon executive power. So, actually, Finland can be said that it is a semi-predisnetialism country, but trends to a cabinet system.

　　Finland technology administrative system can be divided into four parts, and the main agency in each part, based upon its authority, coordinates and cooperates with making, subsidizing, executing of Finland’s technology policies. The first part is the policy-making, and it is composed of the Congress, the Cabinet and the Research and Innovation Council; the second part is policy management and supervision, and it is leaded by the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, and other Ministries; the third part is science program management and subsidy, and it is composed of the Academy of Finland (AOF), the National Technology Agency (Tekes), and the Finnish National Fund Research and Development (SITRA); the fourth part is policy-executing, and it is composed of universities, polytechnics, public-owned research institutions, private enterprises, and private research institutions. Concerning the framework of Finland’s technology administrative, it can be referred to below.

B. The Agency of Finland’s Technology Policy Making and Management

(A) The Agency of Finland’s Technology Policy Making

　　Finland’s technology policies are mainly made by the cabinet, and it means that the cabinet has responsibilities for the master plan, coordinated operation and fund-assignment of national technology policies. The cabinet has two councils, and those are the Economic Council and the Research and Innovation Council, and both of them are chaired by the Prime Minister. The Research and Innovation Council is reshuffled by the Science and Technology Policy Council (STPC) in 1978, and it changed name to the Research and Innovation Council in Jan. 2009. The major duties of the Research and Innovation Council include the assessment of country’s development, deals with the affairs regarding science, technology, innovative policy, human resource, and provides the government with aforementioned schedules and plans, deals with fund-assignment concerning public research development and innovative research, coordinates with all government’s activities upon the area of science, technology, and innovative policy, and executes the government’s other missions.

　　The Research and Innovation Council is an integration unit for Finland’s national technology policies, and it originally is a consulting agency between the cabinet and Ministries. However, in the actual operation, its scope of authority has already covered coordination function, and turns to direct to make all kinds of policies related to national science technology development. In addition, the consulting suggestions related to national scientific development policies made by the Research and Innovation Council for the cabinet and the heads of Ministries, the conclusion has to be made as a “Key Policy Report” in every three year. The Report has included “Science, Technology, Innovation” in 2006, “Review 2008” in 2008, and the newest “Research and Innovation Policy Guidelines for 2011-2015” in 2010.

　　Regarding the formation and duration of the Research and Innovation Council, its duration follows the government term. As for its formation, the Prime Minister is a chairman of the Research and Innovation Council, and the membership consists of the Minister of Education and Science, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Finance and a maximum of six other ministers appointed by the Government. In addition to the Ministerial members, the Council shall comprise ten other members appointed by the Government for the parliamentary term. The Members must comprehensively represent expertise in research and innovation. The structure of Council includes the Council Secretariat, the Administrative Assistant, the Science and Education Subcommittee, and the Technology and Innovation Subcommittee. The Council has the Science and Education Subcommittee and the Technology and Innovation Subcommittee with preparatory tasks. There are chaired by the Ministry of Education and Science and by the Minister of Economy, respectively. The Council’s Secretariat consists of one full-time Secretary General and two full-time Chief Planning Officers. The clerical tasks are taken care of at the Ministry of Education and Culture.

(B) The Agency of Finland’s Technology Policy Management

　　The Ministries mainly take the responsibility for Finland’s technology policy management, which includes the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Employment and Economy, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Transport and Communication, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Financial, and the Ministry of Justice. In the aforementioned Ministries, the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Employment and Economy are mainly responsible for Finland national scientific technology development, and take charge of national scientific policy and national technical policy, respectively. The goal of national scientific policy is to promote fundamental scientific research and to build up related scientific infrastructures; at the same time, the authority of the Ministry of Education and Culture covers education and training, research infrastructures, fundamental research, applied research, technology development, and commercialization. The main direction of Finland’s national scientific policy is to make sure that scientific technology and innovative activities can be motivated aggressively in universities, and its objects are, first, to raise research funds and maintain research development in a specific ratio; second, to make sure that no matter on R&D institutions or R&D training, it will reach fundamental level upon funding or environment; third, to provide a research network for Finland, European Union and global research; fourth, to support the research related to industries or services based upon knowledge-innovation; fifth, to strengthen the cooperation between research initiators and users, and spread R&D results to find out the values of commercialization, and then create a new technology industry; sixth, to analyze the performance of national R&D system.

　　As for the Ministry of Employment and Economy, its major duties not only include labor, energy, regional development, marketing and consumer policy, but also takes responsibilities for Finland’s industry and technical policies, and provides industries and enterprises with a well development environment upon technology R&D. The business scope of the Ministry of Employment and Economy puts more focus on actual application of R&D results, it covers applied research of scientific technology, technology development, commercialization, and so on. The direction of Finland’s national technology policy is to strengthen the ability and creativity of industries’ technology development, and its objects are, first, to develop the new horizons of knowledge with national innovation system, and to provide knowledge-oriented products and services; second, to promote the efficiency of the government R&D funds; third, to provide cross-country R&D research networks, and support the priorities of technology policy by strengthening bilateral or multilateral cooperation; fourth, to raise and to broaden the efficiency of research discovery; fifth, to promote the regional development by technology; sixth, to evaluate the performance of technology policy; seventh, to increase the influence of R&D on technological change, innovation and society; eighth, to make sure that technology fundamental structure, national quality policy and technology safety system will be up to international standards.

(C) The Agency of Finland’s Technology Policy Management and Subsidy

　　As to the agency of Finland’s technology policy management and subsidy, it is composed of the Academy of Finland (AOF), the National Technology Agency (Tekes), and the Finnish National Fund Research and Development (SITRA). The fund of AOF comes from the Ministry of Education and Culture; the fund of Tekes comes from the Ministry of Employment and Economy, and the fund of SITRA comes from independent public fund supervised by the Finland’s Congress.

(D) The Agency of Finland’s Technology Plan Execution

　　As to the agency of Finland’s technology plan execution, it mainly belongs to the universities under Ministries, polytechnics, national technology research institutions, and other related research institutions. Under the Ministry of Education and Culture, the technology plans are executed by 16 universities, 25 polytechnics, and the Research Institute for the Language of Finland; under the Ministry of Employment and Economy, the technology plans are executed by the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT), the Geological Survey of Finnish, the National Consumer Research Centre; under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the technology plans are executed by the National Institute for Health and Welfare, the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, and University Central Hospitals; under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the technology plans are executed by the Finnish Forest Research Institute (Metla), the Finnish Geodetic Institute, and the Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute (RKTL); under the Ministry of Defense, the technology plans are executed by the Finnish Defense Forces’ Technical Research Centre (Pvtt); under the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the technology plans are executed by the Finnish Meteorological Institute; under the Ministry of Environment, the technology plans are executed by the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE); under the Ministry of Financial, the technology plans are executed by the Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT). At last, under the Ministry of Justice, the technology plans are executed by the National Research Institute of Legal Policy.

※Finland’s Technology Innovation System,STLI, https://stli.iii.org.tw/en/article-detail.aspx?no=55&tp=2&i=168&d=6885 (Date:2026/03/08)
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Experiences about opening data in private sector

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All the data owners have to do is just to transfer their own data to the platform without concern since the platform would handle other affairs. Ⅴ. Conclusion 　　Actively engaging the private sector in the open data value-chain is considered an innovation imperative as it is highly related to the development of information economy. Although many works still need to be done such as identifying mechanisms for catalyzing private sector engagement, these works can be done by organizations such as the World Bank and the Centre for Open Data Enterprise. Private-public collaboration is also important when it comes to strengthening the global data infrastructure, and the benefits of open data are diverse and range from improved efficiency of public administrations to economic growth in the private sector. However, open private data is not the goal but merely a start for open data revolution. 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Post Brexit – An Update on the United Kingdom Privacy Regime

Post Brexit – An Update on the United Kingdom Privacy Regime 2021/9/10 　　After lengthy talks, on 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom (‘UK’) finally exited the European Union (‘EU’). Then, the UK shifted into a transition period. The UK government was bombarded with questions from all stakeholders. In particular, the data and privacy industry yelled out the loudest – what am I going to do with data flowing from the EU to the UK? Privacy professionals queried – would the UK have a new privacy regime that significantly departs from the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’)? Eventually, the UK made a compromise with all stakeholders – the British, the Europeans and the rest of the world – by bridging its privacy laws with the GDPR. On 28 June 2021, the UK obtained an adequacy decision from the EU.[1] This was widely anticipated but also widely known to be delayed, as it was heavily impacted by the aftermaths of the invalidation of the US- EU Privacy Shield.[2] 　　While the rest of the world seems to silently observe the transition undertaken by the UK, post-Brexit changes to the UK’s privacy regime is not only a domestic or regional matter, it is an international matter. Global supply chains and cross border data flows will be affected, shuffling the global economy into a new order. Therefore, it is crucial as citizens of a digital economy to unpack and understand the current UK privacy regime. This paper intends to give the reader a brief introduction to the current privacy regime of the UK. The author proposes to set out the structure of the UK privacy legislation, and to discuss important privacy topics. This paper only focuses on the general processing regime, which is the regime that is most relevant to general stakeholders. UK Privacy Legislation 　　There are two main privacy legislation in the UK – the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘DPA’) and the United Kingdom General Data Protection Act (‘UK GDPR’). These two acts must be read together in order to form a coherent understanding of the current UK privacy regime. 　　The UK GDPR is the creature of Brexit. The UK government wanted a smooth transition out of the EU and acknowledged that they needed to preserve the GDPR in their domestic privacy regime to an extent that would allow them to secure an adequacy decision. The UK government also wanted to create less impact on private companies. Thus, the UK GDPR was born. Largely it aligns closely with the GDPR, supplemented by the DPA. ICO 　　The Information Commissioner’s Office (‘ICO’) is the independent authority supervising the compliance of privacy laws in the UK. Prior to Brexit, the ICO was the UK’s supervisory authority under the GDPR. A unique feature of the ICO’s powers and functions is that it adopts a notice system. The ICO has power to issue four types of notices: information notices, assessment notices, enforcement notices and penalty notices.[3] The information notice requires controllers or processors to provide information. The ICO must issue an assessment notice before conducting data protection audits. Enforcement is only exercisable by giving an enforcement notice. Administrative fines are only exercisable by giving a penalty notice. Territorial Application 　　Section 207(1A) of the DPA states that the DPA applies to any controller or processor established in the UK, regardless where the processing of personal data takes place. Like the GDPR, the DPA and the UK GDPR have an extraterritorial reach to overseas controllers or processors. The DPA and the UK GDPR apply to overseas controllers or processors who process personal data relating to data subjects in the UK, and the processing activities are related to the offering of goods or services, or the monitoring of data subjects’ behavior.[4] Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries 　　On 28 June 2021, the UK received an adequacy decision from the EU.[5] This means that until 27 June 2025, data can continue to flow freely between the UK and the European Economic Area (‘EEA’). 　　As for transferring personal data to third countries other than the EU, the UK has similar laws to the GDPR. Both the DPA and the UK GDPR restrict controllers or processors from transferring personal data to third countries. A transfer of personal data to a third country is permitted if it is based on adequacy regulations.[6] An EU adequacy decision is known as ‘adequacy regulations’ under the UK regime. 　　If there is no adequacy regulations, then a transfer of personal data to a third country will only be permitted if it is covered by appropriate safeguards, including standard data protection clauses, binding corporate rules, codes of conduct, and certifications.[7] The ICO intends to publish UK standard data protection clauses in 2021.[8] In the meantime, the EU has published a new set of standard data protection clauses (‘SCCs’).[9] However, it must be noted that the EU SCCs are not accepted to be valid in the UK, and may only be used for reference purposes. It is also worth noting that the UK has approved three certification schemes to assist organizations in demonstrating compliance to data protection laws.[10] Lawful Bases for Processing 　　Basically, the lawful bases for processing in the UK regime are the same as the GDPR. Six lawful bases are set out in article 6 of the UK GDPR. To process personal data, at least one of the following lawful bases must be satisfied:[11] The data subject has given consent to the processing; The processing is necessary for the performance of a contract; The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation; The processing is necessary to protect vital interests of an individual – that is, protecting an individual’s life; The processing is necessary for the performance of a public task; The processing is necessary for the purpose of legitimate interests, unless other interests or fundamental rights and freedoms override those legitimate interests. Rights & Exemptions 　　The UK privacy regime, like the GDPR, gives data subjects certain rights. Most of the rights granted under the UK privacy regime is akin to the GDPR and can be found under the UK GDPR. Individual rights under the UK privacy regime is closely linked with its exemptions, this may be said to be a unique feature of the UK privacy regime which sets it apart from the GDPR. Under the DPA and the UK GDPR, there are certain exemptions, meaning organizations are exempted from certain obligations, most of them are associated with individual rights. For example, if data is processed for scientific or historical research purposes, or statistical purposes, organizations are exempted from provisions on the right of access, the right to rectification, the right to restrict processing and the right to object in certain circumstances.[12] Penalties 　　The penalty for infringement of the UK GDPR is the amount specified in article 83 of the UK GDPR.[13] If an amount is not specified, the penalty is the standard maximum amount.[14] The standard maximum amount, at the time of writing, is £8,700,000 (around 10 million Euros) or 2% of the undertaking’s total annual worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year.[15] In any other case, the standard maximum amount is £8,700,000 (around 10 million Euros).[16] Conclusion 　　The UK privacy regime closely aligns with the GDPR. However it would be too simple of a statement to say that the UK privacy regime is almost identical to the GDPR. The ICO’s unique enforcement powers exercised through a notice system is a distinct feature of the UK privacy regime. Recent legal trends show that the UK while trying to preserve its ties with the EU is gradually developing an independent privacy persona. The best example is that in regards to transfers to third countries, the UK has developed its first certification scheme and is attempting to develop its own standard data protection clauses. The UK’s transition out of the EU has certainly been interesting; however, the UK’s transformation from the EU is certainly awaited with awe. [1] Commission Implementing Decision of 28.6.2021, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by the United Kingdom, C(2021) 4800 final,https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/decision_on_the_adequate_protection_of_personal_data_by_the_united_kingdom_-_general_data_protection_regulation_en.pdf.. [2] Judgment of 16 July 2020, Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems, C-311/18, EU:C:2020:559, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0311. [3] Data Protection Act 2018, §115. [4] Data Protection Act 2018, §207(1A); REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art 3. [5] supra note 1. [6] Data Protection Act 2018, §17A-18; REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art 44-50. [7] Data Protection Act 2018, §17A-18; REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art 46-47. [8]International transfers after the UK exit from the EU Implementation Period, ICO, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/international-transfers-after-uk-exit/ (last visited Sep. 10, 2021). [9] Standard contractual clauses for international transfers, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/standard-contractual-clauses-scc/standard-contractual-clauses-international-transfers_en (last visited Sep. 10, 2021). [10] ICO, New certification schemes will “raise the bar” of data protection in children’s privacy, age assurance and asset disposal, ICO, Aug. 19, 2021, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2021/08/ico-approves-the-first-uk-gdpr-certification-scheme-criteria/ (last visited Sep. 10, 2021). [11] REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art 6(1)-(2); Lawful basis for processing, ICO, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/ (last visited Sep. 10, 2021). [12] Data Protection Act 2018, sch 2, part 6, para 27. [13] id. at §157. [14] id. [15] id. [16] id.

Strengthening Taiwan’s Pharmaceutical Resilience: Legal Reflections from the European Union’s Critical Medicines Act

Strengthening Taiwan’s Pharmaceutical Resilience: Legal Reflections from the European Union’s Critical Medicines Act 2025/11/15 Introduction: From Vulnerability to Vision For Taiwan, an island state positioned at the crossroads of geopolitical tension and globalized medical trade, the question of pharmaceutical resilience is no longer a technical concern but a constitutional one. A nation’s ability to secure the continuous availability of essential medicines defines not only its public health capacity but the very credibility of its governance. In this light, the European Union’s (hereunder, the “EU”) proposed Critical Medicines Act (hereunder, “EU CMA”) offers Taiwan an illuminating case of how law can move beyond crisis management toward systemic foresight[1]. Resilience in the pharmaceutical sector is not merely about supply stability; it embodies a triple constitutional function—protecting life and health as fundamental rights, safeguarding national security through stable access to critical goods, and reinforcing trust in regulatory governance. Law thus becomes the medium through which uncertainty is rendered governable. The global pandemic revealed that the absence of legal foresight can paralyze even the most advanced health systems, exposing the structural fragility behind administrative efficiency. While Taiwan’s current pharmaceutical regulatory framework remains largely event-driven, reactive, and post-facto, the EU CMA exemplifies an industry-oriented, anticipatory, and pre-emptive model. The contrast underscores a jurisprudential lesson: resilience cannot be legislated through emergency decrees alone; it must be architected through a continuous, legally structured process that anticipates vulnerabilities before they materialize. This article identifies three foundational principles embedded in the EU CMA—visibility, diversification, and agility—and explores how these principles could guide Taiwan in constructing a forward-looking pharmaceutical resilience regime. The goal is not imitation, but inspiration—extracting from the EU experience a conceptual framework for a resilient Taiwanese pharmaceutical order. The EU CMA as a Law of Foresight The EU CMA represents a paradigm shift in pharmaceutical governance. Instead of fragmented national reactions to shortages, the Act establishes a Union-wide framework “to strengthen the availability and security of supply of critical medicinal products” through coordinated information systems, joint vulnerability assessments, and strategic industrial actions[2]. Its architecture reflects a policy-cycle logic: identification of critical medicines (Union list), assessment of vulnerabilities (harmonized monitoring), and action to strengthen capacity (strategic projects, coordinated procurement). Each stage is legally codified and procedurally transparent. The EU CMA thus transforms resilience from a policy aspiration into a governance architecture mandated by law. This approach reveals a fundamental evolution in regulatory philosophy: from law as reaction to law as anticipation. The EU does not merely respond to pharmaceutical disruptions; it legislates the ability to foresee them. This transformation elevates resilience from a managerial tool to a juridical principle that guides administrative behavior and industrial coordination. In this sense, the EU CMA operates as a constitutional statute of preparedness—one that embeds strategic vigilance within the ordinary operations of the market. Moreover, the Act’s systemic design demonstrates a rare synthesis of industrial, health, and competition policies under a unified legal grammar. By integrating economic instruments (such as incentives for local production) with public health imperatives (such as the availability of essential drugs), the EU CMA transforms siloed policy domains into a coherent resilience regime. It institutionalizes coordination not as an afterthought but as a binding legal discipline. Crucially, the EU’s approach embodies what might be called the legality of anticipation: law as an instrument that compels foresight. Resilience here is treated as a public good, transcending national borders but rooted in legal coordination. For Taiwan—whose pharmaceutical imports are geographically concentrated and whose market size limits domestic leverage—the lesson is profound: foresight must be institutional, not intuitive. Visibility: Law as an Instrument of Anticipation At the heart of the EU CMA lies the principle of visibility—the legalization of information as a tool of preparedness. The Act mandates the creation of a Union list of critical medicines[3] and a continuous monitoring system for supply vulnerabilities, coordinated through the Critical Medicines Coordination Group[4]. By institutionalizing information flows, the EU transforms data into a public good and transparency into an act of resilience. Visibility performs a dual function. On one hand, it is technocratic, enabling states to detect early signals of supply risk. On the other, it is constitutional, embedding accountability within knowledge. Uncertainty, when unregulated, leads to discretion; when structured, it becomes a risk, which law can govern. The EU CMA thus converts chaos into cognition—an epistemic transformation at the heart of modern administrative law. For Taiwan, this implies a shift from episodic crisis reporting toward permanent, cross-sectoral data governance. Information duties should not be seen as bureaucratic burdens but as civic infrastructures that permit collective foresight. Visibility, therefore, is not simply about surveillance but about legally enabling knowledge—the first step toward prevention rather than post-hoc management. Diversification: Embedding Resilience into Market Rationality The second principle, diversification, redefines efficiency itself. The EU CMA promotes manufacturing capacity within Europe under the doctrine of “open strategic autonomy”[5]. It supports Strategic Projects that enhance production, encourages cooperation with like-minded countries, and authorizes procurement methods that reward resilience factors alongside price—what EU law calls “MEAT” (Most Economically Advantageous Tender)[6]. This reframes the very idea of market rationality: security and competition are not opposites but complements. Law functions here as a corrective to market myopia, ensuring that the invisible hand does not ignore visible fragility. By quantifying resilience as a measurable value, the EU transforms precaution into an economic variable. For Taiwan—whose procurement and reimbursement systems have historically emphasized price containment—this perspective opens conceptual space. Resilience should not be perceived as inefficiency, but as intertemporal justice: a society’s investment in its future continuity. A diversified system—of suppliers, regions, and regulatory instruments—creates not redundancy but adaptability. In this sense, diversification is law’s expression of prudence in an interconnected economy. Agility: From Administrative Response to Legal Readiness The third principle, agility, captures the law’s capacity to act swiftly yet lawfully. The EU CMA institutionalizes flexibility through accelerated procedures for strategic projects, coordinated procurement frameworks, and crisis response mechanisms[7]. These powers are accompanied by procedural safeguards and sunset clauses, ensuring proportionality and reversibility. Agility thus represents legality in motion: action without arbitrariness. It reconciles speed with scrutiny by embedding emergency measures within predefined legal channels. The lesson for Taiwan is both institutional and philosophical—true readiness is not improvisation, but preparation that preserves legitimacy. In Taiwan’s current system, regulatory energy peaks during emergencies and dissipates thereafter. A mature resilience framework would instead cultivate continuous readiness—administrative structures that learn, anticipate, and adapt. Agility, understood legally, means codifying responsiveness as a standing competence of governance. It is the hinge connecting foresight and execution, legality and flexibility. Taiwan’s Legal Trajectory: From Event-Driven to Industry-Oriented Regulation Comparatively, Taiwan’s Pharmaceutical Affairs Act—even with its proposed amendments—remains largely event-driven and post-crisis in design[8]. Regulatory intervention often follows episodes of shortage or disruption. While recently introduced draft revisions strengthening supply chain obligations[9], these proposed revisions still operate primarily within a reactive paradigm. By contrast, the EU CMA envisions an industry-oriented, anticipatory, and system-based model. It embeds resilience into the legal DNA of pharmaceutical policy—linking regulation, industrial strategy, and public health. For Taiwan, this means evolving from regulatory firefighting to regulatory design: from curing failures to cultivating foresight. To achieve this, Taiwan’s legal development must transcend compliance formalism and embrace a culture of legal learning—where rules are not static commands but adaptive instruments of governance. The transition from event-driven to foresight-driven lawmaking will not only strengthen national health security but also elevate Taiwan’s position in the network of like-minded economies pursuing resilient supply systems. Conclusion: Toward a Resilient Legal Modernity The EU Critical Medicines Act demonstrates that law can be an architecture of anticipation. Its three pillars—visibility, diversification, and agility—form a grammar of resilience that integrates market mechanisms, administrative capacity, and democratic legitimacy. For Taiwan, the value of this model lies not in replication but in reflection. Visibility teaches that knowledge must be institutionalized. Diversification reminds us that resilience can coexist with efficiency. Agility shows that speed and legality are not mutually exclusive. Together, they suggest a new philosophy of governance: one that replaces reaction with design, and uncertainty with structured foresight. Yet the deeper lesson of the EU CMA is that resilience is not simply a functional attribute of a regulatory system—it is a constitutional virtue of modern states. To build resilience is to affirm the social contract anew: to promise citizens not that crises will never occur, but that when they do, institutions will stand ready, transparent, and just. This transforms law from a mirror of disorder into an instrument of collective composure. For Taiwan, embracing resilience as a constitutional principle means reimagining the relationship between law, science, and sovereignty. In a world where disruption is perpetual—whether by pandemics, trade shocks, or technological change—resilience becomes the language through which legality and modernity converge. It marks the transition from governing by reaction to governing by imagination. While the EU CMA relies on the Union’s vast market power to incentivize and coordinate pharmaceutical resilience, Taiwan faces a distinct structural challenge: its market size, though dynamic, cannot generate comparable leverage on a global scale. This asymmetry compels Taiwan to craft a dual strategy—anchoring its domestic resilience through legal foresight, while simultaneously aligning with international frameworks that promote secure and diversified supply chains. How Taiwan can reconcile these two imperatives—maintaining openness and integration with global partners, yet safeguarding autonomous resilience at home—will define the next frontier of its pharmaceutical governance. It is within this strategic and normative intersection that the Institute for Information Industry’s Science and Technology Law Institute (STLI) will continue its research efforts, exploring legal architectures capable of linking Taiwan’s national resilience with the broader ecosystem of global health security. Ultimately, resilience is not merely a regulatory principle but a moral commitment to time—a covenant between generations that law will foresee, prepare, and preserve. As Taiwan refines its pharmaceutical governance, the lesson from the EU CMA is both institutional and existential: to govern resilience is to govern the future itself, and to govern the future is to affirm the dignity of foresight as the highest form of rule of law. [1] EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down a framework for strengthening the availability and security of supply of critical medicinal products as well as for improving the availability of, and access to, medicinal products of common interest (Critical Medicines Act), COM(2025) 102 final (Mar. 11, 2025), https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2abe4fc8-059e-47d9-a20a-d9e3bfc5dc2c_en?filename=mp_com2025_102_act_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2025). [2] id. at Page 17. [3] id. at Page 27. [4] id. at Page 35. [5] CRITICAL MEDICINES ALLIANCE, STRATEGIC REPORT OF THE CRITICAL MEDICINES ALLIANCE (Feb. 28, 2025), https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3da9dfc0-c5e0-4583-a0f1-1652c7c18c3c_en?filename=hera_cma_strat-report_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2025). [6] EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down a framework for strengthening the availability and security of supply of critical medicinal products as well as for improving the availability of, and access to, medicinal products of common interest (Critical Medicines Act), COM(2025) 102 final (Mar. 11, 2025), https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2abe4fc8-059e-47d9-a20a-d9e3bfc5dc2c_en?filename=mp_com2025_102_act_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2025). [7] id. at Page 7. [8] Pharmaceutical Affairs Act (Taiwan), Ministry of Justice, https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=L0030001 (last visited Nov. 2, 2025). [9] 〈衛生福利部公告「藥事法」部分條文修正草案〉，法源法律網，https://www.lawbank.com.tw/news/NewsContent.aspx?NID=206187.00（最後瀏覽日：2025/11/03）。

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