> Article > Intellectual Property
Back
Previous Antitrust Liability to the Conduct of “Refusal to License” of the Standard Essential Patent Next The IP Strategy of Collaboration during COVID-19 Pandemic in Taiwan

The Dispute on WTO TRIPS IP Waiver Proposal and the Impact on Taiwan

The Dispute on WTO TRIPS IP Waiver Proposal and the Impact on Taiwan

1. IP Waiver proposal

　　On October 2, 2020, South Africa and India summit a joint proposal (IP/C/W/669) (hereinafter as “first proposal”) for TRIPS council of the World Trade Organization(WTO), titled “Waiver from Certain Provisions of the Trips Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of Covid-19”, called for temporary IP waiver of intellectual property in response for Covid-19 pandemic.

　　In first proposal, it supported a waiver from the implementation or application of Sections 1, 4, 5, and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement in relation to prevention, containment or treatment of COVID-19, which directs to copyright and related rights, industrial designs, patents and protection of undisclosed information. All enforcement measures under part III of the TRIPS agreement such as civil and administrative procedures and remedies, border measures and criminal procedures for protecting aforesaid intellectual property shall also be waived until widespread vaccination is in place globally, and the majority of the world's population has developed immunity[1].

　　On May 25, 2021, the first proposal was revised (IP/C/W/669/Rev.1, hereinafter as “second proposal”) and resubmitted for WTO by the African Group, The Plurinational State Of Bolivia, Egypt, Eswatini, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kenya, The Ldc Group, Maldives, Mozambique, Mongolia, Namibia, Pakistan, South Africa, Vanuatu, The Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela and Zimbabwe[2]. In the second proposal, the scope of IP waiver was revised to be limited to "health products and technologies" used for the prevention, treatment or containment of COVID-19, and the minimum period for IP waiver was 3 years from the date of decision.

2. The Pros and Cons of IP Waiver proposal

　　The IP waiver proposal is currently supported by over 100 WTO members. However, in order to grant the waiver, the unanimous agreement of the WTO's 159 members would be needed[3], but if no consensus is reached, the waiver might be adopted by the support of three-fourths of the WTO members[4].

　　The reason for IP waiver mainly focus on the increase of production and accessibility of the vaccines and treatments, since allowing multiple actors to start production sooner would enlarge the manufacturing capacity than concentrate the manufacturing facilities in the hands of a small number of patent holders[5]. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) also support IP waiver proposal to prevent the chilling effect of patents as hindrances of the introduction of affordable vaccines and treatment in developing countries[6], and urges wealthy countries not to block IP waiver to save lives of billions of people[7].

　　Most opponents against IP waiver proposal are rich countries such as European Union (EU), UK, Japan, Switzerland, Brazil, Norway, Canada, Australia[8]. On May 5, 2021, United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced its support the IP waiver, but only limited into vaccine[9].

　　EU was the main opponent against IP waiver proposal at the WTO[10]. On June 4, 2021, EU offered an alternative plan to replace IP waiver proposal. Specifically, EU proposed that WTO members should take multilateral trade actions to expand the production of COVID-19 vaccines and treatments, and ensure universal and fair access thereof. EU calls for WTO members to ensure that COVID-19 vaccines, treatments and their components can cross borders freely, and encourage producers to expand their production and provide vaccines with an affordable price. As to IP issues, EU encourages to facilitate the exploitation of existing compulsory licensing systems on TRIPS, especially for vaccine producers without the consent of the patent holder[11].

　　Many pharmaceutical companies also express dissent opinions against the IP waiver proposal. The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) indicated that the proposal would let unexperienced manufacturers, which are devoid of essential know-how, join into vaccine supply chains and crowd out the   established contractors[12].

　　The chief patent attorney for Johnson & Johnson pointed out that since the existing of IP rights not only promote the development of safe and effective vaccines at record-breaking speed, but also allow the IP owner to enter into agreements with appropriate partners to ensure the production and distribution of qualitied vaccines, the problem resides in infrastructure rather than IP. Thus, instead of IP waiver, boosting adequate health care infrastructure, vaccine education and medical personnel might be more essential for COVID-19 vaccines equitably and rapidly distributed[13].

　　Pfizer CEO warned that since the production of Pfizer’s vaccine would require 280 different materials and components that are sourced from 19 countries around the world, the loss of patent protection may trigger global competition for these vaccine raw materials, and thus threaten vaccine production efficiency and affect vaccine safety[14].

　　Moderna CEO said that he would not worry about the IP waiver proposal since Moderna had invested heavily in its mRNA supply chain, which did not exist before the pandemic, manufacturers who want to produce similar mRNA vaccines will need to conduct clinical trials, apply for authorization, and expand the scale of production, which may take up to 12 to 18 months[15].

3. Conclusion

　　The grant of the IP waiver proposal might need the consensus of all WTO members. However, since the proposal might not be supported by several wealth countries, which might reflect the interest of big pharmaceutical companies, reach the unanimously agreement between all WTO members might be difficult. Besides, the main purpose for IP waiver is to increase the production of vaccines and treatments. However, when patent protection was lifted, a large number of new pharmaceutical companies lacking necessary knowhow and experience would join the production, which might not only result in snapping up the already tight raw materials, but also producing uneven quality of vaccines and drugs. Since patent right is only one of the many conditions required for the production of vaccines and drugs, IP waiver might not help increase the production immediately. Thus, other possible plans, such as the alternative plan proposed by EU, might also be considered to reduce disputes and achieving the goal of increasing production.

As to the impact of the IP waiver proposal for Taiwan, it can be analyzed from two aspects:

1. Whether Taiwan need IP waiver to produce COVID-19 vaccine and drugs in need

　　Since there is an established patent compulsory licensing system in Taiwan, the manufacture and use of COVID-19 vaccine and drugs might be legally permissible. To be specific, Article 87 of Taiwan Patent Act stipulates: “In response to national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the Specific Patent Agency shall, in accordance with an emergency order or upon notice from the central government authorities in charge of the business, grant compulsory licensing of a patent needed, and notify the patentee as soon as reasonably practicable.” Thus, in response to national emergency such as COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (TIPO) could grant compulsory licensing of patents needed for prevention, containment or treatment of COVID-19, in accordance with emergency order or upon notice from the central government authorities. In fact, in 2005, in response to the avian flu outbreaks, TIPO had grant a compulsory licensing for Taiwan patent No.129988, the Tamiflu patent owned by Roche.

2. Whether IP Waiver would affect Taiwan’s pharmaceutical or medical device industry

　　In fact, there are many COVID-19 related IP open resources for innovators to exploit, such as Open COVID Pledge[16], which provides free of charge IPs for use. Even for vaccines, Modena had promised not to enforce their COVID-19 related patents against those making vaccines during COVID-19 pandemic[17]. Therefore, currently innovators in Taiwan could still obtain COVID-19 related IPs freely without overall IP Waiver. Needless to say, since many companies in Taiwan still work for the research and development of COVID-19-related medical device and drugs, sufficient IP protection could guarantee their profit and stimulate future innovation.

　　Accordingly, since Taiwan could produce COVID-19 vaccines and drugs in need domestically by existing patent compulsory licensing system, and could obtain other COVID-19 related IPs via global open IP resources, in the meantime IP protection would secure Taiwan innovator’s profit, IP waiver proposal might not result in huge impact on Taiwan.

 

[1]Waiver From Certain Provisions Of The Trips Agreement For The Prevention, Containment And Treatment Of Covid-19, WTO, Oct 2, 2020, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True (last visited July 5, 2021)

[2]Waiver From Certain Provisions Of The Trips Agreement For The Prevention, Containment And Treatment Of Covid-19 Revised Decision Text, WTO, May 25, 2021, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669R1.pdf&Open=True (last visited July 5, 2021)

[3]COVID-19 IP Waiver Supporters Splinter On What To Cover, Law360, June 30, 2021, https://www.law360.com/articles/1399245/covid-19-ip-waiver-supporters-splinter-on-what-to-cover- (last visited July 5, 2021)

[4]The Legal Framework for Waiving World Trade Organization (WTO) Obligations, Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10599 (last visited July 5, 2021)

[5]South Africa and India push for COVID-19 patents ban, The Lancet, December 5, 2020, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)32581-2/fulltext (last visited July 5, 2021)

[6]MSF supports India and South Africa ask to waive COVID-19 patent rights, MSF, Oct 7, 2020, https://www.msf.org/msf-supports-india-and-south-africa-ask-waive-coronavirus-drug-patent-rights (last visited July 5, 2021)

[7]MSF urges wealthy countries not to block COVID-19 patent waiver, MSF, Feb. 3, https://www.msf.org/msf-urges-wealthy-countries-not-block-covid-19-patent-waiver (last visited July 5, 2021)

[8]Rich countries are refusing to waive the rights on Covid vaccines as global cases hit record levels, CNBC, Apr. 22, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/22/covid-rich-countries-are-refusing-to-waive-ip-rights-on-vaccines.html (last visited July 5, 2021)

[9]Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on the Covid-19 Trips Waiver, May 5, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver (last visited July 5, 2021)

[10]TRIPS waiver: EU Council and European Commission must support equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines for all, Education International, June 9, 2021, https://www.ei-ie.org/en/item/24916:trips-waiver-eu-council-and-european-commission-must-support-equitable-access-to-covid-19-vaccines-for-all (last visited July 5, 2021)

[11]EU proposes a strong multilateral trade response to the COVID-19 pandemic, European Commission, June 21, 2021, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2272 (last visited July 5, 2021)

[12]Drugmakers say Biden misguided over vaccine patent waiver, Reuters, May 6, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/pharmaceutical-association-says-biden-move-covid-19-vaccine-patent-wrong-answer-2021-05-05/ (last visited July 5, 2021)

[13]J&J's Chief Patent Atty Says COVID IP Waiver Won't Work, Law360, Apr. 22, 2021, https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1375715?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=section (last visited July 5, 2021)

[14]Pfizer CEO opposes U.S. call to waive Covid vaccine patents, cites manufacturing and safety issues, CNBC, May 7, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/07/pfizer-ceo-biden-backed-covid-vaccine-patent-waiver-will-cause-problems.html (last visited July 5, 2021)

[15]Moderna CEO says he's not losing any sleep over Biden's support for COVID-19 vaccine waiver, Fierce Pharma, May 6, 2021, https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/moderna-ceo-says-he-s-not-losing-any-sleep-over-biden-s-endorsement-for-covid-19-ip-waiver (last visited July 5, 2021)

[16]Open Covid Pledge. https://opencovidpledge.org/ (last visited July 7, 2021)

[17]Statement by Moderna on Intellectual Property Matters during the COVID-19 Pandemic, Moderna, Oct. 8, 2020, https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-details/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during-covid-19  (last visited July 7, 2021)

Links
※The Dispute on WTO TRIPS IP Waiver Proposal and the Impact on Taiwan,STLI, https://stli.iii.org.tw/en/article-detail.aspx?no=105&tp=2&i=171&d=8704 (Date:2024/10/07)
Quote this paper

Shih, Ya-Hsun
 Legal Researcher

Release： 2021/08
Tag
Read with phone
Back
Previous Antitrust Liability to the Conduct of “Refusal to License” of the Standard Essential Patent Next The IP Strategy of Collaboration during COVID-19 Pandemic in Taiwan
You may be interested
Mainland China changes domestic regulation for game consoles

In 2000, the General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China issued “the Notice on Launching a Special Campaign against Illegal Electronic Game Rooms”(國務院辦公廳轉發文化部等部門關於開展電子遊戲經營場所專項治理意見的通知). From then on, Mainland China has strictly enforced prohibition on gaming consoles, however in December 21, 2013, “the State Council released the Comprehensive Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, the State Council’s Decision to Temporarily Adjust Relevant Administrative Laws and State Council Regulated Special Administrative Measures for Approval or Access in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone”(國務院關於在中國(上海)自由貿易試驗區內暫時調整有關行政法規和國務院文件規定的行政審批或者准入特別管理措施的決定). As a result of the thirteen year long prohibition on game consoles, the development of the game consoles market has been limited in Mainland China, while mobile phone and online games have dominated the video games market in the country. Mainland China’s lifting of the ban on game consoles will lead to a reshuffling of the gaming market, and is certainly worth a deeper look. This following article will review the evolution of the gaming regulatory policy in Mainland China over the recent years, and identifies the changes and problems that may arise during the deregulation process. The sale of game consoles has been prohibited in Mainland China since 2000 According to “The Notice on Launching a Special Campaign against Illegal Electronic Game Rooms” issued by General Office of the State Council in 2000, “companies and individuals were prohibited from the manufacture or sale of game consoles, as well as the production or sale of related accessories”. As a result, the mobile game consoles and the television game consoles both lost their legitimacy in the video game industry in Mainland China. The stated intent of the ban against video arcades was to protect the youth and ensure public order. And yet, in spite of potentially impacting youth in a similar manner, the online game sector has been listed as a key industry for development and has been strongly supported by the government. This has clearly contradicted the reason of banning the game consoles. Thus, the major console manufacturers, Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo, have been trying in various ways to enter the Chinese market, and have called on the Mainland China government to open their domestic market for the sale of game consoles. Announcement of reopening the sale of game consoles in China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone in 2013. After thirteen long years, the State Council issued the “the Comprehensive Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone”, permitting foreign enterprises to produce and sell game equipment in the Free Trade Zone. Five days later, Blockbuster that under Shanghai Media Group announced a cooperation with Microsoft in a joint venture company within the Free Trade Zone, claiming their main business as " design, development, production games, entertainment applications and derivative products; sales, licensing, marketing and production for third-party games and entertainment applications software; technical advice and services related to video games ". In December 21, 2013, “the State Council released the Comprehensive Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, the State Council’s Decision to Temporarily Adjust Relevant Administrative Laws and State Council Regulated Special Administrative Measures for Approval or Access in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone”, officially lifted the prohibition on game consoles in the Free Trade Zone, and also opened the gates to investors. Potential problems facing China’s game consoles market As the case study above describes, Microsoft chose to enter the Mainland China market through a joint venture, the main reason being that foreign investment in entities engaged in internet data operations is still prohibited in China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone. Thus, Microsoft will need to rely heavily on Blockbuster for the data operation and set-top box business license, which was the main subject as the Internet service content provider. In addition, apart from the joint venture between Blockbuster and Microsoft, there are two other companies in the industry: Sony and Nintendo, which retain a large part of the game consoles market, but have not taken action at the moment. These two companies have a pivotal position in the game consoles industry, and therefore it is predicted they will likely follow the Blockbuster and Microsoft example to look for a license holder vendor as a way to enter the mainland China market. On the other hand, at the end of June 2014 the updated announcement regarding the China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone “negative list”, still clearly stated that foreign enterprises in the Free Trade Zone are “prohibited from direct or indirect participation in online game operations and services”. Due to the trend among game consoles towards online connectivity, the classification of related games as online games, and prohibition of foreign enterprises from entering this space, domestic game developers have enjoyed a safe monopoly over the industry in Mainland China. But if the industry is not restricted under the scope of foreign operation of online games, and foreign enterprises may be allowed involvement in the management of their operations directly or indirectly, “fully localized” online game industry in Mainland China may be challenged in a noticeable way. In addition, although Mainland China has begun to loosen control over game consoles, the publication of electronic publications licensed by a foreign copyright owner (including online gaming works) will be determined under the General Administration of Press and Publication (新聞出版廣電總局). An enterprise who wishes to enter the Mainland China market has to create content which is able to pass a content review, at the same time maintaining the original integrity of the game. Moreover, consumers in Mainland China have long been accustomed to "cheap" or "free" Internet games, so are they going to change their behavior and be willing to pay for their games? These are big obstacles to be overcome by the industry.

 The Introduction to the Trade Secret Management System Standard

The Introduction to the Trade Secret Management System Standard 2024/02/06 The “Trade Secret Management System”, released by the Science & Technology Law Institute of Institute for Information Industry on March 1, 2023, is a standard to guide organizations developing a systematic trade secret management system in alignment with relevant regulations and their operation objectives. Its aim is to assist the organizations reducing the risks of trade secret leakage while improving organizational competitive advantages. The Trade Secret Management System standard provides a framework for organizations to design, implement, and continuously improve their trade secret management performance. As defined in Article 2 of the Trade Secrets Act, "trade secret" could be any method, technique, process, formula, program, design, or other information that may be used in the course of production, sales, or operations, meeting following requirements: 1. It is not known to persons generally involved in the information of this type; 2. It has economic value, actual or potential, due to its secretive nature; and 3. Its owner has taken reasonable measures to maintain its secrecy. The Trade Secret Management System standard comprises a total of 10 chapters. The following is a brief overview of each chapter: Chapter 1: This chapter indicates the standard is applicable to all organizations regardless of their types, sizes, and the products or services they provide. It mentions that the organization can determine their management approached to meet the requirements of the standard. Chapter 2: This chapter provides the definitions of specific terms used in the standard. Chapter 3: This chapter introduces the top management’s responsibility to ensure the establishment, continuous appropriateness, completeness, and effectiveness of the trade secret management system. Chapter 4: This chapter requires the organization to define the scope of its trade secrets and ensure the defined trade secrets can be identified. This chapter also requires organization set up the permission to restrict access to personnel who need to know or use the trade secrets. Chapter 5: This chapter introduces the organization shall control the use of trade secrets, including actions such as copying, destruction, etc. Additionally, organization shall preserve the records of the aforementioned use of trade secrets and detect if any abnormal usage exists. Chapter 6: This chapter discusses measures the organization shall take for internal personnel control. These measures include regular training on trade secret-related requirements, signing of confidentiality agreements, and various management actions the organization should take throughout the processes of personnel recruitment, employment, and departure. Chapter 7: This chapter demonstrates the organization’s management of environments, equipment and internet involving its trade secrets. It requires the implementation of access control measures for places where trade secrets are stored or processed. It also stipulates controls on the use of record media and devices which can access trade secrets, as well as controlling the transmission of trade secrets via network. Chapter 8: This chapter introduces the management measures the organization shall take when interacting with other parties. These measures include signing non-disclosure agreement (NDAs) with the party who will access trade secrets and requiring such party not to hold the trade secrets once the corporation ends. Chapter 9: This chapter introduces that the organization shall establish a trade secret dispute resolution procedure to prevent or mitigate damages to the organization caused by disputes. Chapter10: This chapter outlines the supervision and the improvement of the trade secret management system of the organization. Organizations can follow the standard to build their own trade secret management system based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) concept. The trade secret management system would include defining trade secrets to be managed, establishing protocols for the use of trade secrets, managing employees, controlling of internet, devices and environment related to trade secrets, regulating external activities, developing trade secret dispute resolution procedure, and regularly monitoring the effectiveness to improve trade secret management performance. This standard could serve as a benchmark for the organization or third parties to evaluate compliance with expected trade secret managements.

Introduction to Essential Data Governance and Management System(EDGS)

Introduction to Essential Data Governance and Management System(EDGS) 2022/12/30 I. Background 　　Along with organizations face the industrial, social and economic level of Digital Transformation trend brought by the development of emerging technology or the occurrences of disasters or emergencies(such as COVID-19), and so on. Inducing the increasing demand for transformation of digital governance and management. Including the board of directors and the top managements’ decision making, supervision to internal audit, internal control etc. It is necessary to establish and implement the digitized management measure of content or process step by step. Strengthening the reality, integrity and full disclosure of data, in order to improve the efficiency of organizational decision making, execution, supervision and management. 　　Although implementing the digitization process, brings convenience and efficacy to the organization, accompanied by risks. Digital data has characters of being easy to modify and spread. This often results in difficulty for the original version owner in proving the originator’s identity and then impacts rights protect. Additionally, when cooperating with others, the organizations may provide essential digital data to others, or receive others’ essential digital data. When data breaches or controversies occur, it is required to have measures assisting in the identification or prove the origin of the data. In order to delineate the responsibilities and enhance mutual trust. 　　Essential Data Governance and Management System(hereinafter referred to as, EDGS) is a management model which is to be introduced at the discretion of each organization. Looking forward to improve the degree of the ability in organizations’ digital and governance level progressively. Starting to improve the protected process of the digital data in the first place, reinforcing the long-term preservation of validity of the essential digital data. In order to guarantee the evidence capacity and reinforce the probative value by the time litigations has been instituted or the related competent authority investigates. II. Setting Objectives 　　The purpose of EDGS is to help organizations consolidate with existing internal auditing, internal control or other management process and then implement tweaks that establish an organizations’ essential data governance and management system that meets the requirements of EDGS. In order to attain the following benefits(as shown in Figure 1 below): a. Improve the digitalization level of governance and management in internal control, internal auditing or surveillance. b. Improve organizations’ cooperation, trust and the chance of digital transformation. c. Reinforce organizations to identify and manage the self-generated, provided or received external digital data. d. Reinforce organizations’ validity of evidence presented in litigation or the inspection certification of competent authority. Figure 1: Setting Objectives of EDGS III. Scope of Application 　　EDGS is designed to be applicable to all organizations, regardless of their type, size, and the products or services they provide. In addition, the requirement of EDGS are centered on the organizations’ essential data governance and management system process (as shown in Figure 2 below). The so-called organizations’ essential data governance and management system process refers to from the digital data process of generation, protection and maintenance to the digital evidence preservation information process of acquisition, maintenance and verification by setting management objectives in accordance with the management policies established by the organization. Figure 2: The Conceptual Flow Chart for the Organizations’ Essential Digital Data Governance and Management System Process IV. Process of Application 　　EDGS encourages organizations to link and reinforce the existing “process management” approach and “PDCA management” cycle(as shown in Figure 3 below) in developing, implementing and improving their essential data governance and management system. Figure 3: The “PDCA management” Cycle of EDGS V. Table of Contents 　　Chapters 0 to 4 of EDGS are the description of the system structure, scope of application, definition of terms and consideration factors; Chapters 5 to 10 are important management items. 0. Introduction 　0.1. General Description 　0.2. Target 　0.3. Process Management 　0.4. Management Cycle 　0.5. Setting Objectives 　0.6. Compatibility with other management systems 1. Scope of Application 2. Version Marking 3. Definition of Terms 　3.1 Organization 　3.2 Digital record 　3.3 Identification Technology 　3.4 Metadata 　3.5 Hash Function 　3.6 Hash Value 　3.7 Time-Stamp 4. Organization Environment 　4.1 Internal and External Issues 　4.2 Stakeholders 5. Management Responsibility of Digital Governance and Management 　5.1 Management Commitment 　5.2 Management Policy 　5.3 Management Objective Planning 　5.4 Management Accountability and Communication 6. System Planning 　6.1 Basic Requirements 　6.2 Response to Risks and Opportunities 　6.3 Change Planning 7. Support 　7.1 Resources 　7.2 Personnel 　7.3 Equipment or System Environment 　7.4 Communication Channels 8. Practice Process of Essential Digital Data Governance and Management 　8.1 Generation, Maintenance and Protection of Digital Data 　8.2 Acquisition, Maintenance and Verification of Digital Evidence Preservation Information 9 Performance Evaluation 　9.1 Basic Requirements 　9.2 Data Analysis 　9.3 Internal Audit 　9.4 Management Review 10 Improvement For the full text of the EDGS(Chinese Version), please refer to： https://stli.iii.org.tw/publish-detail.aspx?d=7198&no=58

Antitrust Liability to the Conduct of “Refusal to License” of the Standard Essential Patent

Antitrust Liability to the Conduct of “Refusal to License” of the Standard Essential Patent 2022/07/19 　　The notion of Standard Essential Patent（SEP）emerges in the era when manufacturers seek ‘‘compatibility’’ and ‘‘interoperability’’ of their products. The concept of SEPs is proposed to help manufacturers ‘‘talk’’ to each other so the collective manufacturers enjoy the advantage of economies of scales. Meanwhile, the compatibility and interoperability derived from SEPs enhance the consumers’ valuation of the product which creates the ‘‘network effect’’ of the products. 　　There is a long-debated issue in the field of SEP—to what extent shall the SEP holders license their patents in the various level of the supply chain. This issue has much to do with the ‘‘FRAND commitment’’, and is worthy of further analysis. I. SEP and FRAND Commitment 　　The concept of SEP is—when any certain patented technology is selected by the ‘‘Standard Setting Organization’’（SSO）as the commonly used standard, such the patented technology is categorized as a SEP. The SEP holder therefore enjoys stronger ‘‘market power’’ because market participants have no choice but to use the SEP and are required to seek license from the SEP holders. 　　Therefore, to prevent the SEP holders from abusing their market power, SSOs usually require SEP holders to make the FRAND commitment; that is, to license on ‘‘fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory’’ terms. Once the SEP holder breaches the commitment, the SSOs might exclude that technique from the standard. II. “License to all”or“Access to all”issues under FRAND Commitment 　　The FRAND commitment, by textual reading incorporates the wording of ‘‘non-discriminatory’’, and can infer two co-related yet debatable concepts—the ‘‘License to all’’ or ‘‘Access to all’’ arguments. 　　The ‘‘License to all’’ argument holds that all participants in the supply chain retain the access to the specified SEP, while the ‘‘Access to all’’ argument, on the contrary, contends that FRAND commitments don’t necessarily ask SEP holder to license to all practitioners, but when a SEP holder is going to license, he must license on FRAND terms. 　　According to observations, there is a common phenomenon in the SEP licensing practice—most SEP holders tend to license only to the End-Product manufacturers rather than to the manufacturers of the ‘‘Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit’’（SSPPU）. What the SEP holders expect through ‘‘refusal to license’’ to the SSPPU manufacturers are to maximize the potential royalties. Cases inclusive of the Qualcomm case[1] and the Continental case[2] have shown such practical tendency, and only when the SSOs can well define the definitions of FRAND commitments might the issue be truly settled. 　　There are some End-Product manufacturers that consider it ‘‘discriminatory’’ and against the FRAND commitments if the SEP holders refuse to negotiate with SSPPU manufacturers requesting to be the licensee. On the other hand, some consider it inappropriate for the End-Product manufacturers to refuse all negotiations when the SEP holder requests it to be the party to the licensing negotiations[3]. III. The ‘‘refusal to license’’ and the derived Anti-Trust Issue 　　As generally admitted, a firm has no general duty to deal with others[4]; however, there are times when SEP holders’ ‘‘refusal to deal∕license’’ behaviors can constitute wrongful monopoly under Sherman Act section 2. The U.S. judicial practices have categorized three main ‘‘refusal to deal∕license’’ behaviors as wrongful monopoly under Sherman Act section 2; they are[5]: 1.dominant firm forces its customers not to do business with new competitors of that firm, or the dominant firm will terminate business with the customer[6]; 2.dominant firm tries to abandon or alter an existing relationship[7]; 3.dominant firm refuses to provide access to ‘‘essential facility’’ (the equipment or techniques that is indispensable when others would like to compete in the relevant market with the dominant firm). 　　As SEP can be categorized as an ‘‘essential facility’’, this paper will only focus on the third category. The ‘‘Essential Facility Doctrine’’ is—when any monopolist withholds an essential facility and refuses to provide his competitors with the access to the said essential facility, a wrongful monopoly due to the Facility holders’ ‘‘refusal to deal∕license’’ is constituted. 　　According to the leading case—the MCI case[8], four factors are to be proved by the plaintiff when seeking resort to ‘‘Essential Facility Doctrine’’; they are:（1）the monopolist’s control of an essential facility;（2）the inability of a competitor to duplicate that essential facility;（3）the monopolist’s denial of access to that essential facility to a competitor;（4）the feasibility of providing the essential facility to the competitor by the monopolist. 　　As we can shortly conclude here, if a SEP holder constitute wrongful monopoly because of his ‘‘refusal to license’’ behavior, the perquisite is that the SEP holder would like to join in the ‘‘competition’’ in the relevant market himself. IV. Conclusion—the commonly seen ‘‘refusal to license’’ behavior of SEP holders doesn’t constitute wrongful monopoly 　　As mentioned before, ‘‘competition’’ serves as the prerequisite for the ‘‘Essential Facility Doctrine’’; thus, some SEP holders’ refusal to license to SSPPU manufacturers behaviors—such as Qualcomm in the Qualcomm case and Nokia in the Continental case—are not in accordance with ‘‘Essential Facility Doctrine’’ and do not constitute wrongful monopoly. Qualcomm and Nokia chose not to license to SSPPU manufacturers merely because they want to earn more royalties by licensing to End-Product manufacturers; they didn’t make this choice because themselves would like to compete in the SSPPU markets. However, since there is no clear definition of FRAND yet, whether the SEP holders have truly breached the FRAND commitment remains unsolved puzzle and shall retain to SSO’s clearer definition and the Court’s further rulings. [1]FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020). SEP holder Qualcomm would only like to license to the cellphone OEM manufactures rather than to other chips manufacturers. [2]Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, et al, No. 20-11032 (5th Cir. 2022). SEP holder Nokia and a licensing platform—Avanci (that Nokia had joined) would only like to license to car manufacturers rather than to Telematics Control Unit（TCU）manufacturers. [3]Japan Patent Office [JPO], GUIDE TO LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS (2018), https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/support/general/sep_portal/document/index/guide-seps-en.pdf(last visited July 19, 2022). [4]See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919);Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009); Aerotec Int'l v. Honeywell Int'l, 836 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016) [5]ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 630-654 (2002). [6]See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) [7]See Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) [8]MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983)

Most read
[　X Close　]
Copyright © 2016 STLI,III. All Rights Reserved.
TOP