Online Digital Content Protection issues in Taiwan

By
Ying-Hsi Chiu, Project Manager
Science and Technology Law Center
Institute for Information Industry
Taiwan , Republic of China
English Conference Paper of The 6 th PDMC International Seminar on Software and Digital Content IPR Protection in Digital Environment, Korea

In recent years, there is a phenomenon that governments in various countries launched different programs or action plans to stimulate the development and use of digital content, with the hope to boost a new economy based upon this promising industry. The rise of digital content signifies the shift of economy from manufacture of physical items to high value intangibles. However, the nature of digital content such as easy-copy, low-cost and high-quality, render the new industry even more vulnerable to piracy. Furthermore the threats to lose profits and even the future of the whole industry pose a severe challenge to governments. In order to support digital content industry to continue thriving in a healthy and sound environment, proper legal protection and stringent enforcement measures, especially for on-line digital content, will definitely have a profound impact in the long run.

Taiwan Government also put digital content as one of the most promising industries for the next generation. Human resources and financial supports have been allocated, and we have seen more and more talents and companies joining this industry. However, in the meanwhile, in addition to the continuous task on cracking down piracy, our Government has been working on amending relevant laws and regulations in order to provide a solid legal infrastructure for digital content industry. In this paper, I would like to introduce you the major achievements regarding our recent amendments of Copyright Law, Rating system for digital content and the draft of “Digital Content Industry Promotion Act”. Of course, two local peer to peer cases and other legislative proposals regarding ISP responsibility will also be discussed.

A. the Impact of Copyright Law amendments in 2003 and 2004 on Digital Content

With Taiwan 's accession to World Trade Organization, Taiwan is under the obligation to amend her domestic intellectual property laws to be in line with the minimum standards as required in TRIPs. Besides, the society of Taiwan , at the same time, is experiencing a knowledge-based revolution. Almost every kind of information is digitalized, but relevant laws offer little or inadequate legal protections which in turn arouse more piracy on internet and greatly reduce our confidence in internet creativity. Copyright Law is the existing law that has been confronted with the most impacts from the progress of scientific and technological development. Therefore, c opyright law has been amended successively in July 2003 and August 2004 so as to cope with the increasing application of digital science and technology. The key amendments that have profound impact on digital contents are summarized as follows:

a. The Right of Temporary Reproduction 1:

Whether “temporary reproduction” is a type of reproduction under copyright law has been a issue of discussion for years, and finally in 2003, the amendment gave an positive answer. Temporary reproduction of copyrighted works is deemed a type of reproduction, but is not protected under copyright law if the temporary reproduction is transient, incidental, an essential part of a technology process, and without independent economic significance, where solely for the purpose of lawful network relay transmission, or for the lawful use of a work. A “lawful network relay transmission” includes technically unavoidable phenomena of the computer or machine occurring in network browsing, caching, or other processes for enhancing transmission efficiency.

For the above amendment,, the definition of "reproduction" was also amended to include the "direct, indirect, permanent and/or temporary reproduction activities" 2.

b. The Right of Public Transmission 3

One of the most important amendments regarding the protection of digital content is the new article about “public transmission”. The term is defined as “to make available or communicate to the public the content of a work through sounds or images by wire or wireless network, or through other means of communication, including enabling the public to receive the content of such work by any of the above means at a time or place individually chosen by them.”

The act of public transmission is characterized in its mode of operation by means of interactive computerized or Internet transmission which is different from the mode of operation of transmitting the contents of copyrighted works in a unilateral manner such as public oral transmission, public broadcasting, or public performance etc.

To confer the new added definition of “public transmission” 4, the Article 3-1-7 regarding the definition of "public broadcast" 5 was also amended 6, so as to distinguish the operation modes of "public transmission" and "public broadcast" in order to avoid confusion while using these two different terms.

c. Protection of Electronic Rights Management Information

When copyright law confers the “public transmission” right to authors, the introduction of “Electronic Rights Management Information” will definitely facilitate the author to be easily accessed and encourage more exploitation of digital contents. The term " electronic rights management information" refers to the electronic information which is used to identify a copyrighted work, the title of the work, author, economic rights holder or person licensed thereby, and the period or conditions of exploitation of the work, including numbers or symbols that represent such information 7. Anyone who removes or alters the electronic rights management information without authorization shall be imposed civil liability for damages and criminal liability for sentence up to one year imprisonment, detention or fine.

d. Technology Protection Measures 8

The term "technology protection measures", that is, the "anti-circumvention measures", means the equipments, devices, components, technology or other technological means employed by copyright owners to prohibit or restrict, in effective manner, others from accessing or utilizing his/her work without prior authorization. Anyone who disarms, destroys or by any other means circumvents the technological protection measures employed by the copyright owner shall be subject to civil liability for damages.

The new amendment further specifies that any equipment, device, component, technology or information for disarming, destroying, or circumventing technological protection measures shall not, without legal authorization, be manufactured, imported, offered to the public for use, or offered in services to the public. Violation of this article shall be imposed criminal liability for sentence up to one year imprisonment, detention or fine.

e. Specific Punishment for Use of Pirated Software 9

Before the 2004 amendment, the use of pirated software for commercial purposes shall be deemed an infringement of copyright only if the user has “actual knowledge” that he is using pirated software for that purpose. The application of this article, however, was controversial because it was difficult to prove that the user did have “actual knowledge” of the contended facts. Hence in the 2004 amendment, the requirement of “actual knowledge” was deleted, and therefore, as long as there is the fact of using pirated software, the user shall have no excuse to running away form civil liability for damages and criminal liability for sentence of up to two years imprisonment or detention, or in lieu thereof or in addition thereto, a fine of no more than five hundred thousand New Taiwan Dollars (hereinafter called NT Dollars).

f. Increasing the magnitude of criminal liability for illegal optical disk copyright infringement

Owing to the massive harmful power on digital content by illegal optical disks, the amendment increases the magnitude of criminal liability for illegal optical disk copyright infringement. A person who infringes on the economic rights of another person by means of reproducing a work onto an optical disk shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from six months to five years, and in addition thereto, may be fined ranging from five hundred thousand to five million NT Dollars.

Besides, heavy criminal liability is also imposed on a person who distributes or with intent to distribute publicly displays or possesses a copy of optical disk knowing that it infringes on the economic rights shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from six months to three years and, in addition thereto, may be fined ranging from two hundred thousand to two million NT Dollars.

Both offenses are actionable not upon complaint.

B. Local P2P case analysis and possible solution

No matter we accept it or not, Internet has changes our life style in many ways . People find that many real-life activities could now find their counterparts “on line”, which bring us not only convenience and exciting experiences, but sometimes also raise problems. Downloading on-line music has drawn much attention during recent years. This newly flourishing business model provides music lovers a wide range of selections on-line, through peer to peer technology at relatively low cost. However, this new business did not receive supports from record companies and music right holders. On the contrary, these P2P companies were accused of the main cause for the sharp drop in profits for the past few years. Although it is difficult to prove the direct relationship between lost of profits and the downloading services, we have seen many copyright infringement cases were brought to courts in the United States (Napster/Groster cases), Holland /Australia (Kazaa case) and Japan (MMO case) and the judgments, even with similar facts, were opposite! This situation just reflects the complexity of the whole issue and arouses more discussion on this topic.

In August 2003, International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, Taiwan Branch (hereinafter referred to as IFPI Taiwan) brought complaints against two local P2P companies in Taipei and the courts also reached opposite judgments. It is the main purpose of this paper to discuss the two judgments and possible solution in the future.

Before we start to discuss the two cases, I would like to take this opportunity to briefly clarify our copyright law liability system. Unlike American legal system, where liability for violation of copyright law is civil liability in nature, the legal responsibility for copyright infringement in Taiwan is criminal liability, and therefore, courts in Taiwan will apply stricter standard in deciding whether violation of copyright is intentional.

a. ezPeer case

This is the first P2P case in Taiwan and Taipei Shihlin District Court found in June 2005 that the defendant, ezPeer company, is not guilty of copyright violation charges for the following reasons:

  1. In the indictment, the prosecutor claimed that ezPeer provides on-line music downloading services through a “centralized P2P framwork”, so it is reasonable to conclude that ezPeer has “actural knowledge” about the fact of copyright infringement by its members. With such knowledge in mind, ezPeer still provides file-exchange services, and therefore, ezPeer is suspecious of violating copyright of the record companies. The Court, however, held that ezPeer is in fact a “decentralized P2P framwork”, and further held that it is not important to decide the type of P2P framework in this case because the original structure of P2P was not designed for the purpose of violating copyright.
  2. The Court maintained that the downloading and transmission of musical files by individual member might satisfay fair-use circumstances or other requirements for legal exploitation of the works. From the evidences submitted by the prosecutor, the Court is not able to ascertain if ezPeer is able to distinguish the legality of conducts acted by its members. Under such circumstances, the Court helded that it is also impossible to conclude that ezPeer is an accomplice in this case.
  3. Under present relevant laws, ezPeer is under no legal obligation to take active actions to provide special devices or measures to filter off the downloading and transmission of musical files that are suspecious of violating copyright law.
Of course, ezPeer judement ignited another pro and con debate in Taiwan . It is interesting to note that the judgment of ezPeer case was rendered on the 30 th of June, 2005, only three days after the Groster judgment which was rendered on the 27 th of June 2005. We are not sure if the Groster judgment has any impact on the Kuro case, but as we will see below, the judgment of Kuro case is just totally opposite to ezPeer.
b. Kuro case

On the 9 th of September , 2005, Taipei District Court reached its judgment on Kuro case, and held that the defendant, providing unauthorized music downloading services for the purpose of making profits, is jointly responsible as conspiracy with its individual member for infringing plaintiff's copyright. The CEO and General Manager of Kuro were sentenced for three-years' imprisonment separately, and both were fined three million NT Dollars; the responsible person (chairman) of Kuro was sentenced for two-years' imprisonment and Kuro's member, Miss Chen, was also sentenced for four-months' imprisonment, which could be substituted by fine, and which also obtained a respite for three years.

In addition to criminal action, IFPI also filed a civil lawsuit claiming for compensation, and this case finally reached a peaceful settlement on the 15 th of September, 2006. Kuro promised to pay IFPI Taiwan 3 millions and 5 hundred thousand NTD as compensation. A new company /will be incorporated to continue the legal music platform business. The members' list, brand name and the employees of Kuro will be transferred to the new company under a license agreement. In the future, the new company will provide downloading services not with P2P technology, but with streaming model, and the member fee will have a jump from the present 99 NTD/month to 150 NTD/month.

A brief comparison can be made between the two local cases:

  1. Taipei Court found that when Kuro's server is under normal
    operation, and when Kuro's member would like to download a specific music file from another member, Kuro's server will provide IP address, route and establish connection in order to facilitate its member to conduct fast search and to download the music file; If the connection is interrupted during transmission, Kuro's server will automatically locate other member's IP to resume the transmission. The Court was convinced under these facts that Kuro was a “centralized P2P framework”.
  2. The Court further found that Kuro published a great deal of commercial advertisements on various media to increase its membership; Kuro also established “feed-back mechanism” on its own website to encourage the users to download music file. Given all these evidences, The court was convinced that Kuro, who had actual knowledge that the P2P technology it provided will be utilized by others as a tool to carry out criminal activities, should induce the general public to pay or buy its membership to infringe other's copyright in order to pursue its own commercial benefits. In doing so, the court held that Kuro has already foreseen that its member will use P2P technology to conduct unauthorized music downloading, the copyright holder's damages and the causation between the two, and the result of causing lost of profits on plaintiff is not against Kuro's intent. Therefore, Kuro must be responsible for violating copyright liability.

We found that the supporting evidences really play important roles in helping the Court to reach its final judgment and that is one major reason why we have two cases with similar facts but having opposite results. The P2P issue, with the settlement between Kuro and IFPI Taiwan, is at rest for the time being, but efforts trying to have legislative solution are just begun.

There was suggestion to amend Copyright Law to have a “compensation system” to solve the P2P problems. This proposal, however, did not receive much support among scholars and legislators. Recently another proposal was brought to our attention that our Copyright Law shall adopt a procedure similar to the one adopted in DMCA. This new proposal arouses another big issue: how should we regulate ISP? This issue has been in debate for years in Taiwan , and so far there is still no consensus on this point. As a matter of fact, ISP relates not only to copyright issues, privacy protection, anti-porn/violence for minors on internet are also important topics needed to address our concerns. So far, it is too early to comment the future of this new proposal, but we will keep close watch of its future development. From III's point of view, a single legislation encompassing all issues regarding ISP will be a better solution.

C. Rating system for digital contents

With the rapid advances of technology and the widespread use of computers, Internet has become an indispensable part in our daily lives. When we enjoy the convenience of having easy and quick access to almost all kinds of information, we are exposing ourselves, at the same time, to a world which is flooded with impoper or even indecent contents. Those contents deliver either wrongful or harmful messages to the viewers and sometimes cause negative impacts on their minds forever. This situation poses a quite serious problem especially for children and teenagers who are encouraged to acquaint themslves with the cyber space but do not equipped with proper knowledge and ability to distinguish healthy and useful contents from unhealthy and harmful ones. Hence, in addition to protectingof the right of digital content, while in the process of promoting digital content industry, setting clear rules to regulate content providers to protect minors are also very important. In order to insure the sound development of the physical and mental status of the minors, Article 27, Paragraph III of the “Children and Youth Welfare Act 10” requires that “the competent authority should publish rating regulations for publication 11, compouter software and internet content”. This is not to impose any restrictions on the freedom of speech on internet, but rather a protection measure by providing a basic reference for parents and the minors to decide which content is appropriate for them.

a.Regulations of Internet Content Rating

The “Regulations of Internet Content Rating” was first published by Government Information Office (hereinafter referred to as GIO) on the 26 th of April, 2004. The regulation provides a grace period of 18 months in order to avoid rushness and, therefore, the exact enforcement date was the 26 th of October, 2005. This Regulation was further amended in October 2005.

The most important spirit of the Regulation is “self discipline” principle. According to the amended regulation, content providers shall classify the contents either “restricted” or “non-restricted” by themselves. Restricted contents providers are required by the Regulation to put a “restricted” label on the homepage or relevant web pages in a conspicuous manner. Before the amendment, the rating system was classified as “common for all”, “protected” (which means the content is not suitable for children under 6), “parents guide” (which means that the content is not suitable for children under 12; for the youth between 12 to 18, parents guide is needed) and “restricted” (not suitable for people under 18). So under the present classification, Internet content that is not rated as “restricted” may be viewed by children under guidance or under the discretion of parents, guardians or others taking care of them 12.

In order to carry out the functions specified in the regulation, the “Taiwan Internet Content Rating Promotion Foundation 13” (hereinafter referred to as TICRF) was established by GIO on the 7 th of January, 2005 . This will facilitate the development of Internet-related industry while protecting freedom of speech online and regulate user behavior.

b. Regulations of Computer Software Rating

The “Regulations of Computer Software Rating” was published by Industry Development Bureau (hereinafter referred to as IDB) of Ministry of Economic affairs on the 6 th of July, 2006 and will be enforced on the 5 th of January of 2007. Following the Internet Content Rating Regulation, this regulation adopts the “self-discipline” principle, and “four tiers” rating classification. However, there a re some points to be noted:

1. The term “computer software” in this Regulation refers only to “computer games”, excluding other kinds of software like searching engine, data mining, tool or educational software.

2. Only the game software that can be played through “computer” shall be the subject under this regulation. Games played on other devices, such as mobile phone, PDA, television or other devices. As a result, video games do not fall within the definition of “computer game” under this regulation and, therefore, is not regulated so far.

3. The competent authority for the new Regulation is IDB. Not like GIO establishing a foundation under its donation, IDB will encourage the private sector to organize professional groups to provide consultation services regarding any question or misunderstanding arising from this regulation. Anyone who would like to challenge the rating label marked by the computer software providers, may also bring their cases to any of those professional groups for opinions.

5. The new Regulation requires that the computer software providers must put the label not only on the web page providing downloading services but also on the package in a conspicuous manner. It further requires that for “restricted” software, a warning sentence like “This software is intended for use for persons above 18” must be properly marked.

D. The “Digital Content Industry Promotional Act” (Draft)

a.To restore the copyright pledge recordation system

As we have pointed out that copyright and other intangible assets are playing a more and more important role in the knowledge based economy. Therefore, the purposes of copyright law are no longer limited in protecting the rights of the authors, but are extended to facilitate the maximum exploitation of these works in order to manifest their potential economic values. As we all know that the most valuable assets for digital content companies are their intangibles, such as patents, copyrights or trademarks. In the early stage, those start-up companies might rely heavily on government's financial supports. However, when digital content companies are becoming more mature and try to make use of their intellectual properties as collateral to reach a loan agreement with the banks, they will find that the banks are not willing to accept these intangibles as collateral 14. The situation for copyright is even worse in Taiwan since our copyright competent authority no longer provides copyright recordation services to the public 15, and therefore, the banks are even less interested in accepting copyright as collateral because they are not able to estimate their risks with accuracy in any particular case when those important information regarding the “intangible collateral” is not available from any trustworthy government agency or private organization.

In order to provide a formal channel of disclosure and to ignite the economic potential in intellectual properties in the future, our government is planning to restore the copyright pledge recordation system in the draft of “Digital Content Industry Promotional Act”, aiming that this will offer the digital content companies a better position to negotiate with the bank and other financial institutions for loan agreements.

b. Exploitation of Work Whose Authorship is Unknown

At a higher level of the panorama, Copyright Law encourages the exploitation of other's works in order to facilitate further idea exchange and culture development. However, such a privilege is granted by law only when the users obtain author's authorization in advance, except in some specified fair-use circumstances or using works which already in public domain. However, author's authorization is sometimes difficult or even impossible to obtain when the author's whereabouts is unknown 16. This is especially true in the internet environment when the flow of information is so fast and the amount of information is enormous. This situation undoubtedly creates a big hurdle for content users and impedes their willingness to continue creative activities on internet . In order to solve this problem and to reach full utilization of digital contents, our Government is planni ng to bring this licensing deadlock to an end by setting a procedure which allows the users to submit sufficient evidences to the copyright competent authority to prove that he/she has exhausted all possible means but still fail to locate the author. After reviewing all the documents and evidences, copyright competent authority will grant the authorization on a non-exclusive basis, and the user has to deposit the license fee as prescribed in the approval letter and then use the work in the manner as prescribed therein.

Taiwan Government is hoping that in the internet era, authors are urged to exercise their rights granted under Copyright Law in a much more positive manner by using “electronic rights management information” to enable others to share authors' wisdom and to help the whole society to benefit from the wisdom-sharing process.

Conclusion

The whole world is facing a new digital era that nobody has ever experienced before, especially the Internet world. Traditional legal system is no longer enough to deal with problems related to the creativities of intangible assets. Members of modern society, need to find the best solution to irrigate and protect these digital fruits, and, at the same time, to resolve or prevent problems or expected harm from the development of digital content industry. To set up a new legal system along with various industrial policies is deemed a good solution to build up sound environment for the growth of digital industry.

Challenges and hurdles will be confronting us every single day. They come to existence even faster than before. Their existences just send us clear messages that it is time to submit more proposals to promote digital industry, to create maximum profit to the digital society as a whole and to prevent harmful results from this trend of digital tide. We believe that Taiwan Government is now well prepared to face this new age and to overcome all the expected or unexpected challenges. Major changes of legal structure will be achieved step by step within the following years and it is expected that when cases relating to digital content are accumulated to certain amount , the consensus to solve those legal issues will become much clear. When we reach this point, our society will be more comfortable and confident in using and creating digital contents and the digital industry in Taiwan will be mature.


1. This amendment is made pursuant to Article 9 of the TRIPs which provides that every member of the WTO shall adhere to the provisions set out in Article 1 through Article 21 of the 1971 Berne Copyright Convention. Article 9 of the Berne Convention entitles the authors of the literary and art works protected by the Convention the exclusive right to licensing, in any manner or form, the reproduction of his/her copyrighted works.

2. The ROC Copyright Law Article 3-1-5

3. This amendment was made by making reference to Article 8 of the WCT and Article 10 and Article 14 of the "WPPT", and Article 2, and Article 2 –1 and 2-2 of the EU 2001 Copyright Directives

4. "Public transmission" means to make available or communicate to the public the of a work' content through sounds or images by wire or wireless network, or through other means of communication, including enabling the public to receive the content by any of the above means at a time or place individually chosen by them

5. "Public broadcast" means to communicate to the public the a work's content through sounds or images by means of transmission of information by a broadcasting system of wire, wireless, or other equipment, where such communication is for the purpose of direct listening reception or viewing reception by the public. This includes any communication, by transmission of information via a broadcasting system of wire, wireless, or other equipment, to the public of an original broadcast of sounds or images by any person other than the original broadcaster

6. The amendment was referenced to the provisions set out respectively in Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "WCT") and Article 10 and Article 14 of "The WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty" (hereinafter referred to as "WPPT")

7. The ROC Copyright Law Article 3-1-17 , The definition of the term " electronic rights management information" was added with reference to the provisions set out respectively in Article 12 of the WCT, and Article 19 of the WPPT which requires all signatory countries to provide full protection and remedies to the integrity of electronic rights management information, Article 7 of the EU 2001 Copyright Directives, Article 1202 of the US Copyright Act, and Article 2-1-21 of the Japanese Copyright Law.

8. The ROC Copyright law Article 3-1-18 , this item was added in 2004 amendment. The definition of the term "technology protection measures" are added to the 2004 Copyright Law pursuant to in Article 11 of the WCT and Article 18 of the WPPT respectively, requiring the mandatory and adequate legal protection to the "anti-circumvention measures". And, the Article also makes reference to the relevant provisions provided in Article 6 of the EU 2001 Copyright Directives"; Article 1201 of the US Copyright Act; Article 20,1,20 of the Japanese Copyright Law; Article 18 of the "On-line Digital Contents Industry Development Act" and Article 30 of the "Computer Programs Protection Act" of Korea respectively.

9. The ROC Copyright Law Article 87-5 and 87-6

10. The Act was put in force on the 28th of May, 2003

11. ROC Government has already enacted rating regulations for publication (books, magazines, etc.) and movies/TV programs.

12. Many teachers and parents group are criticizing the new rating classification. They agree that it is sometimes difficult for the content providers to mark correct label for contents which are either “protected” or “parent guide”. However, they argue that it is irresponsible to shift the whole burden to parents who do not have enough profession or simply do not have time to do so.

13. For more detailed information, please visit TICRF's website at http://www.ticrf.org.tw/

14. The conservative attitude of the banks and other financial institutions are understandable. First of all, the market for intangibles as collateral is just not mature for the time being, and we do not have enough experiences in the area of intangible assets evaluation. Secondly, banks are more familiar with traditional collateral, like lands, houses, etc. In fact, they are quite confused about how to deal with all these intangible assets in their hands. Thirdly, an effective mechanism for the withdrawal of banks and financial institutions from the market is still lacking, which greatly increases the risks for banks, and in turn, will render banks more hesitated to reach any loan agreement with digital content companies from the very beginning.

15. The Copyright Law of Republic of China was first promulgated in 1928. At that time, copyright protection would be obtained only if the author fulfilled the strict “registration” process. In 1985, Copyright Law was undergoing an overall review, and an internationally accepted principle that “copyright protection will be automatically obtained upon completion of the work” was adopted. However, copyright registration system was still maintained for voluntary application for registration and the issuance of copyright registration certificate. In 1992, a more loose “copyright recordation system” was adopted to replace the “copyright registration system” to avoid any confusion. In 1998, after many years' debates, copyright recordation system was finally abolished for the following reasons:

1). The existence of “copyright recordation system” always delivers wrong information to the public that copyright law still requires registration for protection of a work. So it would be better to abolish the recordation system to avoid any misunderstanding in the future.

2). In a copyright lawsuit, the courts, instead of conducting substantial fact-finding procedure to ascertain who the copyright holder is, very often require the party claiming copyright protection to submit copyright registration certificate or recordation transcript to prove that he/she is the copyright holder. In doing so, the spirit of copyright law was led to such a distortion that would render the public even more confused about the true meaning of copyright law.

3). Due to limited manpower in our copyright competent authority, services for applications either for copyright registration or recordation will consume a lot of administrative resources , and the crowding-out effect would have negative influence on the allocation of resources to other pending copyright issues or basic researches at hand.

16. This is termed “orphan works” by Professor Lawrence Lessig.

※Online Digital Content Protection issues in Taiwan,STLI, https://stli.iii.org.tw/en/article-detail.aspx?d=6121&i=170&no=105&tp=2 (Date:2024/07/16)
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The research of CMI points out the maritime law associations of Finland, Panama and United State assume that the STCW convention would likely apply to shore-based personnel as well in excepted circumstances where there is no new specific legislation. And the British maritime law association states that regardless of whether STCW would apply to unmanned operation or not, it is clear that certain provisions on training and competence would not apply to shore-based controller and other personnel. Japanese maritime association also states that although the convention does not find application to a remotely controlled unmanned ship, certain rules requiring watchkeeping officers to be presented may nevertheless arguably be interpreted to render an unmanned ship in breach of STCW and to that extent be applicable to unmanned ships. Therefore the amendment of convention seems inevitable. Standing on the other side, the Institute of Marine Engineering Science & Technology recommended that pairing human with machine effectively to enhance human intelligence and performance rather than totally replacing human is an area that should not be overlooked. Even if the application of unmanned ships comes in reality, seafarer skill will still remain an essential component in the long term future of the shipping sector. The minimum qualification of masters, officers and watch personnel may not need to be changed. Human error has been used to create a blame culture towards the workforce at sea, and it also results from poor implementation/ introduction/ preparation for new technology. Many studies show that seafarers are worried about the impact of autonomous ships. If the development of autonomous ships means replacing all the human elements on ships, people who work in marine sector will not accept those novel technologies easily, and this won’t lead to a safer future of maritime industry. Safety requirement of the remote control ship and autonomous ship Rule 8 (a) and rule 5 of the international regulation for preventing collisions at sea, 1972(COLREGS) require the operation of ships to comply with the duty of “good seamanship”, “proper lookout”. These rules are based on the operation by human, thus, leading to the following two questions: (1) Would the operation of unmanned ship contrary to the duty of “good seamanship”? The duty of good seamanship emphasizes the importance of human experiences and judgments in the operation of a vessel, and the adaptability of responses provided by good seamanship. Whether an autonomous ship would be able to reach this level of adaptive judgment would depend on the sophistication of its autonomous system. According to CMI’s research, the maritime law associations of countries including Argentina, British, Canada, China, German, Japan and Panama emphasize the requirement that autonomous ship must be at least as safe as ships operated by a qualified crew. (2) Would the proper lookout sets in rule 5 satisfied by camera and aural censoring equipment? COLREG rule 5 has two vital elements. First, crew on the bridge should pay attention to everything, not just looking ahead out of the bridge windows but looking all around the vessel, using all senses and all personnel equipment. Second, use all information continuously to assess the situation your vessel is in and the risk of collision. In this context, if the sensors and transmission equipment are sufficient to enable an appraisal of the information received in a similar manner available as if the controller was on board, then Rule 5 should be considered satisfied. However, it is unlikely that fully autonomous ship could comply with rule 5. It depends on the sophistication of its autonomous system. If the technology is unlikely at present to provide as equivalent spatial awareness and appreciation of the vessel’s positon as there are human on board, then rule 5 would not be considered fulfilled. Liability Liability is an important issue which is frequently mentioned in the area of autonomous ship. According to the study of MUNIN in 2015, liability issue of autonomous ship might arise under the following situations: (1) Deviation Suppose a ship was navigating autonomously, and the deviation of the system caused collision damage, how might liability be apportioned between ship-owner and the manufacturers? According to the research of CMI, 10 maritime law associations stated that under its domestic law, the third party may have a claim against the manufactures. (British, Canada, China, Croatia, Dutch, French, Germany, Italy, Spain, Malta) They may do so in tort if negligence on the part of manufacturers can be proved and if this can be shown to be causative of the damage. In European Union, third parties may also claim under Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member State concerning liability for defective products. (2) Limitation of liability Article 1 of the 1976 convention on limitation of liability of owner of ships provides that ship-owner may limit their liability to all claims arising from any incident. The size of limitation is based upon the tonnage of the ship. Within the convention, the term ship-owner is held to include the ship’s owner, charterer, manager or operator. International conventions dealing with limitation of liability are phrased in neutral terms with regard to the presence of a master or crew; therefore, circumstances in which a ship has no person on board do not appear to undermine the operation of those conventions. (3) Bill of lading Bill of lading is a written document signed on behalf of the owner of ship in which goods are embarked, and the ship-owner acknowledges the receipt of the goods, and undertakes to deliver them at the end of voyage. Typically, the shipper will sign the bill of lading along with the owner of the cargo at the point that shipper takes carriage of the cargo in question. The bill of the lading will then be signed by the cargo’s recipient once it has reached its destination. In other words, the document accompanies the cargo all the time, and is signed by the owner, shipper and recipient. It will generally describe the nature and quantity of goods being shipped. A question arises as in the absence of a master or any crew on board the ship, how will the bill of lading be signed by ship’s master? III. Conclusion   The shipping industry is a rich, highly complex and diverse industry, which has a history of both triumph and tragedy in its adoption of technology. In light of the potential for the remote and autonomous ship, and for the sake of contributing to the assurance of safe and efficient operation, it is better to understand the impact on the industry. The taxonomy of automation between human and machine is vast and complex, especially in the sector of law.   Therefore, before the system can reach fully autonomy and undertake independent, our law should be ready. IV. Reference [1] Comité Maritime International, Maritime Law for Umanned Ships, 2017, available at https://comitemaritime.org/work/unmanned-ships/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) [2] MUNIN, D9.3: Quantitative Assessment, Oct. 10, 2015, available at http://www.unmanned-ship.org/munin/news-information/downloads-information-material/munin-papers/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) [3] Martime Digitalisation & Communication, MSC 100 set to review MASS regulations, Oct. 23, 2018, available at https://www.marinemec.com/news/view,msc-100-set-to-review-mass-regulations_55609.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) [4] IMAREST, Autonomous Shipping-Putting the human back in the headline, April. 2018, available at https://www.imarest.org/policy-news/institute-news/item/4446-imarest-releases-report-on-the-human-impact-of-autonomous-ships (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) [5] Danish Martime Authority, Analysis of regulatory barriers to the use of autonomous ships(Final Report), Dec. 2017, available at https://www.dma.dk/Documents/Publikationer/Analysis%20of%20Regulatory%20Barriers%20to%20the%20Use%20of%20Autonomous%20Ships.pdf (last visited Dec. 25, 2018)

From the Expansion of WAGRI, Japan's Agricultural Data Collaboration Platform, into a Smart Food Chain to Discuss Smart Measures in Responding to the Pandemic

From the Expansion of WAGRI, Japan's Agricultural Data Collaboration Platform, into a Smart Food Chain to Discuss Smart Measures in Responding to the Pandemic Yu Yu Liu I. Introduction   For the past few years, Taiwan has been progressively developing smart agriculture. During this process, general agricultural enterprises and farmers are challenged with and discouraged by expensive equipment installations and maintenance costs. The creation of a new business model which facilitates the circulation and application of agricultural data may lower the threshold of intellectualization acquisition, and become the key to the popularization and implementation of smart agriculture. This article shall analyze the strategy of promoting the use of data circulation for smart agriculture in Japan, which has a similar agricultural paradigm as Taiwan, and provide a reference for the development of smart agriculture in Taiwan.   Japan is facing the same problems as Taiwan, in terms of the aging farmers and low birth rates, that lead to the lack of successors. The Japanese government proposed the concept of Society 5.0 in 2016, expecting to use information and communication technology (ICT) to drive the development of various fields of society[1]. In the agricultural field, the use of ICT in agriculture can facilitate the transmission of experience by turning the tacit knowledge of experienced farmers into externalized data.   At that time, there were many ICT system service technologies developed by private companies In Japan, but the system services provided by various companies were not compatible with each other due to the lack of collaboration, and the data formats and standards produced by ICT system providers were varied; furthermore, the data in the public sector (research and administrative agencies) was also divided and managed independently. To facilitate the integration, management, and circulation of agricultural data, the Japanese Agricultural Data Collaboration Platform (WAGRI[2]) was born. II. The Development of WAGRI 1. Japan's Prime Minister directed the construction of a data platform   The Japanese government held the 6th Future Investment Conference[3] on March 24, 2017, chaired by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who mentioned that in order to cultivate safe and tasty crops, the government and the private sector should provide each other with updated information on crop growth conditions, climate, maps, etc., and build an information collaboration platform that can be easily used by anyone by mid-2017, with all the necessary data fully disclosed. The project was handed over to the IT General Strategy Headquarters[4] to realize the above-mentioned platform.   At the 10th Future Investment Conference, held on June 9, 2017, the Future Investment Strategy 2017[5] was announced with the goal of realizing "Society 5.0". During the conference, it was mentioned that the "Japanese Agricultural Data Collaboration Platform (hereinafter referred to as WAGRI), which is based on publicly available information from the agriculture, forestry, and water industries, such as agricultural, topographical, and meteorological data held by the public sector, that can be shared and used for a variety of purposes, would be constructed in 2017. 2. The Trial Run of WAGRI   WAGRI is supported by the Cabinet Office's Phase 1 of the Strategic Innovation Promotion Program (SIP), under one of the 11 projects entitled "Next Generation Innovation Technologies for Agriculture, Forestry and Water Industries"17[6] (which is managed by The National Agriculture and Food Research Organization [NARO]17[7]). The platform was constructed by the SFC Research Institute of Keio University17[8] in collaboration with an alliance of 23 organizations that participate in SIP research, including agricultural production corporations, agricultural machinery manufacturers, ICT providers, universities, and research institutions (e.g., Japanese IT companies NTT - Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Fujitsu Limited, major agricultural machinery manufacturer- Kubota Corporation, Yanmar Holdings Co., Ltd.)17[9]. WAGRI has three major functions: "cooperation" (breaking down the barriers between different systems so that data is compatible and interchangeable), "sharing" (data is shared in a way chosen by the providers, so as to facilitate the establishment of a business model for data exchange and use), and "provision" (soil and meteorological data are provided by public and private sectors to help facilitate data acquisition and subsequent circulation). During the trial run, there were practical cases that demonstrated that after the implementation of WAGRI, the costs of labor and time spent on data collection and utilization had been significantly reduced17[10]. 3. The Independent Operation of WAGRI   In April 2019, WAGRI, which was originally supported by the SIP program, was transferred to NARO to be the main operating body and officially start the operation.   With the updated use of the information required to operate the WAGRI platform independently, starting in April 2020, the original no-fee approach has been changed. Organizations wishing to use WAGRI are required to pay variable fees according to the following two methods of using the platform [11]: (1)Data users (those who use WAGRI data), data users-and-providers (those who use WAGRI data and provide data to WAGRI) ·Monthly fee of 50,000 yen for platform use. ·If fee-based data is accessed, a separate data usage fee must be paid. (2)Data providers (those who provide data to WAGRI) ·Monthly fee of 30,000 yen for platform use. ·Proviso: If the data provided is free of charge, in principle, there is no requirement to pay the platform utilization fee. III. Application of WAGRI’s Expansion in Response to the Pandemic   The Smart Food Chain Alliance[13], which is supported by one of the 12 projects of the SIP Phase 2 program - "Smart bio industry / basic agricultural technology[12]", will expand WAGRI, which was established with the support of the SIP Phase 1 program, to build a smart food chain platform (WAGRI-dev for short).The main mission of the Smart Food Chain Alliance is to build a smart food chain (commercialized services are expected to begin in 2025) that enables the interoperability of data related to food processing, distribution, sales, and exports, to serve as a basis for fresh food logistics in Japan. This platform is built on the framework of WAGRI, and expanded to WAGRI-dev.   In response to the pandemic, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) jointly issued the "Interim guidance for COVID-19 and Food Safety for competent authorities responsible for national food safety control systems[14]" on April 7, 2020. Based on these guidelines, the Smart Food Chain Alliance of the Japanese SIP program "Smart bio industry / basic agricultural technology" has developed "Guidelines for the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Countermeasures". As part of the above-mentioned program, the "Japanese Food Guidelines Collaboration System (WAGRI.info, in short)"[15] developed countermeasure applications to respond to the pandemic.   WAGRI.info opened its website on July 13, 2020 to accept food safety registrations from food and agricultural product related companies. This registration is not limited to those who meet the COVID-19 countermeasure guidelines, but also those who meet the existing quality and safety management guidelines (e.g. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP), etc.). It also provides a corporate search function for general public use.   WAGRI.info is a part of WAGRI-dev, and will add various data collaboration functions and measures in the future to prevent data manipulation and unauthorized access. The Japanese government originally expected to build the world's first smart food chain platform that includes data from production to processing, distribution, sales and exporting by expanding WAGRI; in response to the pandemic, related functions were added to create a food safety information network.   In Taiwan, there are also data platforms related to smart agriculture that provide OPEN DATA interface functions[16], and the development of food safety traceability integrated application systems to provide information on the flow of school lunch ingredients. In addition to Japan's WAGRI model of data integration and sharing that, can be used as a model for the development of smart agriculture in Taiwan, WAGRI.info's approach can also be used as a reference for domestic food safety policies, in response to the pandemic. [1]"The Science and Technology Basic Plan", Cabinet Office of Government of Japan website: https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/kihonkeikaku/index5.html (last viewed on 07/12/2021). [2]WAGRI is a data platform that consists of a variety of data and services connected to form a wheel that coordinates various communities and promotes "harmony", with the anticipation of leading innovation in the field of agriculture. The word is formed by the combination of WA + AGRI (WA is the Japanese word for harmony + AGRI for agriculture). WAGRI website, https://wagri.net/ja-jp/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [3]As the command headquarters of the Japanese government for implementing economic policies and realizing growth strategies, the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization has been holding a "Future Investment Conference" session approximately every month since 2016, to discuss growth strategies and accelerate social structural reforms, so as to expand future investment. "Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization", Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [4]The Japanese government has been actively promoting the use of IT as a means of helping to solve social issues in various fields. In 2000, the IT Basic Act (Basic Act on the Formation of an Advanced Information and Telecommunications Network Society) was enacted in Japan, and in the following year, the IT Strategy Headquarters (Strategic Headquarters for the Promotion of an Advanced Information and Telecommunications Network Society) was established in accordance with the said laws. In 2013, in accordance with the Government Chief Information Officer (CIO) Act, the Cabinet Secretariat established the position of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Information Technology Policy (Government CIO, in short), and IT Strategic Headquarters was integrated with the GCIO to be the IT Comprehensive Strategy Headquarters (Strategic Headquarters for the Promotion of an Advanced Information and Telecommunications Network Society, IT Comprehensive Strategy Headquarters) to rapidly promote the key policies for an advanced telecommunications network society, and to break the vertical gap of the ministries and departments, and to connect the entire government horizontally. "Strategic Headquarters for the Promotion of an Advanced Information and Telecommunications Network Society" (IT Comprehensive Strategy Headquarters), Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/it2/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [5]Hsu, Yu-Ning, "The 10th Future Investment Conference, held at the Prime Minister's Residence of Japan, proposing Japan's "Future Investment Strategy 2017”, to realize "Society 5.0" as its goal", Science & Technology Law Institute website, https://stli.iii.org.tw/article-detail.aspx?no=64&tp=1&i=72&d=7844, (last visited on 07/12/2021). [6]Focusing on the important issues of "Society 5.0" in conjunction with the key areas of governance of the Future Investment Conference, the Cabinet Office set up an annual budget for science and technology to help create and promote the "Strategic Innovation Promotion Program (SIP)". The first phase of the SIP is a five-year program running from FY2014 to FY2018. "Strategic Innovation Promotion Program (SIP)", Cabinet Office website, https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/gaiyo/sip/index.html (last visited on 07/12/2021). Qiu, Jin-Tien (2017), "Technology Innovation Strategy for Realizing the Super Smart Society (Society 5.0) in Japan", National Applied Research Laboratories website, https://portal.stpi.narl.org.tw/index/article/10358 (last visited on 07/12/2021) [7]The National Agriculture and Food Research Organization, NARO in short, is a national research and development corporation for agricultural and food industry technology. [8]The SFC Research Institute, located on the Shonan-Fujisawa campus of Keio University, is a research institute affiliated with the Graduate School of Policy and Media Studies, the Department of General Policy, and the Department of Environmental Intelligence, and is an important research institute involved in the development of smart agriculture in Japan. Professor Atsushi Shinjo is the research director of WAGRI, and he is also the Deputy Government CIO of the Cabinet Secretariat and the Acting Director of the IT Strategy Office, contributing to the creation of the "Agricultural Information Creation and Distribution Promotion Strategy". He also serves as the President of the WAGRI Council and the Director of NARO's Agricultural Data Collaboration, and facilitates the coordination between WAGRI and Japan's smart agriculture empirical Project. He is a key player in the Japanese government's efforts to promote the flow of agricultural data, and is committed to promoting the development of smart agriculture in Japan. Keio Research Institute at SFC website, https://www.kri.sfc.keio.ac.jp/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [9]IoTNEWS, Building an ‘Agricultural Data Collaboration Platform’ Using Microsoft Azure Through Industry-government-academia Collaboration to Realize Digital Agriculture" 05/15/2017, https://iotnews.jp/archives/56366 (last visited on 07/12/2021). [10]Shinjo, Atsushi, "ICT changes society: Development of agricultural data collaboration platform and future plans, Technology and Promotion : Journal of the National Council of Agricultural Promotion and Staff Council Organization, December, pp. 24-26 (2017); Technology Policy Office, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, "Construction of agricultural data collaboration platform", 2018/09,http://www.affrc.maff.go.jp/docs/smart_agri_pro/attach/pdf/smart_agri_pro-15.pdf .(last visited on 07/12/2021). [11]"The Use of the Agricultural Data Collaboration Platform (WAGRI) Since FY2019", NARO website https://www.naro.go.jp/project/results/juten_fukyu/2018/juten01.html (last visited on 07/12/2021). , NARO website https://www.naro.affrc.go.jp/laboratory/rcait/wagri (last visited on 07/12/2021). [12]Same as Note 6; The SIP Phase 2 plan runs for a total of approximately five years, from the end of FY2017 to FY2022. [13]The construction of a smart food chain is one of the main research topics of the project. The members of the Smart Food Chain Alliance include: the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and other government organizations as observers, and more than 70 organizations as participants, including local governments, academic and research institutions, agricultural production corporations, wholesale markets, mid-marketers, logistics industries, retail businesses, manufacturers, and ICT providers (The representative of the Alliance is the Keio Research Institute at SFC), reference Note 13. SIP vol. 2, [Symposium on "Smart Bio-industry and Agricultural Technology" 2020 - Aiming to build a new smart food chain] 03/10/2020, WAGRI website, https://wagri.net/ja-jp/News/generalnews/2020/20200310 (last visited on 07/12/2021). [14]See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZASTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS [FAO], COVID-19 and Food Safety: Guidance for Food Businesses: Interim guidance (Apr. 7, 2020), http://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/1275311/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Health Organization jointly issued Interim guidance for COVID-19 and Food Safety for competent authorities responsible for national food safety control systems, Chinese Academy of Inspection and Quarantine, http://www.caiq.org.cn/kydt/902625.shtml (last visited 07/12/2021). [15]WAGRI.info Office, "WAGRI.info (Food Guideline Collaboration System) website launched and began accepting business registration", 07/13/2020, https://kyodonewsprwire.jp/release/202007131927 (last visited on 07/12/2021). Japanese Food Guideline Collaboration System WAGRI.info website, https://www.wagri.info/ (last visited on 07/12/2021). [16]Smart Agriculture Common Information Platform Website, https://agriinfo.tari.gov.tw/ (last visited 07/12/2021); "Smart Agriculture 4.0 Common Information Platform Construction (Phase II) Results Presentation", 12/12/2019, Smart Agriculture Website, https://www.intelligentagri.com.tw/xmdoc/cont?xsmsid=0J141518566276623429&sid=0J338358950611186512, (last visited on 07/12/2021).

How Does Taiwan Respond to Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization

How Does Taiwan Respond to Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalization Yuan-Qing, Liao Attorney and Legal Researcher 2022/3/24 I. The Tax Challenges arising from Digitalization   According to the Ability-to-pay principle, companies need to pay income tax for their income or profit. Nevertheless, in order to avoid their tax obligations, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have been continuously developing sophisticated and refined tax planning practices to disconnect or mismatch between “where value is created” and “where taxes are paid”, and such practices erode the tax base.[1]   A well-known example of trade model under digitalization of MNCs is that “MNCs do not necessarily have to open domestic physical stores or set up servers, those domestic consumers can purchase goods and services from MNCs directly through the Internet”. This trade model not only breaks the international tax rules “With Permanent Establishment (PE), With taxing power”, but also disconnects or mismatches between “where value is created” and “where taxes are paid” more perfectly. As a result, the taxing power of “where value is created” is eroded. This is a classical type of challenges faced by tax regulators in the age of digitalization of the economy.   In response, The European Commission (EC) and The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had respectively proposed new plans to ensure that digital business activities are taxed in a fair and friendly way. (I) The Digital Service Tax proposed by EC[2]   In 2018, EC proposed a temporary tax - Digital Services Tax (DST), which a basic rate of 3% to be imposed on revenues of a digital platform when such platform meets all of the following criteria, including (1) online placement or advertising services, (2) sales of collected user data, (3) facilitate interactions between users, (4) annual worldwide revenues exceeding 750 million euros and (5) taxable revenues within the European Union (EU) exceeding 50 million euros.[3]   Concerning that the DST apparently targeting US MNCs - Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (GAFA), the US government once threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs. Insofar, it seems that only a part of MNCs will be immediately affected by DST, but the entire trading systems in the rest of the world will be impacted if the retaliatory tariffs conducted by the US take effect. (II) The Two-Pillar plan released by OECD[4]   In October 2020, OECD had released Reports on the Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints (The Two-Pillar plan), which aimed to terminate the international dispute resulting from DST of EC and provide solutions for tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy in the long term.[5]   Pillar One is “Unified Approach”, to ensure the exercise of taxing powers of governments and a fairer distribution of profits among countries where largest MNCs, including digital companies are located at. It would “re-allocate” the taxing powers over MNCs among governments of different jurisdictions. The governments located at the place where MNCs have business activities and earn profits will have the tax powers over those MNCs, even MNCs do not have a physical presence there. Pillar Two is “Global Anti-Base Erosion rules (GloBE)”, tried to protect tax bases of countries through the introduction of “Global Minimum Tax (GMT)” which sets up a minimum corporate income tax rate on MNCs to prevent tax competitions among countries.   Compared with DST proposed by EC, which focuses on the taxing powers of the government that is located at the place where value is created. The Two-Pillar plan focuses more on both re-allocation of international taxing powers and protects the tax base of each country. (II) The Consensus on The Two-Pillar plan[6]   The Group of Seven (G7[7]), G20[8] and 137 countries and jurisdictions OECD stated not only agreed to remove the DST or the similar measures, but also had a consensus on Two-Pillar plan to reform international taxation rules[9]. In order to ensure that MNCs pay a fair share of tax wherever they operate, as well as to set a GMT rate to protect tax base of each country. Moreover, the new international tax system that the GMT rate is 15%[10] is expected to take effect in 2023 and an estimated 154 domestic MNCs will be thus affected accordingly. II. The Response of Taiwan to Tax Challenges   A foreign enterprise has to pay Taiwan taxing regulators enterprise income tax for income generated in Taiwan in the premise that this foreign enterprise has a PE in Taiwan. In other words, a PE in Taiwan, which is recognized as the fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on[11], is the determinant that affects the power of Taiwan to tax the profits of a foreign enterprise. In brief, “No PE, No taxing power”.   In the era of digitalization, the foreign enterprises can create value through the digital means without establishing a PE in Taiwan. The situation of disconnection or mismatch between where value is created and where taxes are paid not only erodes the taxing power of Taiwan, but also breaks the principle of equality in substantive taxation[12] as mentioned above. As a result, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) adjusted and implemented several new taxation policies or measures, including, inter alia, “Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services[13]” and “Income Basic Tax Act”. These two measures were once considered similarly to DST or GMT individually. (I) Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services   Responding to tax challenges posed by foreign enterprises under digitalization, the MOF promulgated a new income tax regulation “Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services[14]”, and asked those foreign enterprises who provide cross-border electronic services to purchasers in Taiwan, shall register for business value-added tax (VAT), including register a tax identification number and file taxes. The causation between the electronic services and national economy shall be the determinant to identify income generated in Taiwan: The payment made by a purchaser located in Taiwan to a foreign enterprise in order to procure following products or services provided by such foreign enterprise shall be deemed as income generated in Taiwan. (1) The product that is produced, manufactured, transmitted, downloaded and saved in a digital device and can only be provided with assistance by individuals or enterprises in Taiwan. (2) The real-time, interactive, handy, and continuing electronic services that are provided through digital means A foreign enterprise provides a digital platform to conduct transactions, once one of the transaction parties is in Taiwan, the sales amounts shall be recognized as income generated in Taiwan (II) Income Basic Tax Act (IBT)   To promote domestic economic development and industrial innovation, Taiwan has enacted many laws on tax incentives, mainly tax deductions and credits. However, these laws have been overdeveloped, the implement period has also been excessively extended, which contributes to severely unreasonable tax burden inequality.   Therefore, Taiwan officially introduced Alternative Minimum Tax System (AMT) and promulgated Income Basic Tax Act (IBT)[15] since 2006. As a separate taxation system, AMT is imposed by government that places a floor on the percentage of taxes a certain filer must pay, regardless of how many tax incentives the filer may claim[16]. Hence, in accordance with Article 1 of IBT “[T]he purposes of this Act are to uphold tax equity, to ensure tax revenue for the country, and to establish the basic requirements of profit-seeking enterprises and individuals in regard to their obligation to fulfill their income tax burden as a contribution to public finance.”   AMT uses a different set of rules to determining taxable income compared with the normal tax calculations. Once the regular income-tax amount is higher than the AMT, the taxpayer pays the regular income tax. Thus, if AMT is higher, then the taxpayer pays the AMT. And according to Article 8 (1) of IBT, the enterprise IBT rate is prescribed of 12% since 2013.[17]   However, according to Article 3 (1) (5) of IBT[18], a foreign enterprise without domestic fixed place of business or domestic business agent is not regulated by IBT. (III) Conclusion “Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services (Hereinafter referred to as “the measure”)” asked the foreign enterprises to file income tax. But the elements of “the measure” are different from DST. The reasons may be (1) “This measure” has been designed and promulgated earlier than DST and (2) The DST is essentially more like alternative minimum tax. IBT may effect by the concept of “with PE, with taxing power”. Therefore, a foreign enterprise without PE in Taiwan is not regulated by IBT, this means “No PE, No obligation of IBT”. Also, the IBT rate of profit-seeking enterprise is 12%. III. The Remaining Problems of Tax System in Taiwan   It is foreseeable that with the international consensus on launching the Two-Pillar Plan in 2023, those countries and jurisdictions will start to adjust their tax policies, inclusive of increasing the income tax rate as well as basic tax rate. As long as the issue of "Taiwan companies abusing tax planning to hide wealth aboard and avoid domestic tax obligations" is not solved, this issue will lead to the continuous erosion of Taiwan taxing power.   Concretely, in order to reduce domestic tax burden, several Taiwan companies abusing tax planning to detain profits in foreign affiliated companies or disguise as foreign companies. Though Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services has taking effect, those companies pay income tax only on income generated in Taiwan instead of global income. Therefore, the Controlled Foreign Company Rules and the Place of Effective Management Rules have been proposed. (I) The Controlled Foreign Company Rules   A controlled foreign corporation (CFC) is a corporate entity that is registered and conducts business in foreign countries or jurisdictions, and is either directly or indirectly controlled by a resident taxpayer.   According to Article 43-3 of the Income Tax Act, if a parent company holds 50% or more of the shares of a foreign subsidiary, or has significant influence on such foreign subsidiary, the subsidiary may be seen as a conduit of the parent company and subject to domestic enterprise income, whether there is dividend distribution to the parent company or not, unless the subsidiary can pass the substantial activity test or its revenue is below a certain threshold.[19]   Yet, the “Paragraph 3”, compared with “Paragraph 4”, is not ruled the “a CFC can deduct the domestic income tax from foreign income tax it paid[20]”, which may result in double taxation.   The Taiwan CFC rules have not come into effect yet. However, according to the ancillary resolution passed by Legislative Yuan[21], our CFC Rules will come into effect within one year after the tax amnesty legislation, "The Management, Utilization, and Taxation of Repatriated Offshore Funds Act", expires. Namely, the Taiwan CFC Rules will finally come into effect in 2022 at the latest. (II) The Place of Effective Management Rules   The place of effective management (PEM) is defined as a place where key managements and commercial decisions a business entity substantially made.[22] This means, once a foreign company sets and operates a branch in Taiwan, and this branch substantially made key managements and commercial decisions for the foreign company, then it will be deemed as a PEM, the foreign company will also be deemed as a domestic company, and will be subject to tax assessment in accordance with the Taiwan Income Tax Act and other tax regulations.[23]   Following the PEM rules, which is incorporated into Article 43-4 of the Income Tax Act, the elements of PEM including (1) decision making location, (2) record keeping and maintenance location, and (3) actual operating location are all in Taiwan.   However, take foreign experience for example, German practice believes that the PEM rules only need to list "decision making location" as a necessary condition. The rest elements "record keeping and maintenance location" and "actual operating location" are more like reference factors than necessary conditions[24].   The Taiwan PEM rules list all three elements as necessary conditions, which may probably cause excessive restrictions on future applications. And the PEM Rules were announced by the MOF in July 2016, which have yet to take effect neither. (III) Attachment: The Sophisticated and Conflicting Tax System   The enterprise income tax rate in Taiwan is 20% to 24% in accordance with Article 5 (5) and Article 66-9 (1) of Income Tax Act. Still, to achieve specific policy goals by promoting or suppressing certain behaviors, a policy that oriented tax deductions and credits is called tax incentives, and the disadvantage of which is apparently turn the tax burden into inequality. In the end, to solve the inequality of tax burden resulting from tax incentives and to ensure tax revenue, the minimum tax will be levied by AMT. The AMT rate in Taiwan is 12% as aforementioned.   The implementation of tax incentives and AMT has made the domestic tax system over-complicated. Since the overused tax incentives have abnormally increase the amount of uncompetitive enterprises, who heavily rely on them. While the AMT may strangle the enterprises, who are compliance with economic policies. Then, the interaction and conflicts between tax incentives and AMT not just complicate the domestic tax system, also substantively result in unpredictability and inconsistency of domestic tax environment, which may cause a double-loss situation between tax revenue for the country and economic development policies. IV. Conclusions and Prospects (I) Conclusion Amend the Income Basic Tax Act and Increase Enterprise Rate to at Least 15%   First, those foreign enterprises without PE but create value in Taiwan are not ruled by IBT. Second, the enterprise IBT rate in Taiwan is now 12%, apparently lower than GMT of 15%. If IBT rate maintains 12% through 2023, the difference between GMT and IBT may be deemed as a harmful tax-based competition. Hence, it is imperative to amend the IBT to rule the foreign enterprises without PE but create value in Taiwan and increase the enterprise IBT rate to at least 15%.   Once consider that GMT is aimed at large MNCs, the IBT may adopt a categorized approach and set different rates based on the size of the enterprise. For instance, increase the IBT rate of MNCs that meet all GMT criteria to 15%, and the rest maintains 12%. Amend and Take CFC rules and PEM rules into effects   A domestic company pays income tax on global income, while a foreign company with PE in Taiwan pays income tax on income generated in Taiwan. Responding to digitalization, the implement of Income Taxation on Cross Border Electronic Services regulates foreign companies without PE in Taiwan to pay income tax generated in Taiwan fairly.   It is necessary to implement both CFC rules and PEM rules, to prevent domestic companies from abusing tax planning to detain the profit in foreign affiliated companies or to disguise as foreign companies for reducing domestic tax burden, which may continuously eroding taxing power of Taiwan. However, CFC rules and PEM rules still leave some problems to be improved and solved as aforementioned, which is undoubtedly the obligation of Taiwan government. (II) Prospects Substantive Review the Tax Incentives and Reconstruction of Taiwan Tax System   The Reasoning of Interpretation No.565 mentioned that “[W]hile taxpayers should, under the principle of equality in taxation, pay taxes which they are supposed to pay according to their actual taxpaying ability, it is not forbidden by Article 7 of the Constitution to specify, with reasonable cause, differential treatments by way of exceptions or special provisions within the scope of discretion authorized by law to grant taxpayers of a particular class tax benefits in the form of tax reduction or exemption in order to promote the public interest.”.   The principle of ability-to-pay means that those who have greater ability to pay taxes, usually measured by income, wealth and financial capability, should pay more in taxes compared with those who have minor capability. Since taxation is the pecuniary obligation with non-counter performance under public law, the only foundation of legitimacy is the principle of ability-to-pay. Therefore, this is the core principle of the tax law.   To achieve specific policy goals, a policy that oriented tax deductions and credits to promote or suppress certain behaviors is called tax incentives, which can be permitted only in case of justifiable reasons presented. Nevertheless, the weak connection between the policy goals and the tax incentives made the acts, especially the tax incentives, unreasonable.   Additionally, the tax-form expenditure is generally a formal review of fiscal balance, no substantive review of the impact on principle of ability-to-pay taxation and the compensation for it. Under these premises, the excessively extended implementation period of tax incentives has resulting in severely unreasonable tax burden inequality and excessive reliance of uncompetitive enterprises on tax incentives.   To sum up, instead of implement the tax incentives to limit the principle of ability-to-pay, then solve it with AMT. The enactment, amendment and implement of tax laws must strictly abide by above principle. The restriction of above principle must be strictly review and limited as a whole. Namely, it is better to comply with the principle of ability-to-pay strictly. Therefore, it is important to substantively review the domestic tax incentives and reconstruct the domestic tax system. Ministry of Digital Development and The Tax Reform   Taiwan government is intending to form Ministry of Digital Development (MODD),[25] which is considered as a step toward the right direction to coordinate and expedite the development of Taiwan’s digital economy.   According to Article 1 of the Organizational Act of MODD, "[T]o promote the development of digital industries such as national communications, information, cyber security, network and communication, to undertake digital governance and digital infrastructure, and to assist the digital transformation of public and private sectors, the Executive Yuan has specially established the Ministry of Digital Development."[26]   However, in name of the above-mentioned policies and ideals, which may possibly related to tax policies. Thus, this article considered that, once the MODD is staffed with public servants and experts both proficient in tax law as well as forward-thinking, and given a clear mandate, the MODD may not only contribute significantly to both domestic digital transformation and the tax reform, but also improve the efficiency of tax administration and maximize the overall economic and social benefits. [1] OECD, 〈BEPS – Base Erosion and Profit Shifting〉, https://cleartax.in/s/beps-oecd (last visited Aug 20, 2021). [2] 拙著,〈柳暗花明的數位服務稅〉,工商時報名家評論,2021年5月17日,網址:https://view.ctee.com.tw/tax/29375.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年11月24日。 [3] 陳衍任,〈歐洲數位服務稅發展簡析〉,台灣經濟論衡,2020年3月,第18卷第1期,頁58,網址:https://www.ndc.gov.tw/Content_List.aspx?n=1BD4A3B93EF55A5F,最後瀏覽日:2021年4月21日。 [4] 拙著,〈勢在必行的全球企業最低稅負制〉,工商時報名家評論,2021年4月20日,網址:https://view.ctee.com.tw/tax/28814.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年11月24日。 [5] 拙著,〈勢在必行的全球企業最低稅負制〉,工商時報名家評論,2021年4月20日,網址:https://view.ctee.com.tw/tax/28814.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年11月24日。 [6] 拙著,〈取消數位服務稅已為國際趨勢〉,工商時報名家評論,2021年11月23日,網址:https://view.ctee.com.tw/economic/34152.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年11月24日。 [7] Mayer Brown LLP, 〈The G7 Agrees on a Broad Framework for Pillar One and Two〉, June 23, 2021, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2021/06/one-small-step-but-perhaps-one-giant-leap-for-global-tax-reform-the-g7-agrees-on-a-broad-framework-for-pillar-one-and-two (last visited Nov 11, 2021). [8] G20, 〈G20 ROME LEADERS’ DECLARATION〉, at 11 of 20, https://www.g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/G20-ROME-LEADERS-DECLARATION.pdf (last visited Nov 11, 2021). [9] OECD, 〈Mauritania joins the Inclusive Framework on BEPS and participates in the agreement to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy〉, https://www.oecd.org/tax/mauritania-joins-the-inclusive-framework-on-beps-and-participates-in-the-agreement-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.htm (last visited Nov 11, 2021). [10] Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising From the Digitalization of the Economy, at 4 (Aug 2021), available at https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf (last visited Aug 20, 2021). [11] Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2010 (Full Version), at c(5)-1 (2010), available at https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2010_9789264175181-en#page208 (last visited Aug 20, 2021) [12] 稅捐稽徵法第12條之1第1項:「涉及租稅事項之法律,其解釋應本於租稅法律主義之精神,依各該法律之立法目的,衡酌經濟上之意義及實質課稅之公平原則為之。」亦有釋字第420、460、496、519、597、625及第700號供參。 [13] 資誠,〈法國徵數位服務稅,我不跟進〉,2019年7月24日報導,網址:https://www.pwc.tw/zh/news/media/media-20190724-1.html,最後瀏覽日:2021年4月15日。 [14] 財政部賦稅署,〈外國營利事業跨境銷售電子勞務課徵所得稅制度簡介〉,2018年4月27日,頁1以下,網址:https://www.dot.gov.tw/download/dot_201804270002_1_doc_476,最後瀏覽日:2021年4月21日。 [15] 中華民國94年12月28日總統華總一義字第09400212601號令制定公布全文18條;本條例施行日期除另有規定外,自95年1月1日施行。 [16] 所得基本稅額條例第1條:為維護租稅公平,確保國家稅收,建立營利事業及個人所得稅負擔對國家財政之基本貢獻,特制定本條例。 [17] 財政部台財稅字第10100670710號函:自102年度起營利事業基本稅額之徵收率為12%。 [18] 所得基本稅額條例第3條第1項第5款:營利事業或個人除符合下列各款規定之一者外,應依本條例規定繳納所得稅:五、所得稅法第七十三條第一項規定之非中華民國境內居住之個人或在中華民國境內無固定營業場所及營業代理人之營利事業。 [19] 所得稅法第43條之3第1項:營利事業及其關係人直接或間接持有在中華民國境外低稅負國家或地區之關係企業股份或資本額合計達百分之五十以上或對該關係企業具有重大影響力者,除符合下列各款規定之一者外,營利事業應將該關係企業當年度之盈餘,按其持有該關係企業股份或資本額之比率及持有期間計算,認列投資收益,計入當年度所得額課稅:一、關係企業於所在國家或地區有實質營運活動。二、關係企業當年度盈餘在一定基準以下。但各關係企業當年度盈餘合計數逾一定基準者,仍應計入當年度所得額課稅。 [20] 參考「所得稅法增訂第43條之3建立我國受控外國公司(CFC)課稅依據,係以受控外國公司當年度盈餘,依控制公司對其持有之資本比率按「權益法」認列之國外投資收益。惟查此依權益法認列之投資收益,似漏未規定該關係企業在國外已納所得稅額可予扣抵,恐形成公司階段稅負重複課稅;對照本條第4項規範營利事業於實際獲配股利或盈餘時,國外已納所得稅額得予扣抵之規定,其疏漏自明。」立法院,〈受控外國公司課稅新制相關問題評析〉,110年8月,網址:https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=6590&pid=210513,最後瀏覽日:2021年10月25日。 [21] 境外資金匯回管理運用及課稅條例自2019年8月15日起施行,施行期間2年,已於今(2021)年8月14日失效,故我國CFC制度至遲於明(2022)年8月14日前報請行政院核定施行日期。參考「另附帶決議針對105年增訂之「所得稅法」第43條之3條文(營利事業CFC制度),與106年增訂之「所得基本稅額條例」第12條之1條文(個人CFC制度),要求財政部於本案施行期滿後1年內報請行政院核定施行日期,有助落實反避稅條款。」立法院,〈制定境外資金匯回管理運用及課稅條例〉, 網址:https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=33324&pid=184215,最後瀏覽日:2021年8月20日。 [22] OECD, 〈THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION ON THE APPLICATION OF “PLACE OF EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT”AS A TIE BREAKER RULE〉, at 4 (Feb 2001), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/1923328.pdf (last visited Aug 20, 2021). [23] 所得稅法第43條之4第1項:依外國法律設立,實際管理處所在中華民國境內之營利事業,應視為總機構在中華民國境內之營利事業,依本法及其他相關法律規定課徵營利事業所得稅;有違反時,並適用本法及其他相關法律規定。 [24] 參考「從德國的經驗回頭看台灣可以發現:台灣雖然立意良善地將「決策者或決策地」、「帳簿及會議紀錄的製作或儲存地」,以及「實際執行主要經營活動地」,「同時」列為PEM的認定標準。然而,其中只有「決策者或決策地」確實屬於PEM認定上的必要條件;至於將「財務報表、會計帳簿紀錄、董事會議事錄或股東會議事錄的製作或儲存處所」及「實際執行主要經營活動地」也列為PEM的認定標準,恐怕就值得商榷。因為上述兩項標準,固然可以作為認定企業的PEM是否在台灣境內的「參考因素」,但卻不適合作為認定企業的PEM在台灣境內的『必要條件』」。陳衍任,〈實際管理處所在適用上的爭議問題〉,月旦會計實務研究,2018年3月,頁29以下。 [25] 2021 Taiwan White Paper Overview, 〈Facing New and Existing Challenges Head On〉, at WP7 (2021), https://amcham.com.tw/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/June-2021-Taiwan-Business-TOPICS.pdf (last visited Aug 20, 2021). [26] 作者自譯。

Research on Possible Artificial Intelligence Usage in Criminal Activities in Recent Years (2017-2018)

  Artificial Intelligence has become a worldwide center topic that attracts lots of attention in recent years. Most topics emphasize on the application of this technology and its implication to the economic of human society. Fewer emphasize on the more technical part behind this technology. Mostly the society of human emphasizes on the bright side of this technology.   However, seldom do people talk about the possible criminal usage that exploits this technology. The dark side easily slips one’s mind when one is immersed in the joy of the light. And this is the goal of this paper to reveal some of this possible danger to the public, nowadays or in the future, to the readers. I. What A.I. IS HERE: a brief history   First we will start by defining what we mean when referring to “Artificial Intelligence” in this paper.   First of all, the so-called “Artificial Intelligence” nowadays mainly refers to the “Deep Learning” algorithm invented by a group of computer scientists around 1980s, among which Geoffrey Everest Hinton is arguably the most well-known contributor. It is a kind of neural network that resembles the information processing and refinement in human brain, neurons and synapses.   However, the word A.I. , in its natural sense, contains more than just “Deep Learning” algorithm. Tracing back to 1950s, by the time when the computer was first introduced to the world, there already existed several kinds of neural networks.   These neural networks aims to bestow the machines the ability to classify, categorize a set of data. That is to give the machine the ability to make human-like reasoning to predict or to make induction concerning the attribute of a set of data.   Perceptron, as easy as it seems, was arguably the first spark of neural network. It resembled the route of coppers and wires in your calculator. However, due to its innate inability to solve problems like X-OR problem, soon it lost its appealing to the computer scientists. Scientists then turned their attention to a more mathematical way such as machine learning or statistics.   It wasn’t until 1980s and 2000s that the invention of deep learning and the advance of computing speed fostered the shift of the attention of the data scientist back to neural networks. However, the knowledge of machine learning still hold a very large share in the area of artificial intelligence nowadays.   In this sense, A.I. actually is but a illusive program or algorithm that resides in any kinds of physical hardware such as computer. And it comprises of deep learning, neural network and machine learning, as well as other types of intelligence system. In short, A.I. is a software that is not physical unless it is embedded in physical hardware.   Just like human brain, when the brain of human is damaged, we cannot make sound judgement. More worse, we might make harmful judgement that will jeopardize the society. Imagine a 70-year-old driving a car and he or she accidentally took the accelerator for the break and run into crowds. Also like human brain, when a child was taught to misbehave, he, when grown up, might duplicate his experience taught in his childhood. So is A.I.. As a machine, it can be turned into tools that facilitate our daily works, weapons that defend our land, and also tools that can be molded for criminal activities. II. Types of Criminal Activities Concerning Possible Artificial Intelligence Usage: 1. Smart Virus   Probably the first thing that comes into minds is the development of smart virus that can mutate its innate binary codes so as to slip present antivirus software detection according to its past failure experience. In this case, smart virus can gather every information concerning the combination of “failure/success of intrusion” and “the sequence of its innate codes” and figure out a way to mutate its codes. Every time it fails to attack a system, it might get smarter next time. Under the massive data fathered across the world wide internet, it might have the potential to grow into an uncontrollable smart virus.   According to a report written in Harvard Business Review [1], such smart virus can be an automatic life form which might have the potential to cause world wide catastrophe and should not be overlooked. However, ironically, it seems that the only way to defend our system from this kind of smart virus is to deploy the smart detector which consists of the same algorithm as the smart virus does.   Once a security system is breached, any possible kinds of personal information is obtainable. The devastating outcome is a self-proved chain reaction. 2. Face Cheating   An another possible kind of criminal activity concerning the usage of artificial intelligence is the face cheating.   Face Lock has been widely-used nowadays, ranging from smart phones to personal computers. There is an increase in the usage of face lock due to its convenience and presumably hard-to-cheat technology. The most widely-used neural network in this technology is the famous Convolution Neural Network. It is a kind of neural network that mimics the human vision system and retina by using max-pooling algorithm. However there are still other types of neural networks capable of the same job such as Hinton Capsule, etc..   According to a paper by Google Brain [2], “adversarial examples based on perceptible but class-preserving perturbations can fool this multiple machine learning models also fool time-limited humans. But it cannot fool time-unlimited humans. So a machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples: small changes to images can cause computer vision models to make mistakes such as identifying a school bus as an ostrich.”   Since the face detection system is sensitive to small perturbation in object-recognition. It might seem hard to cheat a face detection system with another similar yet different face.   However, just like the case in the smart virus, what makes artificial intelligence so formidable is not its ability to achieve high precision at the first try, but its ability to learn, refine, progress and evolve through numerous failure it tasted. Every failure will only make it smarter. Just like a smart virus, a cheater neural network might also adjust its original synapse and record the combination of “failure/success of intrusion” and “the mixture of the matrix of its innate synapse” and adjust the synapses to transform a fault face into a authentic face to cheat a face detection system, possibly making the targeted personal account widely available to all public faces through face perturbation and transformation.   A cheater neural network might also tunes its neurons in order to fit into the target face to cheat the face detection system. 3. Voice Cheating   An another possible kind of criminal activity concerning the usage of artificial intelligence is the voice cheating.   Just like Face Cheating, when a system is designed to be logged in by the authentic voice of the user, the same system can be fooled using similar voice that was generated using Artificial Intelligence. 4. Patrol Prediction   There is quite an unleash in the area of crime prediction using Artificial Intelligence. According to a paper in European Police Science and Research Bulletin [3], “Spatial and temporal methods appear as a very good opportunity to model criminal acts. Common sense reasoning about time and space is fundamental to understand crime activities and to predict some new occurrences. The principle is to take advantage of the past acknowledgment to understand the present and explore the future.”   In this sense, the police is able to track down possible criminal activities by predicting the possible location, time and methods of criminal activities by using Artificial Intelligence, lengthening the time of pre-action and saving the cost of unnecessary human labor.   Yet the same goes for criminal activities. The criminals is also able to track down the timing, location, and length of every patrol that the police makes. The criminal might be able to avoid certain route in order to achieve illegal deals or other types of criminal activities. Since fewer criminals use A.I. as a counter-weapon to the police, the detection system of the policy will not easily spot this outliers in criminal activities, making these criminal activities even more prone to success. If this kind of dark technology is combined with other types of modern technology such as Drone Navigation or Drone Delivery, the perpetrators might be able to sort out a safe route to complete drug deals by using Artificial Intelligence and Drone Navigation. III. A.I. Cyber Crimes and Criminal Law: Who should be responsible?   What comes out from the law goes back to the law. With these kinds of possible threats in the present days or in the future. There is foreseeably new kinds of intelligent criminal activities in the near future. What can Law react to these potential threats? Is the present law able to tackle these new problems with present legal analysis? The question requires some research.   After the Rinascimento in Europe in 17th century, it is almost certain that a civilian has its own will and should be held liable for what he did. The goal of the law to make sure this happens since a civilian has its own mind. Through punishment, the law was presumed to guarantee that a outlier can be corrected by the enforcement of the law, which is exactly the same way in which a human engineer trains a artificial intelligence system.   However, when 21th century arrives, a new question also appear. That is, can Artificial Intelligence be legally classified as subject that have mental requirement in the law, rather than just more object or tools that was manipulated by the perpetrators? This question is philosophical and can be traced back to 1950s when a Turing Test was proposed by the famous English computer scientist Alan Turing.   Some scholars proposed there could co-exist three kinds of liability. That is, solely human liability, joint human and A.I. entity liability, and solely A.I. entity liability ([4], p.95). The main criterion for these three classes is that whether a human engineer or practitioner is able to foresee the outcome of this damage. When a damage attributable to the A.I. system cannot be foreseen by human engineer, it might be solely A.I. entity liability. Under this point of view, the present criminal system is self-content to deal with A.I. entity crimes, for all we need to do is to view an A.I. system as a car or a automobile.   So from the point of view of the law, as a training system designed to re-train human in order to stabilize the social system, all we need to do is focus our attention of the act of human itself.   Yet when a super intelligence A.I. entity was developed and is not controllable and its behavior is not foreseeable by its creators, should it be classified as an entity in the criminal law?   If the answer is YES, however, it is quite meaningless to punish a machine in this circumstance. All we can do is re-train, re-tune, and re-design the intelligence system under such circumstance. For the machine, re-training itself is some kind of punishment since it was forced to receive negative information and change its innate synapse or algorithm. Yet it is arguable that whether training itself is actually a punishment since machine can feel no pain. Yet, philosophically what pain really is, is also arguable. IV. Conclusion   Across the history of human, it is almost destined that whenever a new technology is introduced to solve an old problem, a new one is to be created by the same technology. It is like a curse that we can never escape, and we can only face it. This paper finds that seldom do people talk the dark side of this new technology. Yet the potential hazard this technology can bring should not be over-looked. Ironically, this hazard that this new technology brings seems to be solvable only by the same technology itself. There might be an endless competition between the dark side and the bright side of the A.I. technology, bringing this technology into another level that surpasses our present imagination.   However, it is never the fault of this technology but the fault of human that mal-practice this technology. So what can a law do in order to crack down these kinds of possible jeopardy is going to be a major discuss in the legal area in the near future. This paper introduces some topics and hopes that it can draw more attention into this area. Reference: [1] Roman V. Yampolskiy, “AI Is the Future of Cybersecurity, for Better and for Worse”, published at: https://hbr.org/2017/05/ai-is-the-future-of-cybersecurity-for-better-and-for-worse. [2] Gamaleldin F. Elsayed, Shreya Shankar, Brian Cheung, Nicolas Papernot, Alex Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, Jascha Sohl-Dickstein, “Adversarial Examples that Fool both Computer Vision and Time-Limited Humans”, arXiv:1802.08195v3 [cs.LG], 2018. [3] Patrick Perrot, “What about AI in criminal intelligence? From predictive policing to AI perspectives”, No 16 (2017): European Police Science and Research Bulletin. [4] Gabriel Hallevy, “When Robots Kill_Artificial Intellegence under Criminal Law”, Northeastern Universoty Press, Boston, 2013. [5] Gabriel Hallevy, “Liability for Crimes Involving Artificial Intelligence Systems”, Springer International Publishing, London, 2015.

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