The Organization Framework, the Notification System and the Legal Norms of Critical Infrastructure Protection in the U.S.

1. Organization Framework

In the organization framework of critical infrastructure protection, there are mainly the public departments and the PPP organizations. The functions and task description of relevant organizations are as follows.

(1) Department of Homeland Security

After the September 11 attacks in America, the Homeland Security Act was passed in November 2002, and based on this act, 23 federal organizations, plans and offices were integrated to establish the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take responsibility for homeland security in America. The tasks include: (1) to analyze intelligence data collected from various departments such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) so that any threats to security can be discovered in time, (2) to protect and defend critical infrastructure, (3) to coordinate and lead America to prevent and respond to the attacks from nuclear weapons, biochemical weapons and other and (4) to coordinate the tasks of the federal government, including emergency and rescue. For the task regarding critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure protection, the main units in charge are the Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) and the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) subordinate to National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to reduce the risk in both physical and cyber security to maintain national security1

(2) Congress

Relevant units and committees are established both in the Senate and the House of Representatives to be responsible for protection and making policies pertinent to important critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure.

(3) Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section

In 1991, the Department of Justice (DOS) established the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), a section of the Criminal Division, to be responsible for all crime combating computer and intellectual property. Computer crime is referred to cases which include electronic penetrations, data thefts, and cyber attacks to the important critical infrastructure. CCIPS also prevents, investigates, and prosecutes computer crimes by working with other government agencies, the private sector, academic institutions, and foreign counterparts.

(4) Other Relevant PPP Organizations

2The Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) is responsible for the information security message sharing among the industries of each critical infrastructure to ensure the liaison and cooperation among industries. Finally, for the issue on critical information infrastructure, especially cyber crimes, both the National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA) and the Cross Sector Cyber Security Working Group (CSCSWG) are designated to serve as crucial roles in governmental and non-governmental internet security prevention to be responsible for techniques and education.

2. Notification System

(1)Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center

The Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) run by Carnegie Mellon University is the oldest and most important early-warning organization for information security in the USA.  With its experts studying internet vulnerabilities and risk assessment released regularly, it reminds people of the possible dangers which exist in the information age and the need to improve internet security.

(2)US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

The US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) was established in 2003. It is responsible for protecting the infrastructure of the internet in America and for coordinating and providing response support and defense against national cyber attacks. It interacts with federal agencies, industry, the research community, state government, and others to disseminate reasoned and actionable cyber security information to the public.

(3)Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the first early warning center of critical infrastructure at the national level, is responsible for providing the information pertinent to legal execution presently and also taking responsibility for the investigation of cyber crime.

(4)Information Sharing and Analysis Centers

Currently, industry in America, including finance, telecommunications, energy, traffic, water resources, together established individual Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) based on the policy made in PDD-63. The ISAC of the financial system established in October 1999 being the first established center. These ISACs further work together to form an ISAC Council to integrate the information from each of them and improve their interaction and information sharing.

3. Legal Norms

In reference to the laws and regulations of critical infrastructure protection, America has aimed at critical infrastructure protection and computer crime to formulate the following regulations.

(1) Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972

According to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), the advisory committee can be established in every federal agency to provide the public, along with received open advice, with relevant objectives, and to prevent the public from being inappropriately influenced by the policies made by the government. However, to keep the private institutions which run the critical infrastructures from worrying the inappropriate leak of the sensitive information provided and consulted by them, Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council was established so that the Secretary of Homeland Security has the right to disregard the regulations of FACA and establish an independent advisory committee.

(2) Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 19863

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was enacted and implemented in 1986. It mainly regulates computer fraud and abuse. The Act states that it is against the law for anyone to access a protected computer without authorization. However, it also recognizes the fact that accessing a computer system of electronic and magnetic records does not mean a violation of the law. According to the CFAA, what is needed is one of the following requirements to be the wrongful conduct regulated in the Act: (1) whoever intentionally accesses a computer to obtain specific information inside the government or whoever has influenced the transmission function of the computer system; (2) whoever intentionally accesses a computer to obtain a protected database (including the information contained in a financial record of a financial institution or of a card issuer, or the information contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, or the information from any department of agency of the United States, or the conduct involving an interstate transaction); (3) whoever intentionally accesses any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the United States, and causes damage. In addition, the Act also prohibits conduct such as transmitting malicious software, and defrauding traffic in any password or similar information. For any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of the law, he/she may maintain a civil action to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief. However, the Computer Abuse Amendment Act (1994) expands the above Act, planning to include the conduct of transmitting viruses and malicious program into the norms whose regulatory measures were adopted by the USA Patriot Act enacted in October 20014

(3) Homeland Security Act of 20025

The Homeland Security Act provides the legal basis for the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and integrates relevant federal agencies into it. The Act also puts information analysis and measures of critical infrastructure protection into the norm. And, the norm in which private institutions are encouraged to voluntarily share with DHS the information security message of important critical infrastructure is regulated in the Critical Infrastructure Information Act: Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information. According to the Act, the DHS should have the obligation to keep the information provided by private institutions confidential, and this information is exempted from disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act.

(4) Freedom of Information Act

Many critical infrastructures in America are regulated by governmental laws, yet they are run by private institutions. Therefore, they should obey the law and provide the government with the operation report and the sensitive information related with critical infrastructure. However, knowing that people can file a request at will to review relevant data from the government agencies based on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), then the security of national critical infrastructure may be exposed to the danger of being attacked. Therefore, the critical infrastructure, especially the information regarding the safety system, early warning, and interdependent units, are all exempted by the Freedom of Information Act.

(5) Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 20026

After the 911 Incident, Congress in America passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act to establish the mechanism to underwrite terrorism risk insurance, in which insurance companies are required to provide terrorism attack risk insurance and the federal government will also cover part of loss for severe attacks.

1.http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0794. shtm (last accessed at 21. 07. 2009).

2.http://www.thei3p.org/ (last accessed at 21. 07. 2009).

3.http://www.panix.com/~eck/computer-fraud-act. html (last accessed at 21. 07. 2009).

4.Mark G.  Milone, Hacktivism:Securing the National Infrastructure, 58 Bus. Law, 389-390, 2002.

5.http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf (last accessed at 21. 07. 2009).

6.http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/pdf/hr3210.pdf (last accessed at 21. 07. 2009).

※The Organization Framework, the Notification System and the Legal Norms of Critical Infrastructure Protection in the U.S.,STLI, https://stli.iii.org.tw/en/article-detail.aspx?no=55&tp=2&i=169&d=6124 (Date:2024/05/12)
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Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Protection

The security facet of cyberspace along with a world filled with CPU-controlled household and everyday items can be examined from various angles. The concept of security also varies in accordance with different stages of national conditions and industrial development in different nations. As far as our nation is concerned, the definition of security industry is "an industry offering protection for human bodies, important infrastructure, information, financial system, as well as offering equipment to defend the security of national lands and the service"1 as initially defined by "Security Industry Program Office." Judging from the illustration of the definition, the security industry should be inter-disciplinary and integrative, which covers almost all walks of life and fields, such as high-tech industrial security management, traffic & transportation security management, fire control and prevention against natural calamities, disaster relief, information security management, security management in defense of national borders, and prevention of epidemics. After the staged mission, "e-Taiwan program", was accomplished in 2007, our government hoped to construct a good surrounding by creating a comfortable life from a user’s point-of-view. This was hoped to be achieved by using "the development of a high-quality internet society" as a main source by using innovative services, internet convergence, perceptive environment, security, trust, and human machine linkage. At the Economic Development Vision for 2015: First-Stage Three-Year Sprint Program (2007~2009) formulated by the Executive Yuan, wireless broadband, CPU computer-controlled items all have become part of our every day lives, and healthcare, along with the green industry are listed as the next emerging industries; whereby the development of relevant critical technologies is hoped to be promoted to create higher industrial values and commercial opportunities. However, from a digitally-controlled-life viewpoint, the issue concerned by all walks of life is no longer confined to the convenience and security of personal life but gradually turns to protection of security of a critical infrastructure (CI) run by using information technology. For instance, finance management, stock market, communication network, harbors and airports, high speed rail, R&D of important technology, science parks, water purification facilities, water supply facilities, power, and energy facilities. 2Because security involves resources related with people's most fundamental living needs and is the most elementary economic activity of the society, it is regarded as an important core objective to promote the modern social security system. Therefore, critical infrastructure protection requires more dependence on information and communication technology to maintain the stability of finance and communication, as well as the security of facilities related with supply and economy of all sorts of livelihoods in order to ensure regular operation. With the influence of information and communication technology on the application of critical infrastructure on the increase, the society has increasingly deepened its dependence on the security of our cyber world. The concept and connotation of information security also keep extending with it toward the aforementioned critical infrastructure protection planning, making critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) and critical infrastructure protection (CIP) more inseparable in concept3 , and becomes an important goal of policy implementation to achieve the vision of a digital lifestyle which is secure for every nation. In recent years, considerable resources have been invested to complete an environment whereby a legal system of “smart lifestyle” is developed. However, what has been done for infrastructure protection continues to appear as not being comprehensive enough. This includes vague definitions, scattered regulations and policies, different protection measures taken by different authorities in charge, obvious differences in relevant risk management measures and in the magnitude of management planning of information security and so on. These problems all influence the formation of national policies and are the obstacles to the promotion of relevant industrial development. In view of this, the 2008/2009 International CIIP Handbook will be used as the cornerstone of research in this project. After the discussion on how critical infrastructure protection is done in America, Germany and Japan, the contents of norms of regulations and policies regarding critical infrastructure protection in our nation will be explored to make an in-depth analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of relevant norms. It is hoped to find out what is missing or omitted in the regulations and policies of our nation and to make relevant amendments. Suggestions will also be proposed so that the construction of a safe environment whereby the digital age of our nation can be expanded to assist the “smart lifestyle” to be developed further. 1.See http://tsii.org.tw/modules/tinyd0/index.php?id=14 (last visited May 24, 2009) 2.For "2008 International Conference on Homeland Security and Application of Technology in Taiwan ~ Critical Infrastructure Protection~", please visit http://www.tier.org.tw/cooperation/20081210.asp (last visit date: 05/17/2009). 3.For critical infrastructure protection, every nation has not only proceeded planning for physical facilities but put even more emphasis on protection jobs of critical information & communication infrastructure maintained via the information & communication technology. In the usage of relevant technical terms, the term "critical infrastructure" has also gradually been used to include the term "critical information & communication infrastructure". Elgin M. Brunner, Manuel Suter, Andreas Wenger, Victor Mauer, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2008. 09, p. 37.

The legal challenges of ubiquitous healthcare

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The Coverage and Policies of Critical Infrastructure Protection in U.S.

Regarding the issue of critical infrastructure protection, the emphasis in the past was put on strategic facilities related to the national economy and social security merely based on the concept of national defense and security1. However, since 911 tragedy in New York, terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and several other martial impacts in London in 2005, critical infrastructure protection has become an important issue in the security policy for every nation. With the broad definition, not only confined to national strategies against immediate dangers or to execution of criminal prevention procedure, the concept of "critical infrastructure" should also include facilities that are able to invalidate or incapacitate the progress of information & communication technology. In other words, it is elevated to strengthen measures of security prevention instead. Accordingly, countries around the world have gradually cultivated a notion that critical infrastructure protection is different from prevention against natural calamities and from disaster relief, and includes critical information infrastructure (CII) maintained so that should be implemented by means of information & communication technology into the norm. In what follows, the International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009 is used as a research basis. The Subjects, including the coverage of CIIP, relevant policies promoted in America, are explored in order to provide our nation with some references to strengthen the security development of digital age. 1. Coverage of Important Critical Information Infrastructures Critical infrastructure is mainly defined in "Uniting and Strengthening our country by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, as known as Patriot Act of the U.S., in section 1016(e)2 . The term ‘critical infrastructure’ refers to "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to our country that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." In December 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) promulgated Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)3 to identify 17 Critical Infrastructures and key resources (CI/KR) ,and bleuprinted the responsibility as well as the role for each of CI/KR in the protection task. In this directive, DHS also emphasized that the coverage of CI/KR would depend on the real situations to add or delete sectors to ensure the comprehensiveness of critical infrastructure. In March 2008, DHS added Critical Manufacturing which becomes the 18th critical infrastructure correspondent with 17 other critical infrastructures. The critical infrastructures identified by DHS are: information technology, communications, chemical, commercial facilities, dams, nuclear reactors, materials and waste, government facilities, transportation systems, emergency services, postal and shipping, agriculture and food, healthcare and public health, water, energy (including natural gas, petroleum, and electricity), banking and finance, national monuments and icons, defense industrial Base, and critical manufacturing. 2. Relevant Policies Previously Promoted With Critical Infrastructure Working Group (CIWG) as a basis, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) directly subordinate to the President was established in 1996. It consists of relevant governmental organizations and representatives from private sectors. It is responsible for promoting and drawing up national policies indicating an important critical infrastructure, including natural disasters, negligence and lapses caused by humans, hacker invasion, industrial espionage, criminal organizations, terror campaign, and information & communication war and so on. Although PCCIP no longer exists and its functions were also redefined by HDSP-7, the success of improving cooperation and communication between public and private sectors was viewed as a significant step in the subsequent issues on information security of critical infrastructure of public and private sectors in America. In May 1998, Bill Clinton, the former President of the U.S., amended PCCIP and announced Presidential Decision Directive 62, 63 (PDD-62, PDD-63). Based on these directives, relevant teams were established within the federal government to develop and push the critical infrastructure plans to protect the operations of the government, assist communications between the government and the private sectors, and further develop the plans to secure national critical infrastructure. In addition, concrete policies and plans regarding information security of critical infrastructure would contain the Defence of America's Cyberspace -- National Plan for Information Systems Protection given by President Clinton in January, 2000 based on the issue of critical infrastructure security on the Internet which strengthens the sharing mechanism of internet information security messages between the government and private organizations. After 911, President Bush issued Executive Order 13228 (EO 13228) and Executive Order 13231 to set up organizations to deal with matters regarding critical infrastructure protection. According to EO 13228, the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council were established. The duty of the former is mainly assist the U.S. President to integrate all kinds of enforcements related to the protection of the nation and critical infrastructure so as to avoid terrorist attacks, while the latter provides the President with advice on protection of homeland security and assists to solve relevant problems. According to EO 13228, the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board directly subordinate to the President was established to be responsible for offering advice on polices regarding information security protection of critical infrastructure and on cooperation plans. In addition, National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), which consists of owners and managers of national critical infrastructure, was also set up to help promote the cooperation between public and private sectors. Ever since the aforementioned executive order, critical infrastructure protection has been more concrete and specific in definition; for instance, to define critical infrastructure and its coverage through HSPD-7, the National Strategy for Homeland Security issued in 2002, the polices regarding the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets addressed by the White House in 2003; all of this are based on the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Moreover, the density of critical infrastructure protection which contains virtual internet information security was enhanced for the protection of physical equipment and the protection from destruction caused by humans. Finally, judging from the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), Sector-Specific Plans (SPP) supplementing NIPP and offering a detailed list of risk management framework, along with National Strategy for Information-Sharing, the public-private partnership (PPP) and the establishment of information sharing mechanism are highly estimated to ensure that the network of information security protection of critical infrastructure can be delicately interwoven together because plenty of important critical infrastructures in the U.S. still depend on the maintenance and operation of private sectors. 1.Cf. Luiijf, Eric A. M. , Helen H. Burger, and Marieke H. A. Klaver, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Netherlands:A Quick-scan”. In:Gattiker, Urs E. , Pia Pedersen, amd Karsten Petersen (eds. ) . EICAR Conference Best Paper Proceedings 2003, http://cip.gmu.edu/archive/2_NetherlandsCIdefpaper_2003.pdf (last accessed at 20. 07. 2009) 2.For each chapter of relevant legal cases, please visit http://academic.udayton.edu/health/syllabi/Bioterrorism/5DiseaseReport/USAPatriotAct.htm. The text regarding the definition of critical infrastructure is cited as "Critical Infrastructure Defined- In this section, the term “critical infrastructure” means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matter. " 1.Cf. Luiijf, Eric A. M. , Helen H. Burger, and Marieke H. A. Klaver, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Netherlands:A Quick-scan”. In:Gattiker, Urs E. , Pia Pedersen, amd Karsten Petersen (eds. ) . EICAR Conference Best Paper Proceedings 2003, http://cip.gmu.edu/archive/2_NetherlandsCIdefpaper_2003.pdf (last accessed at 20. 07. 2009) 2.For each chapter of relevant legal cases, please visit http://academic.udayton.edu/health/syllabi/Bioterrorism/5DiseaseReport/USAPatriotAct.htm. The text regarding the definition of critical infrastructure is cited as "Critical Infrastructure Defined- In this section, the term “critical infrastructure” means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matter. " 3.Introduction of Consumer Protection in Taiwan , Republic of China , Consumer Protection Commission (CPC), Executive Yuan.http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-7.html ( Last visit 2008/6/27 )

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