Introduction to Essential Data Governance and Management System(EDGS)

Introduction to Essential Data Governance and Management System(EDGS)

2022/12/30

I. Background

  Along with organizations face the industrial, social and economic level of Digital Transformation trend brought by the development of emerging technology or the occurrences of disasters or emergencies(such as COVID-19), and so on. Inducing the increasing demand for transformation of digital governance and management. Including the board of directors and the top managements’ decision making, supervision to internal audit, internal control etc. It is necessary to establish and implement the digitized management measure of content or process step by step. Strengthening the reality, integrity and full disclosure of data, in order to improve the efficiency of organizational decision making, execution, supervision and management.

  Although implementing the digitization process, brings convenience and efficacy to the organization, accompanied by risks. Digital data has characters of being easy to modify and spread. This often results in difficulty for the original version owner in proving the originator’s identity and then impacts rights protect. Additionally, when cooperating with others, the organizations may provide essential digital data to others, or receive others’ essential digital data. When data breaches or controversies occur, it is required to have measures assisting in the identification or prove the origin of the data. In order to delineate the responsibilities and enhance mutual trust.

  Essential Data Governance and Management System(hereinafter referred to as, EDGS) is a management model which is to be introduced at the discretion of each organization. Looking forward to improve the degree of the ability in organizations’ digital and governance level progressively. Starting to improve the protected process of the digital data in the first place, reinforcing the long-term preservation of validity of the essential digital data. In order to guarantee the evidence capacity and reinforce the probative value by the time litigations has been instituted or the related competent authority investigates.

II. Setting Objectives

  The purpose of EDGS is to help organizations consolidate with existing internal auditing, internal control or other management process and then implement tweaks that establish an organizations’ essential data governance and management system that meets the requirements of EDGS. In order to attain the following benefits(as shown in Figure 1 below):

a. Improve the digitalization level of governance and management in internal control, internal auditing or surveillance.

b. Improve organizations’ cooperation, trust and the chance of digital transformation.

c. Reinforce organizations to identify and manage the self-generated, provided or received external digital data.

d. Reinforce organizations’ validity of evidence presented in litigation or the inspection certification of competent authority.

Figure 1: Setting Objectives of EDGS

III. Scope of Application

  EDGS is designed to be applicable to all organizations, regardless of their type, size, and the products or services they provide. In addition, the requirement of EDGS are centered on the organizations’ essential data governance and management system process (as shown in Figure 2 below). The so-called organizations’ essential data governance and management system process refers to from the digital data process of generation, protection and maintenance to the digital evidence preservation information process of acquisition, maintenance and verification by setting management objectives in accordance with the management policies established by the organization.

Figure 2: The Conceptual Flow Chart for the Organizations’ Essential Digital Data Governance and Management System Process

IV. Process of Application

  EDGS encourages organizations to link and reinforce the existing “process management” approach and “PDCA management” cycle(as shown in Figure 3 below) in developing, implementing and improving their essential data governance and management system.

Figure 3: The “PDCA management” Cycle of EDGS

V. Table of Contents

  Chapters 0 to 4 of EDGS are the description of the system structure, scope of application, definition of terms and consideration factors; Chapters 5 to 10 are important management items.

0. Introduction
 0.1. General Description
 0.2. Target
 0.3. Process Management
 0.4. Management Cycle
 0.5. Setting Objectives
 0.6. Compatibility with other management systems
1. Scope of Application
2. Version Marking
3. Definition of Terms
 3.1 Organization
 3.2 Digital record
 3.3 Identification Technology
 3.4 Metadata
 3.5 Hash Function
 3.6 Hash Value
 3.7 Time-Stamp
4. Organization Environment
 4.1 Internal and External Issues
 4.2 Stakeholders
5. Management Responsibility of Digital Governance and Management
 5.1 Management Commitment
 5.2 Management Policy
 5.3 Management Objective Planning
 5.4 Management Accountability and Communication
6. System Planning
 6.1 Basic Requirements
 6.2 Response to Risks and Opportunities
 6.3 Change Planning
7. Support
 7.1 Resources
 7.2 Personnel
 7.3 Equipment or System Environment
 7.4 Communication Channels
8. Practice Process of Essential Digital Data Governance and Management
 8.1 Generation, Maintenance and Protection of Digital Data
 8.2 Acquisition, Maintenance and Verification of Digital Evidence Preservation Information
9 Performance Evaluation
 9.1 Basic Requirements
 9.2 Data Analysis
 9.3 Internal Audit
 9.4 Management Review
10 Improvement

For the full text of the EDGS(Chinese Version), please refer to:
https://stli.iii.org.tw/publish-detail.aspx?d=7198&no=58

※Introduction to Essential Data Governance and Management System(EDGS),STLI, https://stli.iii.org.tw/en/article-detail.aspx?no=105&tp=2&i=171&d=8924 (Date:2025/07/06)
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In the face of the crisis of the epidemic, people are willing to share their IP, know-how and experience to gain more time to fight the epidemic. The collaborative IP strategy can implement the concept of open innovation through knowledge sharing, and flexibly use various IP resources in the face of crisis. Especially in the face of a crisis like COVID-19 that has never been dealt with, the collaborative IP strategy can effectively collect the knowledge and creativity of the community. Cases of “National face mask production team” and “Face mask map” can be used as models for collaboration in the face of crisis, and even continue to be used for recovery after the epidemic.   The open innovation theory supports open, flexible and highly interactional “creative networks”.[6] At the same time, the collaborative IP strategy serves as a means to implement the open innovation theory. 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[2]Mukhisa Kituyi, COVID-19: Collaboration is the engine of global science – especially for developing countries, World Economic Forum, May 15, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/global-science-collaboration-open-source-covid-19/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2020). [3] Henry W. Chesbrough, To recover faster from Covid-19, open up: Managerial implications from an open innovation perspective, Industrial Marketing Management, Apr. 16, 2020, available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2020.04.010 (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). [4]Central News Agency, How a team of technicians is helping Taiwan triple mask production, Taiwan News, Mar. 25, 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3903970 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). [5]Keoni Everington, Taiwan platform includes over 100 apps showing mask availability in stores, Taiwan News, Feb. 27, 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3882111 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). [6]Ali Jazairy, Impact of Collaborative Innovation on IP and Future Trends in IP, Les Nouvelles, 47, 224 (2012).

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The ‘‘License to all’’ argument holds that all participants in the supply chain retain the access to the specified SEP, while the ‘‘Access to all’’ argument, on the contrary, contends that FRAND commitments don’t necessarily ask SEP holder to license to all practitioners, but when a SEP holder is going to license, he must license on FRAND terms.   According to observations, there is a common phenomenon in the SEP licensing practice—most SEP holders tend to license only to the End-Product manufacturers rather than to the manufacturers of the ‘‘Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit’’(SSPPU). What the SEP holders expect through ‘‘refusal to license’’ to the SSPPU manufacturers are to maximize the potential royalties. Cases inclusive of the Qualcomm case[1] and the Continental case[2] have shown such practical tendency, and only when the SSOs can well define the definitions of FRAND commitments might the issue be truly settled.   There are some End-Product manufacturers that consider it ‘‘discriminatory’’ and against the FRAND commitments if the SEP holders refuse to negotiate with SSPPU manufacturers requesting to be the licensee. On the other hand, some consider it inappropriate for the End-Product manufacturers to refuse all negotiations when the SEP holder requests it to be the party to the licensing negotiations[3]. III. The ‘‘refusal to license’’ and the derived Anti-Trust Issue   As generally admitted, a firm has no general duty to deal with others[4]; however, there are times when SEP holders’ ‘‘refusal to deal∕license’’ behaviors can constitute wrongful monopoly under Sherman Act section 2. 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SEP holder Qualcomm would only like to license to the cellphone OEM manufactures rather than to other chips manufacturers. [2]Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, et al, No. 20-11032 (5th Cir. 2022). SEP holder Nokia and a licensing platform—Avanci (that Nokia had joined) would only like to license to car manufacturers rather than to Telematics Control Unit(TCU)manufacturers. [3]Japan Patent Office [JPO], GUIDE TO LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS (2018), https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/support/general/sep_portal/document/index/guide-seps-en.pdf(last visited July 19, 2022). [4]See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919);Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009); Aerotec Int'l v. Honeywell Int'l, 836 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016) [5]ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 630-654 (2002). [6]See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) [7]See Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) [8]MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983)

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