Legal Analysis of the U.S. BIOSECURE Act: Implications for Taiwanese Biotechnology Companies
Legal Analysis of the U.S. BIOSECURE Act: Implications for Taiwanese Biotechnology Companies
2024/11/15
I.Introduction
The U.S. BIOSECURE Act (H.R.8333)[1](hereunder, "BIOSECURE Act" or "Act") is a strategic legislative measure designed to protect U.S. biotechnology technologies and data from potential exploitation by foreign entities deemed to be threats to national security. Passed by the House of Representatives on September 9, 2024, with a vote of 306-81[2], the Act demonstrates robust bipartisan support to limit foreign influence in critical U.S. sectors. Passed during the legislative session known as "China Week[3]," the Act imposes restrictions on government contracts, funding, and technological cooperation with entities classified as "Biotechnology Companies of Concern" (hereunder, "BCCs") that are affiliated with adversarial governments. Given Taiwan's prominent role in biotechnology and its strong trade ties with the U.S., Taiwanese companies must examine the implications of the BIOSECURE Act, specifically in regard to technology acquisition from restricted foreign companies and compliance obligations for joint projects with U.S. partners.
This analysis will delve into three core aspects of the BIOSECURE Act: (1) the designation and evaluation of BCCs, (2) prohibitions on transactions involving BCCs, and (3) enforcement mechanisms. Each section will evaluate potential impacts on Taiwanese companies, focusing on how the Act might influence technology transfers, compliance obligations, and partnership opportunities within the U.S. biotechnology supply chain.
II.Designation and Evaluation of Biotechnology Companies of Concern
A central element of the BIOSECURE Act is the process of identifying and evaluating foreign biotechnology companies considered potential threats to U.S. national security.[4] Under Section 2(f)(2) of the Act, a "Biotechnology Company of Concern" is defined as any entity associated with adversarial governments—specifically, China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran[5]—that engages in activities or partnerships posing risks to U.S. security[6]. These risks may include collaboration with foreign military or intelligence agencies, involvement in dual-use research, or access to sensitive personal or genetic information of U.S. citizens. Companies already designated as BCCs include BGI, MGI, Complete Genomics, WuXi AppTec, and WuXi Biologics, all of which have substantial ties to China and the Chinese government or military[7]. Under Section 2(f)(4) of the Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is required to continuously evaluate and update the BCC list in consultation with agencies such as the Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, and the National Intelligence Community to reflect evolving security concerns[8].
The designation process presents significant challenges for Taiwanese companies, particularly those that have connections with BCCs or rely on BCC technologies for their products, diagnostics, or research initiatives. For instance, if a Taiwanese company uses gene sequencing technology or multiomics tools sourced from one of the designated BCCs, it may face restrictions when pursuing contracts with U.S. entities or seeking federal funding. To proactively address these challenges, Taiwanese companies should establish compliance protocols that verify the origin of their technology and data sources. Moreover, developing new supply chain relationships with U.S. or European suppliers may not only reduce reliance on BCC-affiliated technology but also enhance Taiwanese companies' reputation as secure and reliable partners in the biotechnology industry.
By adapting proactively to the BCC designation process, Taiwanese companies can anticipate and respond to future regulatory shifts more effectively. Diversifying their technology base away from BCCs positions these companies to better align with U.S. biosecurity standards, thereby becoming more attractive collaborators for U.S.-based biotechnology and life sciences companies. Given the rapid pace of regulatory and security developments, staying informed about changes in BCC designations will enable Taiwanese companies to operate with greater agility, adjusting suppliers and adopting new compliance measures as needed. Such proactive alignment can strengthen their resilience and reinforce their status as stable and secure participants in the global biotechnology landscape.
III.Prohibition on Government Contracts and Funding
A core component of the BIOSECURE Act is its stringent restrictions on contracting and funding involving entities linked to BCCs, as detailed in Section 2(a) of the act[9]. These restrictions extend beyond direct federal interactions to include any recipients of federal funds, prohibiting them from using such funds to procure biotechnology products or services from BCCs[10]. By curtailing federal support and preventing indirect financial benefits to these companies, the U.S. aims to mitigate national security risks posed by adversarial governments. The wide-reaching scope of these prohibitions makes the BIOSECURE Act one of the most comprehensive legislative efforts to secure the biotechnology sector and address concerns over foreign technologies potentially compromising U.S. security interests.
For Taiwanese biotechnology companies, these prohibitions introduce substantial compliance demands, particularly for companies that utilize BCC technology within their supply chains. For example, a Taiwanese company engaged in a joint research project with a U.S. government contractor may be required to demonstrate that none of its technology or data sources originate from BCCs. Compliance could necessitate rigorous supply chain audits and operational adjustments, potentially increasing short-term costs. However, aligning with U.S. regulatory standards preemptively can position Taiwanese companies as more desirable partners for U.S. entities that are increasingly prioritizing security and regulatory adherence.
The BIOSECURE Act also incentivizes Taiwanese companies to explore alternative technology providers that meet U.S. biosecurity criteria, including secure data management practices, compliance with federal regulations, and the absence of connections to adversarial governments. By sourcing technology from approved U.S. or European biotechnology companies, Taiwanese companies can enhance their market access and collaborative prospects in the U.S. biotechnology and life sciences sectors. This strategy may also foster long-term stability in partnerships and mitigate risks associated with supply chain disruptions, particularly if more companies are designated as BCCs in the future[11]. Establishing partnerships with U.S.-aligned suppliers can also provide Taiwanese companies with a competitive edge in securing government contracts and research funding, as U.S.-based entities increasingly prefer suppliers that comply with national biosecurity requirements.
IV.Enforcement Mechanisms, Transition Periods, and Taiwanese Considerations
The BIOSECURE Act outlines key enforcement mechanisms and transitional provisions designed to facilitate the adjustment process for companies affected by its restrictions. Specifically, Section 2(c) of the Act provides an eight-year grandfathering period for contracts established prior to the Act’s effective date involving existing BCCs, allowing these agreements to continue until January 1, 2032[12]. This provision is intended to provide companies that are dependent on BCC-supplied biotechnology ample time to transition to compliant suppliers. In addition, the Act includes a "safe harbor" provision[13], which clarifies that equipment previously produced by a BCC but now sourced from a non-BCC entity will not be restricted. This allows companies to re-source components without the risk of penalties for past procurement decisions.
For Taiwanese companies, this transition period presents a critical opportunity to adapt to the new regulatory environment without facing immediate disruptions to business operations. Companies dependent on BCC technology for essential biotechnological functions can leverage the eight-year window to gradually phase out such suppliers, thereby minimizing the impact on operations while ensuring future compliance. For example, a Taiwanese company that relies on a BCC’s sequencing technology for genomic research can use this period to forge partnerships with compliant technology suppliers, thereby avoiding sudden disruptions in research or production. Additionally, the Act includes a waiver provision[14] that allows case-by-case exemptions under specific conditions, particularly when compliance is infeasible, such as in instances where critical healthcare services abroad are at risk[15].
By making strategic use of the phased enforcement and waiver provisions, Taiwanese companies can restructure their supply chains to align fully with U.S. requirements. Those that plan these transitions carefully not only ensure regulatory compliance but also enhance their appeal as resilient and trustworthy partners in the U.S. market. Exploring new collaborations with U.S.-approved biotechnology suppliers can further bolster supply chain resilience against future geopolitical or regulatory uncertainties. The transition period[16] and waiver options[17] reflect the BIOSECURE Act's balanced approach between immediate security needs and pragmatic implementation, which Taiwanese companies can capitalize on to build robust, compliant biotechnological operations.
V.Conclusion
The U.S. BIOSECURE Act[18] presents both significant challenges and strategic opportunities for Taiwanese biotechnology companies. The Act’s restrictions on contracts with designated BCCs and funding constraints necessitate a reassessment of technology acquisition strategies and a reinforcement of compliance practices. Taiwanese companies seeking deeper integration into U.S. and global biotechnology markets will benefit from aligning their procurement approaches with non-BCC suppliers, particularly those in the U.S. or allied countries. This proactive alignment will not only mitigate potential compliance risks but also enhance Taiwanese companies’ reputations as reliable global partners in biotechnology.
The phased enforcement and waiver provisions of the BIOSECURE Act[19] provide Taiwanese companies with a clear pathway to navigate the evolving regulatory landscape, allowing them to establish stronger, more resilient supply chains that meet U.S. standards. Such alignment positions these companies as competitive players in the biotechnology sector, contributing to secure and innovative progress in an increasingly interconnected world. By actively engaging with the BIOSECURE Act’s compliance demands, Taiwanese biotechnology companies can leverage the Act's phased implementation to ensure sustained, secure access to the U.S. market and foster strategic biotechnology partnerships.
Reference:
[1] U.S. CONGRESS, H.R. 8333 – U.S. BIOSECURE Act (2024), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8333 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024).
[2] OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Roll Call Vote No. 402 on H.R. 8333 (Sept. 9, 2024), https://clerk.house.gov/Votes?RollCallNum=402&BillNum=H.R.8333 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024).
[3] JANINE LITTLE, U.S. House Of Representatives Passes The BIOSECURE Act During “China Week”, Global Supply Chain Law Blog (Sept. 13, 2024), https://www.globalsupplychainlawblog.com/supply-chain/u-s-house-of-representatives-passes-the-biosecure-act-during-china-week/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2024).
[4] SABINE NAUGÈS & SARAH L. ENGLE, BIOSECURE Act: US Target on Chinese Biotechnology Companies, NAT'L L. REV. (Sept. 13, 2024), https://natlawreview.com/article/biosecure-act-us-target-chinese-biotechnology-companies (last visited Nov. 1, 2024).
[5] 10 U.S.C. § 4872(d) (2024), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/4872 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024).
[6] U.S. CONGRESS, H.R. 8333 – U.S. BIOSECURE Act (2024), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8333 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024).
[7] id.
[8] id.
[9] id.
[10] id.
[11] JANINE LITTLE, U.S. House Of Representatives Passes The BIOSECURE Act During “China Week”, Global Supply Chain Law Blog (Sept. 13, 2024), https://www.globalsupplychainlawblog.com/supply-chain/u-s-house-of-representatives-passes-the-biosecure-act-during-china-week/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2024).
[12] U.S. CONGRESS, H.R. 8333 – U.S. BIOSECURE Act (2024), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8333 (last visited Nov. 1, 2024).
[13] id.
[14] id.
[15] id.
[16] id.
[17] id.
[18] id.
[19] id.
The use of automated facial recognition technology and supervision mechanism in UK I. Introduction Automatic facial recognition (AFR) technology has developed rapidly in recent years, and it can identify target people in a short time. The UK Home Office announced the "Biometrics Strategy" on June 28, 2018, saying that AFR technology will be introduced in the law enforcement, and the Home Office will also actively cooperate with other agencies to establish a new oversight and advisory board in order to maintain public trust. AFR technology can improve law enforcement work, but its use will increase the risk of intruding into individual liberty and privacy. This article focuses on the application of AFR technology proposed by the UK Home Office. The first part of this article describes the use of AFR technology by the police. The second part focuses on the supervision mechanism proposed by the Home Office in the Biometrics Strategy. However, because the use of AFR technology is still controversial, this article will sort out the key issues of follow-up development through the opinions of the public and private sectors. The overview of the discussion of AFR technology used by police agencies would be helpful for further policy formulation. II. Overview of the strategy of AFR technology used by the UK police According to the Home Office’s Biometrics Strategy, the AFR technology will be used in law enforcement, passports and immigration and national security to protect the public and make these public services more efficient[1]. Since 2017 the UK police have worked with tech companies in testing the AFR technology, at public events like Notting Hill Carnival or big football matches[2]. In practice, AFR technology is deployed with mobile or fixed camera systems. When a face image is captured through the camera, it is passed to the recognition software for identification in real time. Then, the AFR system will process if there is a ‘match’ and the alarm would solicit an operator’s attention to verify the match and execute the appropriate action[3]. For example, South Wales Police have used AFR system to compare images of people in crowds attending events with pre-determined watch lists of suspected mobile phone thieves[4]. In the future, the police may also compare potential suspects against images from closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV) or mobile phone footage for evidential and investigatory purposes[5]. The AFR system may use as tools of crime prevention, more than as a form of crime detection[6]. However, the uses of AFR technology are seen as dangerous and intrusive by the UK public[7]. For one thing, it could cause serious harm to democracy and human rights if the police agency misuses AFR technology. For another, it could have a chilling effect on civil society and people may keep self-censoring lawful behavior under constant surveillance[8]. III. The supervision mechanism of AFR technology To maintaining public trust, there must be a supervision mechanism to oversight the use of AFR technology in law enforcement. The UK Home Office indicates that the use of AFR technology is governed by a number of codes of practice including Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Surveillance Camera Code of Practice and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)’s Code of Practice for surveillance cameras[9]. (I) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 lays down police powers to obtain and use biometric data, such as collecting DNA and fingerprints from people arrested for a recordable offence. The PACE allows law enforcement agencies proceeding identification to find out people related to crime for criminal and national security purposes. Therefore, for the investigation, detection and prevention tasks related to crime and terrorist activities, the police can collect the facial image of the suspect, which can also be interpreted as the scope of authorization of the PACE. (II) Surveillance Camera Code of Practice The use of CCTV in public places has interfered with the rights of the people, so the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires the establishment of an independent Surveillance Camera Commissioner (SCC) for supervision. The Surveillance Camera Code of Practice proposed by the SCC sets out 12 principles for guiding the operation and use of surveillance camera systems. The 12 guiding principles are as follows[10]: A. Use of a surveillance camera system must always be for a specified purpose which is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing need. B. The use of a surveillance camera system must take into account its effect on individuals and their privacy, with regular reviews to ensure its use remains justified. C. There must be as much transparency in the use of a surveillance camera system as possible, including a published contact point for access to information and complaints. D. There must be clear responsibility and accountability for all surveillance camera system activities including images and information collected, held and used. E. Clear rules, policies and procedures must be in place before a surveillance camera system is used, and these must be communicated to all who need to comply with them. F. No more images and information should be stored than that which is strictly required for the stated purpose of a surveillance camera system, and such images and information should be deleted once their purposes have been discharged. G. Access to retained images and information should be restricted and there must be clearly defined rules on who can gain access and for what purpose such access is granted; the disclosure of images and information should only take place when it is necessary for such a purpose or for law enforcement purposes. H. Surveillance camera system operators should consider any approved operational, technical and competency standards relevant to a system and its purpose and work to meet and maintain those standards. I. Surveillance camera system images and information should be subject to appropriate security measures to safeguard against unauthorised access and use. J. There should be effective review and audit mechanisms to ensure legal requirements, policies and standards are complied with in practice, and regular reports should be published. K. When the use of a surveillance camera system is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and there is a pressing need for its use, it should then be used in the most effective way to support public safety and law enforcement with the aim of processing images and information of evidential value. L. Any information used to support a surveillance camera system which compares against a reference database for matching purposes should be accurate and kept up to date. (III) ICO’s Code of Practice for surveillance cameras It must need to pay attention to the personal data and privacy protection during the use of surveillance camera systems and AFR technology. The ICO issued its Code of Practice for surveillance cameras under the Data Protection Act 1998 to explain the legal requirements operators of surveillance cameras. The key points of ICO’s Code of Practice for surveillance cameras are summarized as follows[11]: A. The use time of the surveillance camera systems should be carefully evaluated and adjusted. It is recommended to regularly evaluate whether it is necessary and proportionate to continue using it. B. A police force should ensure an effective administration of surveillance camera systems deciding who has responsibility for the control of personal information, what is to be recorded, how the information should be used and to whom it may be disclosed. C. Recorded material should be stored in a safe way to ensure that personal information can be used effectively for its intended purpose. In addition, the information may be considered to be encrypted if necessary. D. Disclosure of information from surveillance systems must be controlled and consistent with the purposes for which the system was established. E. Individuals whose information is recoded have a right to be provided with that information or view that information. The ICO recommends that information must be provided promptly and within no longer than 40 calendar days of receiving a request. F. The minimum and maximum retention periods of recoded material is not prescribed in the Data Protection Act 1998, but it should not be kept for longer than is necessary and should be the shortest period necessary to serve the purposes for which the system was established. (IV) A new oversight and advisory board In addition to the aforementioned regulations and guidance, the UK Home Office mentioned that it will work closely with related authorities, including ICO, SCC, Biometrics Commissioner (BC), and Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) to establish a new oversight and advisory board to coordinate consideration of law enforcement’s use of facial images and facial recognition systems[12]. To sum up, it is estimated that the use of AFR technology by law enforcement has been abided by existing regulations and guidance. Firstly, surveillance camera systems must be used on the purposes for which the system was established. Secondly, clear responsibility and accountability mechanisms should be ensured. Thirdly, individuals whose information is recoded have the right to request access to relevant information. In the future, the new oversight and advisory board will be asked to consider issues relating to law enforcement’s use of AFR technology with greater transparency. IV. Follow-up key issues for the use of AFR technology Regarding to the UK Home Office’s Biometrics Strategy, members of independent agencies such as ICO, BC, SCC, as well as civil society, believe that there are still many deficiencies, the relevant discussions are summarized as follows: (I) The necessity of using AFR technology Elizabeth Denham, ICO Commissioner, called for looking at the use of AFR technology carefully, because AFR is an intrusive technology and can increase the risk of intruding into our privacy. Therefore, for the use of AFR technology to be legal, the UK police must have clear evidence to demonstrate that the use of AFR technology in public space is effective in resolving the problem that it aims to address[13]. The Home Office has pledged to undertake Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) before introducing AFR technology, including the purpose and legal basis, the framework applies to the organization using the biometrics, the necessity and proportionality and so on. (II)The limitations of using facial image data The UK police can collect, process and use personal data based on the need for crime prevention, investigation and prosecution. In order to secure the use of biometric information, the BC was established under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The mission of the BC is to regulate the use of biometric information, provide protection from disproportionate enforcement action, and limit the application of surveillance and counter-terrorism powers. However, the BC’s powers do not presently extend to other forms of biometric information other than DNA or fingerprints[14]. The BC has expressed concern that while the use of biometric data may well be in the public interest for law enforcement purposes and to support other government functions, the public benefit must be balanced against loss of privacy. Hence, legislation should be carried to decide that crucial question, instead of depending on the BC’s case feedback[15]. Because biometric data is especially sensitive and most intrusive of individual privacy, it seems that a governance framework should be required and will make decisions of the use of facial images by the police. (III) Database management and transparency For the application of AFR technology, the scope of biometric database is a dispute issue in the UK. It is worth mentioning that the British people feel distrust of the criminal database held by the police. When someone is arrested and detained by the police, the police will take photos of the suspect’s face. However, unlike fingerprints and DNA, even if the person is not sued, their facial images are not automatically deleted from the police biometric database[16]. South Wales Police have used AFR technology to compare facial images of people in crowds attending major public events with pre-determined watch lists of suspected mobile phone thieves in the AFR field test. Although the watch lists are created for time-limited and specific purposes, the inclusion of suspects who could possibly be innocent people still causes public panic. Elizabeth Denham warned that there should be a transparency system about retaining facial images of those arrested but not charged for certain offences[17]. Therefore, in the future the UK Home Office may need to establish a transparent system of AFR biometric database and related supervision mechanism. (IV) Accuracy and identification errors In addition to worrying about infringing personal privacy, the low accuracy of AFR technology is another reason many people oppose the use of AFR technology by police agencies. Silkie Carlo, director of Big Brother Watch, said the police must immediately stop using the AFR technology and avoid mistaking thousands of innocent citizens as criminals; Paul Wiles, Biometrics Commissioner, also called for legislation to manage AFR technology because of its accuracy is too low and the use of AFR technology should be tested and passed external peer review[18]. In the Home Office’s Biometric Strategy, the scientific quality standards for AFR technology will be established jointly with the FSR, an independent agency under the Home Office. In other words, the Home Office plans to extend the existing forensics science regime to regulate AFR technology. Therefore, the FSR has worked with the SCC to develop standards relevant to digital forensics. The UK government has not yet seen specific standards for regulating the accuracy of AFR technology at the present stage. V. Conclusion From the discussion of the public and private sectors in the UK, we can summarize some rules for the use of AFR technology. Firstly, before the application of AFR technology, it is necessary to complete the pre-assessment to ensure the benefits to the whole society. Secondly, there is the possibility of identifying errors in AFR technology. Therefore, in order to maintain the confidence and trust of the people, the relevant scientific standards should be set up first to test the system accuracy. Thirdly, the AFR system should be regarded as an assisting tool for police enforcement in the initial stage. In other words, the information analyzed by the AFR system should still be judged by law enforcement officials, and the police officers should take the responsibilities. In order to balance the protection of public interest and basic human rights, the use of biometric data in the AFR technology should be regulated by a special law other than the regulations of surveillance camera and data protection. The scope of the identification database is also a key point, and it may need legislators’ approval to collect and store the facial image data of innocent people. Last but not least, the use of the AFR system should be transparent and the victims of human rights violations can seek appeal. [1] UK Home Office, Biometrics Strategy, Jun. 28, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/home-office-biometrics-strategy (last visited Aug. 09, 2018), at 7. [2] Big Brother Watch, FACE OFF CAMPAIGN: STOP THE MET POLICE USING AUTHORITARIAN FACIAL RECOGNITION CAMERAS, https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/all-campaigns/face-off-campaign/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). [3] Lucas Introna & David Wood, Picturing algorithmic surveillance: the politics of facial recognition systems, Surveillance & Society, 2(2/3), 177-198 (2004). [4] Supra note 1, at 12. [5] Id, at 25. [6] Michael Bromby, Computerised Facial Recognition Systems: The Surrounding Legal Problems (Sep. 2006)(LL.M Dissertation Faculty of Law University of Edinburgh), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.7339&rep=rep1&type=pdf , at 3. [7] Owen Bowcott, Police face legal action over use of facial recognition cameras, The Guardian, Jun. 14, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/14/police-face-legal-action-over-use-of-facial-recognition-cameras (last visited Aug. 09, 2018). [8] Martha Spurrier, Facial recognition is not just useless. In police hands, it is dangerous, The Guardian, May 16, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/16/facial-recognition-useless-police-dangerous-met-inaccurate (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). [9] Supra note 1, at 12. [10] Surveillance Camera Commissioner, Surveillance camera code of practice, Oct. 28, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/surveillance-camera-code-of-practice (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). [11] UK Information Commissioner’s Office, In the picture: A data protection code of practice for surveillance cameras and personal information, Jun. 09, 2017, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/encryption/scenarios/cctv/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2018). [12] Supra note 1, at 13. [13] Elizabeth Denham, Blog: facial recognition technology and law enforcement, Information Commissioner's Office, May 14, 2018, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/blog-facial-recognition-technology-and-law-enforcement/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2018). [14] Monique Mann & Marcus Smith, Automated Facial Recognition Technology: Recent Developments and Approaches to Oversight, Automated Facial Recognition Technology, 10(1), 140 (2017). [15] Biometrics Commissioner, Biometrics Commissioner’s response to the Home Office Biometrics Strategy, Jun. 28, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/biometrics-commissioners-response-to-the-home-office-biometrics-strategy (last visited Aug. 15, 2018). [16] Supra note 2. [17] Supra note 13. [18] Jon Sharman, Metropolitan Police's facial recognition technology 98% inaccurate, figures show, INDEPENDENT, May 13, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/met-police-facial-recognition-success-south-wales-trial-home-office-false-positive-a8345036.html (last visited Aug. 09, 2018).
Introduction to the “Public Procurement for Startups” mechanismIntroduction to the “Public Procurement for Startups” mechanism I.Backgrounds According to the EU’s statistics, government procurement budget accounted for over 14% of GDP. And, according to the media report, the total amount of government procurement in Taiwan in 2017 accounted for nearly 8%. Therefore, the government’s procurement power has gradually become a policy tool for the government to promote the development of innovative products and services. In 2017, the Executive Yuan of the R.O.C.（Taiwan）announced a government procurement policy named “Government as Good Partners with Startups （政府成為新創好夥伴）”[1] to encourage government agencies and State-owned Enterprises to procure and adopt innovative goods or services provided by startups. This policy was subsequently implemented through an action plan named “Public Procurement for Startups”（新創採購）[2] by the Small and Medium Enterprise Administration（SMEA）.The action plan mainly includes two important parts：One created the procurement process for startups to enter the government contracts market through inter-entities contracts. The other accelerated the collaboration of the government agencies and startups through empirical demonstration. II.Facilitating the procurement process for startups to enter the government market In order to help startups enter the government contracts market in a more efficient way, the SMEA conducts the procurement of inter-entity supply contracts with suppliers, especially startups, for the supply of innovative goods or services. An inter-entity supply contract[3] is a special contractual framework, under which the contracting entity on behalf of two or more other contracting parties signs a contract with suppliers and formulates the specifics and price of products or services provided through the public procurement process. Through the process of calling for tenders, price competition and so on, winning tenderers will be selected and listed on the Government E-Procurement System. This framework allows those contracting entities obtain orders and acquire products or services which they need in a more efficient way so it increases government agencies’ willingness to procure and use innovative products and services. From 2018, the SMEA started to undertake the survey of innovative products and services that government agencies usually needed and conducted the procurement of inter-entity supply contracts for two rounds every year. As a result, the SMEA plays an important role to bridge the demand and supply sides for innovative products or services by means of implementing the forth-mentioned survey and procurement process. Moreover, in order to explore more innovative products and services with high quality and suitable for government agencies and public institutions, the SMEA actively networked with various stakeholders, including incubators, accelerators, startups mentoring programs sponsored by private and public sectors and so on. Initially the items to be procured were categorized into four themes which were named the Smart Innovations, the Smart Eco, the Smart Healthcare, and the Smart Security. Later, in order to show the diversity of the innovation of startups which response well to various social issues, from 2019, the SMEA introduced two new theme solicitations titled the Smart Education and the Smart Agriculture to the inter-entities contracts. Those items included the power management systems, the AI automated recognition and image warning system, the chatbot for public service, unmanned flying vehicles, aerial photography services and so on. Take the popular AI image warning system as an example, the system is used by police officers to make instant evidence searching and image recording. Other government agencies apply the innovative system to the investigation of illegal logging and school safety surveillance. Moreover, the SMEA has also offered subsidy for local governments tobuy those items provided by startups. That is the coordinated supporting measure which allows startups the equal playing field to compete with large companies. The Subsidy scheme is based on the Guideline for Subsidies on Procurement of Innovative Products and Services[3] (approved by the Executive Yuan on March 29, 2018 and revised on Feb. 20, 2021). In the Guideline, “innovative products and services” refer to the products, technologies, labor, service flows or items and services rendered with creative activities through deploying scientific or technical means and a certain degree of innovations by startups with less than five years in operation. Such innovative products and services are displayed for the inter-entity supply contractual framework administered by the SMEA for government procurement. III.Accelerating the collaboration of the government agencies and startups through empirical demonstration To assist startups to prove their concepts or services, and become more familiar with the governemnrt’s needs, the SMEA also created a mechanism called the “Solving Governmental Problems by Star-up Innovation”（政府出題˙新創解題）. It plans to collect government agencies’ needs, and then solicit innovative proposals from startups. After their proposals are accepted, startups will be given a grant up to one million NT dollars to conduct empirical studies on solution with government agencies for about half a year. Take the cooperation between the “Taoyuan Long Term Care Institute for Older People and the Biotech Startup” for example, a care system with sanitary aids was introduced to provide automatic detection, cleanup and dry services for the patients’discharges, thus saving 95% of cleaning time for caregivers. In the past, caregivers usually spent 4 hours on the average in inspecting old patients, cleaning and replacing their bedsheets as their busy daily routines. Inadequate caregivers makes it difficult to maintain the care quality. If the problem was not addressed immediately, it would make the life of old patients more difficult. IV.Achievements to date Since the promotion of the products and services of the startups and the launch of the “Public Procurement for Startups” program in 2018, 68 startups, with the SMEA’s assistance, have entered the government procurement contracts market, and more than 100 government agencies have adopted the innovative resolutions. With the encouragement for them in adopting and utilizing the fruits of the startups, it has generated more than NT$150 million in cooperative business opportunities. V.Conclusions While more and more startups are obtaining business opportunities from the favorable procurement process, constant innovation remains the key to success. As such, the SMEA has regularly visited the government agencies-buyers to obtain feedbacks from startups so as to adjust and optimize the innovative products or services. The SMEA has also regularly renewed the specifics and items of the procurement list every year to keep introducing and supplying high-quality products or services to the government agencies. Reference: [1] Policy for investment environment optimization for Startups（2017）,available athttps://www.ndc.gov.tw/nc_27_28382.（last visited on July 30, 2021 ) [2] https://www.spp.org.tw/spp/（last visited on July 30, 2021 ) [3] Article 93 of Government Procurement Act：I An entity may execute an inter-entity supply contract with a supplier for the supply of property or services that are commonly needed by entities. II The regulations for a procurement of an inter-entity supply contract, the matters specified in the tender documentation and contract, applicable entities, and the related matters shall be prescribed by the responsible entity. [4] https://law.moea.gov.tw/LawContent.aspx?id=GL000555（last visited on July 30, 2021）
Impact of Government Organizational Reform to Scientific Research Legal System and Response Thereto (2) – For Example, The Finnish Innovation Fund (“SITRA”)Impact of Government Organizational Reform to Scientific Research Legal System and Response Thereto (2) – For Example, The Finnish Innovation Fund (“SITRA”) III. Comparison of Strength and Weakness of Sitra Projects 1. Sitra Venture Capital Investment Model In order to comprehend how to boost innovation business development to upgrade innovation ability, we analyze and compare the innovation systems applied in Sweden, France and Finland[1] . We analyze and compare the characteristics, strength and weakness of innovation promotion models in terms of funding, networking and professional guidance. Generally, the first difficulty which a start-up needs to deal with when it is founded initially is the funding. Particularly, a technology company usually requires tremendous funding when it is founded initially. Some potentially adequate investors, e.g., venture capitals, seldom invest in small-sized start-up (because such overhead as supervision and management fees will account for a high percentage of the investment due to the small total investment amount). Networking means how a start-up integrates such human resources as the management, investors, technical advisors and IP professionals when it is founded initially. Control over such human resources is critical to a new company’s survival and growth. Professional guidance means how professional knowledge and human resource support the start-up’s operation. In order to make its product required by the market, an enterprise usually needs to integrate special professional knowledge. Notwithstanding, the professional knowledge and talents which are available from an open market theoretically often cannot be accessed, due to market failure[2]. Assuming that Sitra’s funding is prioritized as Pre-seed-Initiation stage, Seed-Development stage and Follow-up – Growth stage, under Finland model, at the Pre-seed-Initiation stage, Sitra will provide the fund amounting to EUR20,000 when Tekes will also provide the equivalent fund, provided that the latter purely provides subsidy, while the fund provided by Sitra means a loan to be repaid (without interest) after some time (usually after commercialization), or a loan convertible to shares. Then, the loan would be replaced by soft or convertible (to shares) investment and the source of funding would turn to be angel investors or local seed capital at the Seed-Development stage. At this stage, the angel investors, local seed capital and Sitra will act as the source of funding jointly in Finland, while Tekes will not be involved at this stage. At the Follow-up-Growth stage, like the Sweden model, Sitra will utilize its own investment fund to help mitigate the gap between local small-sized funding and large-sized international venture capital[3]. How to recruit professional human resources is critical to a start-up’s success. Many enterprises usually lack sufficient professional human resources or some expertise. DIILI service network set up by Sitra is able to provide the relevant solutions. DILLI is a network formed by product managers. Its members actively participate in starts-up and seek innovation. They also participate in investment of starts-up independently sometimes. Therefore, they are different from angel investors, because they devote themselves to the starts-up on a full-time basis[4]. In other words, they manage the starts-up as if the starts-up were their own business. 2. Key to Public Sector’s Success in Boosting Development of Innovation Activity Business In terms of professional guidance, voluntary guidance means the direct supply of such professional resources as financing, human resource and technology to starts-up, while involuntary guidance means the supply of strategic planning in lieu of direct assistance to help the enterprises make routine decisions[5]. The fractured and incomplete professional service attendant market generates low marginal effect. Therefore, it is impossible for the traditional consultation service to mitigate such gap and the investment at the pre-seed initiation stage will be excessive because of the acquisition of the professional services. Meanwhile, professional advisors seldom are involved in consultation services at the pre-seed initiation stage of a start-up because of the low potential added value. Therefore, at such stage, only involuntary professional guidance will be available usually. Under Sitra model, such role is played by an angel investor. Upon analysis and comparison, we propose six suggested policies to boost innovation activities successfully as the reference when observing Sitra operation. First of all, compared with the French model, Finland Sitra and Sweden model set more specific objectives to meet a start-up’s needs (but there is some defect, e.g., Sitra model lacks voluntary professional guidance). Second, structural budget is a key to the successful model. Sitra will receive the funds in the amount of EUR235,000,000 from the Finnish Government, but its operating expenditure is covered by its own operating revenue in whole. Third, it is necessary to provide working fund in installments and provide fund at the pre-seed-initiation stage. Under both of Finland model and Sweden model, funds will be provided at the pre-seed-initiation stage (Tekes is responsible for providing the fund in Finland). Fourth, the difficulty in networking must be solved. In Sitra, the large-sized talent network set up by it will be dedicated to recruiting human resources. Fifth, the voluntary professional guidance is indispensable at the pre-seed-initiation stage, while the same is unavailable at such stage under Sitra model. Instead, the Sweden model is held as the optimal one, as it has a dedicated unit responsible for solving the difficulty to seek profit. Sixth, soft loan[6] will be successfully only when the loan cannot be convertible to shares. At the pre-seed initiation stage or seed-development stage, a start-up is usually funded by traditional loan. Assuming that the start-up is not expected to gain profit, whether the loan may be convertible to shares will also be taken into consideration when the granting of loan is considered (therefore, the fund provider will not be changed to the “capital” provider). Besides, the government authorities mostly lack the relevant experience or knowledge, or are in no position to negotiate with international large-sized venture capital companies. For example, under the French model, the government takes advantage of its power to restrict the venture capital investment and thereby renders adverse impact to starts-up which seek venture capital. Finally, the supply of own fund to meet the enterprises’ needs at seed-development stage and follow-up-growth stage to mitigate the gap with large-sized venture capital[7] is also required by a successful funding model. IV. Conclusion－Deliberation of Finnish Sitra Experience As the leading national industrial innovation ability promoter in Finland, Sitra appears to be very characteristic in its organizational framework or operating mechanism. We hereby conclude six major characteristics of Sitra and propose the potential orientation toward deliberation of Taiwan’s industrial innovation policies and instruments. 1. Particularity of Organizational Standing In consideration of the particularity of Sitra organizational standing, it has two characteristics observable. First, Sitra is under supervision of the Finnish Parliament directly, not subordinated to the administrative organizational system and, therefore, it possesses such strength as flexibility and compliance with the Parliament’s requirements. Such organization design which acts independently of the administrative system but still aims to implement policies has been derived in various forms in the world, e.g., the agency model[8] in the United Kingdom, or the independent apparatus in the U.S.A. Nevertheless, to act independently of the administrative system, it has to deal with the deliberation of responsible political principles at first, which arouses the difficulty in taking care of flexibility at the same time. In Taiwan, the intermediary organizations include independent agencies and administrative corporations, etc., while the former still involves the participation of the supreme administrative head in the right of personnel administration and is subordinated to the ministries/departments of the Executive Yuan and the latter aims to enforce the public missions in the capacity of “public welfare” organization. Though such design as reporting to the Parliament directly is not against the responsible political principles, how the Parliament owns the authority to supervise is the point (otherwise, theoretically, the administrative authorities are all empowered by the parliament in the country which applies the cabinet system). Additionally, why some special authorities are chosen to report to the parliament directly while other policy subjects are not is also disputable. The existence of Sitra also refers to a circumstantial evidence substantiating that Finland includes the innovation policy as one of the important government policies, and also the objective fact that Finland’s innovation ability heads the first in the world. Second, Sitra is a self-sufficient independent fund, which aims to promote technical R&D and also seeks profit for itself, irrelevant with selection of adequate investment subjects or areas. Instead, for this purpose, the various decisions made by it will deal with the utility and mitigate the gap between R&D and market. Such entity is responsible for public welfare or policy projects and also oriented toward gain from investment to feed the same back to the individuals in the organization. In the administrative system, Sitra is not directed by the administrative system but reports to the Parliament directly. Sitra aims to upgrade the national R&D innovation ability as its long-term goal mission and utilizes the promotion of innovation business and development of venture capital market. The mission makes the profit-orientation compatible with the selection of investment subjects, as an enterprise unlikely to gain profit in the future usually is excluded from the national development view. For example, such industries as green energy, which is not likely to gain profit in a short term, is still worth investing as long as it meets the national development trend and also feasible (in other words, selection of marketable green technology R&D, instead of comparison of the strength and weakness in investment value of green energy and other high-polluted energy). 2. Expressly Distinguished From Missions of Other Ministries/Departments For the time being, Sitra primarily invests in starts-up, including indirect investment and direct investment, because it relies on successful new technology R&D which may contribute to production and marketability. Starts-up have always been one of the best options, as large-sized enterprises are able to do R&D on their own without the outsourcing needs. Further, from the point of view of an inventor, if the new technology is marketable, it will be more favorable to him if he chooses to start business on his own or make investment in the form of partnership, instead of transfer or license of the ownership to large-sized enterprises (as large-sized enterprises are more capable of negotiation). However, note that Sitra aims to boost innovation activities and only targets at start-up business development, instead of boosting and promoting the start-up per se. Under the requirement that Sitra needs to seek profit for itself, only the business with positive development view will be targeted by Sitra. Further, Sitra will not fund any business other than innovation R&D or some specific industries. Apparently, Sitra only focuses on the connection between innovation activities and start-up, but does not act as the competent authority in charge of small-sized and medium-sized enterprises. Meanwhile, Sitra highlights that it will not fund academic research activities and, therefore, appears to be distinguished from the competent authority in charge of national scientific research. Though scientific research and technology innovation business, to some extent, are distinguished from each other in quantity instead of quality, abstract and meaningless research is existent but only far away from the commercialization market. Notwithstanding, a lot of countries tend to distinguish basic scientific research from industrial technology R&D in the administration organization's mission, or it has to be. In term of the way in which Sitra carries out its mission, such distinguishing ability is proven directly. 3. Well-Founded Technology Foresight-Based Investment Business The corporate investments, fund investments and project funding launched by Sitra are all available to the pre-designated subjects only, e.g. ecological sustainable development, energy utilization efficiency, and social structural changes, etc. Such way to promote policies as defining development area as the first priority and then promoting the investment innovation might have some strength and weakness at the same time. First of all, the selection of development areas might meet the higher level national development orientation more therefor, free from objective environmental restrictions, e.g. technical level, leading national technology industries and properties of natural resources. Notwithstanding, an enterprise’s orientation toward innovation R&D might miss the opportunity for other development because of the pre-defined framework. Therefore, such way to promote policies as defining development areas or subjects as the first priority will be inevitably based on well-founded technology foresight-based projects[9], in order to take various subjective and objective conditions into consideration and to forecast the technology development orientation and impact to be faced by the home country’s national and social economies. That is, said strength and weakness will be taken into consideration beforehand for foresight, while following R&D funding will be launched into the technology areas pre-designated after thorough analysis. 4. Self-Interested Investment with the Same High Efficiency as General Enterprises Sitra aims to gain profit generally, and its individual investment model, e.g., DIILI, also permits marketing managers to involve business operation. The profit-sharing model enables Sitra to seek the same high efficiency as the general enterprises when purusing its innovation activity development. The investment launched by Sitra highlights that it is not “funding” (which Tekes is responsible for in Finland) or the investment not requiring return. Therefore, it has the system design to acquire corporate shares. Sitra participates in a start-up by offering its advanced technology, just like a general market investor who will choose the potential investment subject that might benefit him most upon his personal professional evaluation. After all, the ultimate profit will be retained by Sitra (or said DIILI manger, subject to the investment model). Certainly, whether the industry which requires permanent support may benefit under such model still remains questionable. However, except otherwise provided in laws expressly, said special organization standing might be a factor critical to Sitra profit-seeking model. That is, Sitra is not subordinated to the administrative system but is under supervision of the parliament independently, and how its staff deal with the conflict of interest issues in the capacity other than the public sector’s/private sector’s staff is also one of the key factors to success of the system. 5. Investment Model to Deal With Policy Instruments of Other Authorities/Agencies Sitra decides to fund a start-up depending on whether it may gain profit as one of its priorities. As aforesaid, we may preliminarily recognize that the same should be consistent with funding to starts-up logically and no “government failure” issue is involved. For example, the funding at the pre-seed-initiation stage needs to tie in with Tekes’ R&D “funding” (and LIKSA service stated herein) and, therefore, may adjust the profit-seeking orientation, thereby causing deviation in promotion of policies. The dispute over fairness of repeated subsidy/funding and rationality of resource allocation under the circumstance must be controlled by a separate evaluation management mechanism inevitably. 6. Affiliation with Enhancement of Regional Innovation Activities Regional policies cannot be separable from innovation policies, especially in a country where human resources and natural resources are not plentiful or even. Therefore, balancing regional development policies and also integrating uneven resource distribution at the same time is indispensable to upgrading of the entire national social economic benefits. The Finnish experience indicated that innovation activities ought to play an important role in the regional development, and in order to integrate enterprises, the parties primarily engaged in innovation activities, with the R&D ability of regional academic research institutions to upgrade the R&D ability effectively, the relevant national policies must be defined for adequately arranging and launching necessary resources. Sitra's approaches to invest in starts-up, release shares after specific period, integrate the regional resources, upgrade the national innovation ability and boost the regional development might serve to be the reference for universities’ centers of innovative incubator or Taiwan’s local academic and scientific sectors[10] to improve their approaches. For the time being, the organization engaged in venture capital investment in the form of fund in Taiwan like Sitra of Finland is National Development Fund, Executive Yuan. However, in terms of organizational framework, Sitra is under supervision of the Parliament directly, while National Development Fund is subordinated to the administrative system of Taiwan. Though Sitra and National Development Fund are both engaged in venture capital investments primarily, Sitra carries out its missions for the purpose of “promoting innovative activities”, while the National Development Fund is committed to achieve such diversified goals as “promoting economic changes and national development[11]” and is required to be adapted to various ministries’/departments’ policies. Despite the difference in the administrative systems of Taiwan and Finland, Sitra system is not necessarily applicable to Taiwan. Notwithstanding, Sitra’s experience in promotion and thought about the system might provide a different direction for Taiwan to think when it is conceiving the means and instruments for industrial innovation promotion policies in the future. [1] Bart Clarysse & Johan Bruneel, Nurturing and Growing Innovation Start-Ups: The Role of Policy As Integrator, R&D MANAGEMENT, 37(2), 139, 144-146 (2007). Clarysse & Bruneel analysis and comparison refers to Sweden Chalmers Innovation model, French Anvar/Banque de Developpement des PMEs model and Finland Sitra PreSeed Service model. [2] id. at 141-143. [3] id. at 141. [4] id. at 145-146. [5] id. at 143. [6] The loan to be repaid is not a concern. For example, the competent authority in Sweden only expects to recover one-fourths of the loan. [7] Clarysse & Bruneel, super note 26, at 147-148. [8] 彭錦鵬，〈英國政署之組織設計與運作成效〉，《歐美研究》，第30卷第3期，頁89-141。 [9] Technology foresight must work with the innovation policy road mapping (IPRM) interactively, and consolidate the forecast and evaluation of technology policy development routes. One study case about IPRM of the environmental sustainable development in the telecommunication industry in Finland, the IPRM may enhance the foresighted system and indicates the potential factors resulting in systematic failure. Please see Toni Ahlqvist, Ville Valovirta & Torsti Loikkanen, Innovation policy road mapping as a systemic instrument for forward-looking policy design, Science and Public Policy 39, 178-190 (2012). [10] 參見李昂杰，〈規範新訊：學界科專辦法及其法制配套之解析〉，《科技法律透析》，第23卷第8期，頁33（2011）。 [11] National Development Fund, Executive Yuan website, http://www.df.gov.tw/(tftgkz45150vye554wi44ret)/page-aa.aspx?Group_ID=1&Item_Title=%E8%A8%AD%E7%AB%8B%E5%AE%97%E6%97%A8#(Last visit on 2013/03/28)
Recommendation of the Regulations on the Legal and Effective Access to Taiwan’s Biological ResourcesPreface Considering that, many countries and regional international organizations already set up ABS system, such as Andean Community, African Union, Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), Australia, South Africa, and India, all are enthusiastic with the establishment of the regulations regarding the access management of biological resources and genetic resources. On the other hand, there are still many countries only use traditional and existing conservation-related regulations to manage the access of biological resources. Can Taiwan's regulations comply with the purposes and objects of CBD? Is there a need for Taiwan to set up specific regulations for the management of these access activities? This article plans to present Taiwan's regulations and review the effectiveness of the existing regulations from the aspect of enabling the legal and effective access to biological resources. A recommendation will be made on whether Taiwan should reinforce the management of the bio-resources access activities. Review and Recommendation of the Regulations on the Legal and Effective Access to Taiwan's Biological Rersearch Resources （1）Evaluate the Needs and Benefits before Establishing the Regulation of Access Rights When taking a look at the current development of the regulations on the access of biological resources internationally, we discover that some countries aggressively develop designated law for access, while some countries still adopt existing regulations to explain the access rights. Whether to choose a designated law or to adopt the existing law should depend on the needs of establishing access and benefit sharing system. Can the access and benefit sharing system benefit the functioning of bio-technological research and development activities that link closely to the biological resources? Can the system protect the interests of Taiwan's bio-research results? In Taiwan, in the bio-technology industry, Agri-biotech, Medical, or Chinese Herb Research & Development are the key fields of development. However, the biological resources they use for the researches are mainly supplied from abroad. Hence, the likelihood of violating international bio-piracy is higher. On the contrary, the incidence of international research houses searching for the biological resources from Taiwan is comparatively lower, so the possibility for them to violate Taiwan's bio-piracy is very low. To look at this issue from a different angle, if Taiwan establishes a separate management system for the access of biological resources, it is likely to add more restrictions to Taiwan's bio-tech R&D activities and impact the development of bio-industry. Also, under the new management system, international R&D teams will also be confined, if they wish to explore the biological resources, or conduct R&D and seek for co-operation activities in Taiwan. Not to mention that it is not a usual practice for international R&D teams to look for Taiwan's biological resources. A new management system will further reduce their level of interest in doing so. In the end, the international teams will then shift their focus of obtaining resources from other countries where the regulation on access is relatively less strict. Before Taiwan establishes the regulations on the legal and effective access to bio-research resources, the government should consider not only the practical elements of the principal on the fair and impartial sharing of the derived interests from bio-research resources, but also take account of its positive and negative impacts on the development of related bio-technological industries. Even if a country's regulation on the access and benefit sharing is thorough and comprehensive enough to protect the interests of bio-resource provider, it will, on the contrary, reduce the industry's interest in accessing the bio-resources. As a result, the development of bio-tech industry will be impacted and the resource provider will then be unable to receive any benefits. By then, the goal of establishing the regulation to benefit both the industry and resource provider will not be realized. To sum up, it is suggested to evaluate the suitability of establishing the management system for the access to biological resources through the cost-effect analysis first. And, further consider the necessity of setting up regulations by the access the economic benefits derived from the regulation for both resource provider and bio-tech industry. （2）The Feasibility of Managing the access to Bio-research Resources from existing Regulations As analysed in the previous paragraphs, the original intention of setting up the Wildlife Conservation Act, National Park Law, Forestry Act, Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, and Aboriginal Basic Act is to protect the environment and to conserve the ecology. However, if we utilize these traditional regulations properly, it can also partially help to manage the access to biological resources. When Taiwan's citizens wish to enter specific area, or to collect the biological resources within the area, they need to receive the permit from management authority, according to current regulations. Since these national parks, protection areas, preserved areas, or other controlled areas usually have the most comprehensive collections of valuable biological resources in a wide range of varieties, it is suggested to include the agreements of access and benefit sharing as the mandatory conditions when applying for the entrance permit. Therefore, the principal of benefit sharing from the access to biological resources can be assured. Furthermore, the current regulations already favour activities of accessing biological resources for academic research purpose. This practice also ties in with the international trend of separating the access application into two categories - academic and business. Australia's practice of access management can be a very good example of utilizing the existing regulations to control the access of resources. The management authority defines the guidelines of managing the entrance of control areas, research of resources, and the collection and access of resources. The authority also adds related agreements, such as PIC (Prior Informed Consent), MTA (Material Transfer Agreement), and benefit sharing into the existing guidelines of research permission. In terms of scope of management, the existing regulation does not cover all of Taiwan's bio-research resources. Luckily, the current environmental protection law regulates areas with the most resourceful resources or with the most distinctive and rare species. These are often the areas where the access management system is required. Therefore, to add new regulation for access management on top of the existing regulation is efficient method that utilizes the least administrative resources. This could be a feasible way for Taiwan to manage the access to biological resources. （3）Establish Specific Regulations to Cover the Details of the Scope of Derived Interests and the Items and Percentage of Funding Allocation In addition to the utilization of current regulations to control the access to biological resources, many countries establish specific regulations to manage the biological resources. If, after the robust economic analysis had been done, the country has come to an conclusion that it is only by establishing new regulations of access management the resources and derived interests of biological resources can be impartially shared, the CBD (Convention of Bio Diversity), the Bonn Guidelines, or the real implementation experiences of many countries can be an important guidance when establishing regulations. Taiwan has come up with the preliminary draft of Genetic Resources Act that covers the important aspects of international access guidelines. The draft indicates the definition and the scope of access activities, the process of access applications (for both business and academic purpose), the establishment of standardized or model MTA, the obligation of disclosing the sources of property rights (patents), and the establishment of bio-diversity fund. However, if we observe the regulation or drafts to the access management of the international agreements or each specific country, we can find that the degree of strictness varies and depends on the needs and situations. Generally speaking, these regulations usually do not cover some detailed but important aspects such as the scope of derived interests from biological resources, or the items and percentage of the allocation of bio-diversity fund. Under the regulation to the access to biological resources, in addition to the access fee charge, the impartial sharing of the derived interests is also an important issue. Therefore, to define the scope of interests is extremely important. Any interest that is out of the defined scope cannot be shared. The interest stated in the existing regulation generally refers to the biological resources or the derived business interests from genetic resources. Apart from describing the forms of interest such as money, non-money, or intellectual property rights, the description of actual contents or scope of the interests is minimal in the regulations. However, after realizing the importance of bio-diversity and the huge business potential, many countries have started to investigate the national and international bio-resources and develop a database system to systematically collect related bio-research information. The database comprised of bio-resources is extremely useful to the activities related to bio-tech developments. If the international bio-tech companies can access Taiwan's bio-resource database, it will save their travelling time to Taiwan. Also, the database might as well become a product that generates revenues. The only issue that needs further clarification is whether the revenue generated from the access of database should be classified as business interests, as defined in the regulations. As far as the bio-diversity fund is concerned, many countries only describe the need of setting up bio-diversity funds in a general manner in the regulations. But the definition of which kind of interests should be put into funds, the percentage of the funds, and the related details are not described. As a result, the applicants to the access of bio-resources or the owner of bio-resources cannot predict the amount of interests to be put into bio-diversity fund before they actually use the resources. This issue will definitely affect the development of access activities. To sum up, if Taiwan's government wishes to develop the specific regulations for the access of biological resources, it is advised to take the above mentioned issues into considerations for a more thoroughly described, and more effective regulations and related framework. Conclusion In recent years, it has been a global trend to establish the regulations of the access to and benefit sharing of bio-resources. The concept of benefit sharing is especially treated as a useful weapon for the developing countries to protect the interests of their abundant bio-research resources. However, as we are in the transition period of changing from free access to biological resources to controlled access, we are facing different regulations within one country as well as internationally. It will be a little bit disappointing for the academic research institution and the industry who relies on the biological resources to conduct bio-tech development if they do not see a clear principal direction to follow. The worse case is the violation of the regulation of the country who owns the bio-resources when the research institutions try to access, exchange, or prospect the biological resources without thorough understanding of related regulations. For some of Taiwan's leading fields in the bio-tech industry, such as Chinese and herbal medicine related products, agricultural products, horticultural products, and bio-tech products, since many resources are obtained from abroad, the incidence of violation of international regulation will increase, and the costs from complying the regulations will also increase. Therefore, not only the researcher but also the government have the responsibility to understand and educate the related people in Taiwan's bio-tech fields the status of international access management regulations and the methods of legally access the international bio-research resources. Currently in Taiwan, we did not establish specific law to manage the access to and benefit sharing of bio-resources. Comparing with the international standard, there is still room of improvement for Taiwan's regulatory protection to the provider of biological resources. However, we have to consider the necessity of doing so, and how to do the improvement. And Taiwan's government should resolve this issue. When we consider whether we should follow international trend to establish a specific law for access management, we should always go back to check the potential state interests we will receive and take this point into consideration. To define the interests, we should always cover the protection of biological resources, the development of bio-tech industry, and the administrative costs of government. Also the conservation of biological resources and the encouragement of bio-tech development should be also taken into consideration when the government is making decisions. In terms of establishing regulations for the access to biological resources and the benefit sharing, there are two possible solutions. The first solution is to utilize the existing regulations and add the key elements of access management into the scope of administrative management. The work is planned through the revision of related current procedures such as entrance control of controlled areas and the access of specific resources. The second solution is to establish new regulations for the access to biological resources. The first solution is relatively easier and quicker; while the second solution is considered to have a more comprehensive control of the issue. The government has the final judgement on which solution to take to generate a more effective management of Taiwan's biological resources.
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